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

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Editor's Note

To many, the study of history may seem to be filled solely with descriptions of endless facts and the tedious memorization of significant dates. In a time of monumental technological advancements, prompting a growing dependence on the usage of large language models, the role of the historian, as many may perceive it, might therefore seem to be steadily slipping away.

While pursuing my degree in history at UCLA, I have realized how this perception of the subject is far from true, and I have also recognized, first-hand, the weight of the historian's responsibility both within academia and broader society. The study proves itself to be anything other than straightforward, and it is clear that historians function as so much more than merely its scribe. Instead, by nature, history is inherently confusing and even contradictory; convoluted records, documents, and accounts often result in conflicting facts and dates, and the lack thereof can mean entire cultures, rich traditions, or vital narratives risk becoming lost in time. Consequently, it is up to the historian to examine all available accounts, reconstruct descriptions, and synthesize narratives to preserve and recount historical data.

Not only is their work in the conservation of information absolutely necessary, but—as a result of historians' responsibilities regarding their methods of interpretation—it is also deeply consequential. The limitless angles through which one can approach or examine any moment in time display the ever-evolving and ever-progressing role of history within society. Therefore, it is essential for the historian to be highly cognizant of the narrative they maintain and the lens they choose to highlight. And the most monumental, consequential pieces of historical work are often those that unveil and consider novel perspectives, constantly perpetuating the evolution and expansion of knowledge regarding the study.

The papers offered in this year's edition of *Quaestio* are each entirely unique; yet, they all are grounded in the reanalysis and reinterpretation of popular history, scrutinized by decades or even centuries of historians before them, through fresh perspectives. Most crucially, the true value of the historian, as well as their responsibility, is wholly represented within these works. The passion, commitment, and curiosity of each of these authors is evident within their narratives, and it is my hope that through reading their papers, you will not only recognize how their care and devotion to proper storytelling is what makes the historian's job indispensable, but that they will also inspire you to embrace that same enthusiasm and dedication they embody within your own passions in life.

Ellie Friederich
Editor-in-Chief

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Bureaucrats and *Barakat*:
The Sociopolitical Relationship between the Naqshbandī Sufi Saint and the Mughal State in the Mughal Deccan during the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

By Katie Adamick

Sufi saints, or *awliya*, are influential mystics of Islam, revered for their piety and spiritual power, which can manifest in the form of miracles (*karamat*), blessings (*barakat*), or divine knowledge. Throughout the Islamic world, these saints are typically celebrated locally, with shrines and lodges acting as important centers of spiritual and community gathering. As illustrated in hagiographical texts, the relationship between the *awliya* and the politically powerful depends on when and where the saint is situated. While some leaders have been threatened by the popularity and social influence of the saints, others have actively sought their blessings and divine favor. Drawing from historian Simon Digby's translation of *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, this paper specifically focuses on the relationship between the Mughal government and two Naqshbandī Sufi saints living in Awrangzeb's Awrangabad in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With a special focus on the lives and experiences of Bābā Shāh Musāfir and Bābā Sa'īd Palangpōsh, this study asserts a mutually beneficial relationship between the politically powerful Mughals and the Sufi saints vis-á-vis economic, social, and political exchanges.

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While some conceptualize Sufism as a marginal sector of Islam, the practice has greatly impacted political and spiritual spheres throughout the history of the Islamic world. A mystical form of Islam, Sufism focuses on the cultivation of a direct, personal relationship with *Allah*, often through prayer, chanting, or meditation, also known as *dikhr*. Considered to be "friends of God," Sufi *wali*, or saints, are incredibly important figures in Sufism and can act as *pirs*, or religious guides. Due to the saint's spiritual power and influential social status in the community, the relationship between the Sufi saint and the government under which they live can be quite complex and varied across the Islamic world. Focusing on this relationship in Mughal India under Emperor Awrangzeb, the Sufi saint and the Mughal state have a mutually beneficial dynamic, with both parties helping the other achieve their respective goals. For the Sufi saints, these goals consisted of charitable contributions to the community and the expansion of religious spaces. For the Mughal state, these goals were to solidify their legitimacy as a relatively new political state and to protect the empire's territory through military endeavors. Thus, in Awrangabad during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the unique relationship between the Sufi saint and the Mughal government was socially and politically reciprocal, involving the exchange of currency and political support for saintly intercession and spiritual guidance. The complexities of this dynamic are exemplified most notably in the fiscal exchanges surrounding saintly miracles and religious institutions, as well as within the social implications of saintly influence. The depiction of this relationship in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya* is especially unique because it involves the shared cultural heritage between the saints and the Mughals, as well as a continuing legacy of Muslim identity and influence in the Deccan.

Simon Digby's *Sufis and Soldiers in Awrangzeb's Deccan* is a translation of *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*. Despite what its title may suggest, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya* is not a *malfúẓ*, or a recording of conversations with a Sufi saint. Rather, the text is categorized as a *tadhkira*, which is a compilation of biographical anecdotes.[1] *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya* was most likely written after 1733, as this was the latest date mentioned in the text. However, it must have

[1] Mahmūd, Bābā Shāh, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, in *Sufis and Soldiers in Awrangzeb's Deccan*, translated and introduction by Simon Digby (Oxford University Press, 2001), 2.

been written before 1762, as this was the year that its author, Bābā Shāh Mahmūd, died. Bābā Shāh Mahmūd, also self-referentially called "the faqír Māhmūd" in the text, was the chosen successor of Bābā Shāh Musāfir. Throughout the text, Bābā Mahmūd draws upon anecdotes from other friends and followers of Bābā Musāfir, such as fellow disciple Hajjí Ashúr. Referencing these accounts, Bābā Mahmūd chronicles the life stories of Bābā Mahmūd and one of his disciples, Baba Palangposh.

Understanding *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*

Introducing Bābā Palanposh and Bābā Musāfir

Two saints, Bābā Sa'īd Palangpōsh (1612-1699) and Bābā Muḥammad Musāfir (1635-1715), are the focus of *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*.[2] These two saints have a personal and spiritual relationship with each other: Bābā Musāfir was the disciple of Baba Palangposh. Throughout the hagiography, Bābā Mahmūd refers to Bābā Musāfir as "*Hazrat*," a title denoting profound respect for Bābā Musāfir's religious piety and influence. Bābā Mahmūd's immense respect and devotion to his *shaykh* (spiritual master), Bābā Musāfir, is evident in his reverent diction and emphasis on Bābā Musāfir's miraculous and charitable acts. As described in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqsybandiyya*, Bābā Musāfir's lifestyle aligns more closely with the traditional conceptions of Sufi piety, as he embodied asceticism and lived as a *faqīr* (Muslim ascetic). He founded a *takya* (Sufi lodge) in Awranagabad in 1682 and spent the last thirty-three years of his life serving at the *takya*.[3]

Throughout *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, Bābā Mahmūd shows similar admiration for Bābā Musāfir's *shaykh*, Bābā Palangposh, as he emphasizes anecdotes of Bābā Palangposh's miraculous work with both the Mughal army and in the community. For sixteen years, Bābā Palangposh served as a spiritual *pīr* to the army of Mughal general Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān Féroz Jang. Bābā Mahmūd asserts that the successes of Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān's army can be accredited to "Bábá Palangposh's spiritual aid." In this role, many of Bābā Palangposh's

[2] Simon Digby, *The Life and Works of Simon Digby,* Volume VIII, *Sufis and Soldiers in Awrangzeb's Deccan II A Historian's Handbook to the Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya of* Bābā *Shāh Mahmud Awrang*ābād*i.* 7-8.

[3] Digby, *The Life and Works of Simon Digby*, 7-8.

miracles, such as saving soldiers from captivity and protecting the forces from natural disasters, served to protect the army. Notably, the hagiography refers to the Mughal army as "the army of Islám," fighting against armies of "unbelievers."[4] As the spiritual protector of "the army of Islám," Bābā Palangposh is thus aiding in the protection and success of this divinely favored military force in their *jihad* for the protection of the Muslim Mughal state. Despite their differing roles in the community, Bābā Palangposh and Bābā Musāfir share qualities of piety, religious devotion, and dedication to the cultivation of Islam.

Contextualizing Bābā Palanposh and Bābā Musāfir

Both Bābā Palangposh and Bābā Musāfir migrated from Ghajdvan, Transoxania (present-day lower Central Asia) to the Mughal Deccan, following a similar path of migration to many other Sufi mystics during the seventeenth century. After Mughal emperor Humāyūn's reconquest of Delhi in 1555, migration from Central Asia to Mughal India increased across social classes, from soldiers to artists to Sufi saints. Travelers were enticed by the wealth and employment opportunities available in the Mughal Empire, and this mass migration was facilitated by diplomatic and cultural ties between the regions.[5] The influential presence of the Naqshbandī Sufis in Mughal India is largely credited to the migration of Khwāja Bāqī Billah and his disciple Shaykh Ahmad from Central Asia in the late sixteenth century.[6] More descendants of the Naqshbandī khwājas continued to migrate to Mughal India in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, establishing relationships with the Mughal court.[7] The mass migration of Naqshbandī Sufis from Central Asia to India during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries led to the influential presence of the Naqshbandī order in the Mughal Empire, as well as subsequently contributing to the influential relationship between the Naqshbandī Sufis and the Mughal state.

[4] Mahmūd, *Malfūzāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 57, 71.

[5] Digby, *The Life and Works of Simon Digby*, 34-35.

[6] Richard Foltz, "The Central Asian Naqshbandī Connections of the Mughal Emperors.," *Journal of Islamic Studies* 7, no. 2, 1996, 229-230; Digby, *The Life and Works of Simon Digby*, 35.

[7] Digby, *The Life and Works of Simon Digby*, 35-36.

The Naqshbandī Sufis and the Mughal Empire

A Story of Shared Origins

A key element of the relationship between the Mughal state and the Naqshbandī Sufi saints is their shared heritage and ideologies. The Mughal Empire was a Timurid dynasty, descending from the Chaghtahtai Turkish military leader Tamerlane, or Timur.[8] Hailing from Central Asia, Zaheerudin Babur (d. 1530) founded the Mughal Empire after conquering Northern India and defeating the Lodis in 1526. The Mughal Empire enjoyed relative political stability and prosperity under the succeeding five emperors. However, the empire began to decline during the reign of Muhiyuddin Muhammad Awrangzeb, and the kingdom eventually dissolved in 1857.[9] Due to their shared origins in Central Asia, the Mughals had an influential, enduring association with the Naqshbandī Sufis. In what historian Nile Green calls "the overlapping of saintly and political geographies," the shared geographic, cultural, and religious heritage between the Sufis and the Mughals helped foster a closer relationship between the Mughal Deccan and Central Asia.[10] This close relationship would help facilitate the migration of Sufis from Central Asia to Mughal India as well as establish the foundation for the relationships between the Sufi saints and Mughal political leaders. For example, Babur had a close personal connection with a Naqshbandī Sufi, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn 'Ubaydullah Aḥrār (d. 1490), long before Babur conquered North India and established his empire. This key relationship proves an enduring connection between the Naqshbandī Sufis and the Mughals, being created long before the establishment of the Mughal Empire.[11] Furthermore, the existence of this relationship before Babur's conquest of North India indicates the role of shared geographic origins in facilitating the long-lasting association between the Naqshbandī Sufis and the Mughals.

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[8] Foltz, "The Central Asian Naqshbandī Connections," 229.

[9] Muhammad Munir, "The Administration of Justice in the Reign of Akbar and Awrangzeb: An Overview," *Journal of Social Sciences* 5, no. 1, 2012, 2-3.

[10] Nile Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century: Saints, Books, and Empires in the Muslim Deccan*, London; New York; Routledge, 2006, 31.

[11] Foltz, "The Central Asian Naqshbandī Connections," 229.

The Role of the Sufi Saint in Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya

To best understand the relationship between the Mughal state and Sufi saints Bābā Palangposh and Bābā Musāfir, it is crucial to examine the social role of the Sufi saint, as described in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*. Within the community, Bābā Mahmūd situates the saint as an intermediary between the people and God, quoting a conversation with Bābā Musāfir. Bābā Musāfir describes the role of the saint as the following: "'For the hearts of the Men of God are a place of the vision of God. Whensoever such a person obtains a place/for himself/in the hearts of these/Men of God/by sincere service and firm belief, it is as if he has entered into the visions of God.'"[12] In this way, gaining favor with a saint consequently allows one to gain favor with God. Aligning with Bābā Musāfir's definition of the saint's role, Green defines the status of the Sufi saints as "embodied sources of divine power and blessing."[13] The role of the saint as an intermediary of God to the material world therefore helps explain the relationship between the Mughal state and the Sufi saint. Even though influential government figures would have superior political, economic, and military power in the physical realm, the saint has access to a relationship that the political elite deeply desire, but cannot access on their own. Thus, despite their authority, the politically powerful Mughals would depend upon the saints to assist them in fostering a positive relationship with God. The Mughals would desire this relationship not only to improve their chances of salvation, but also for divine protection and assistance in the material world, as exemplified by the aforementioned role of Bābā Palangposh in protecting Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān's army. Therefore, winning the favor of a saint would have rewards in the material world, in addition to spiritual benefits. In these ways, the role of the saint as an intermediary between humanity and God explains the importance of the relationship between the saint and the politically powerful Mughals, developing a reciprocal dynamic.

[12]Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 120.

[13] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 51.

Fostering the Saint's Goodwill

Considering the possible military and political benefits accompanying a positive relationship with a saint, it is key to clarify exactly how the Mughal leader could "obtain a place for himself in the hearts of these Men of God." From *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, an essential element of fostering this bond is through religious devotion and faithful practices. This devotion manifests as sincere demonstrations of faith to the saint, such as trusting the saint's divine knowledge and expressing respect towards the saint. An example of such a demonstration of faith can be seen in an interaction between Bābā Palangposh and the Mughal emperor Awrangzeb. In this anecdote, Awrangzeb is struggling in a military conflict against rebelling Afghans. Bābā Palangposh has a dream about the battle between the Afghan rebels and Awrangzeb's forces, and is instructed to tell Awrangzeb that "the Pure Spirits [of the Naqshbandí kwhájas] are his helpers and his aiders." Awrangzeb accepts Bābā Palangposh's wisdom and proceeds to win the battle. Awrangzeb is incredibly grateful to Bābā Palangposh, presenting him with an offering of one thousand rupees and asking for further aid.[14] This exchange indicates Awrangzeb's deep respect for the divine and his sincere appreciation for the power of the Sufi saints. By heeding the saint's wisdom, Awrangzeb won the battle, despite his initial struggles. Furthermore, by expressing respect and gratitude in return, Awrganzeb established a lasting relationship with Bābā Palangposh and continued to reap the benefits of Bābā Palangposh's spiritual support.

In *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, another key element of earning a saint's goodwill is by upholding moral standards of "the sacred Law" as prescribed by the Qur'an and the Sunna. Throughout the hagiography, Bābā Mahmūd emphasizes Bābā Musāfir's strict attitude against the consumption of tobacco, cannabis, or alcohol. Bābā Mahmūd recounted the story of Qilich Beg, a young man from Baluch who drunkenly sought out Bābā Musāfir in the mosque. Bābā Musāfir angrily instructed Qilich Beg to return home, and a few days later, Qilich Beg died. As explained by Bābā Mahmūd, "on account of his [Qilich Beg's]

[14] Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 57.

impoliteness towards Hazrat, he attained his deserts and died in his youth."[15] This story is a harrowing depiction of the fate of *takya* patrons who fail to abide by the ethical code of the Sufi saint. Such immoral behavior is considered gravely disrespectful, and will thus be punished by the saint and by God. Conversely, upholding the morals and behavioral standards of Sharia is considered a minimum requirement to obtain and sustain the saint's favor.

A third crucial element of securing the saint's favor is through the presentation of *nadhr*, a financial offering, to the saint. Throughout *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, there is a strong emphasis on *nadhr* in exchange for the saint "turning his attention" to the patron, or providing miracles and religious intercession. Out of the three discussed components, the presentation of *nadhr* to the saint is the most emphasized element in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*. Across the compiled anecdotes, *nadhr* is typically money (rupees) but may also take the form of livestock. In return for these offerings, the saints provide *barakat*, or saintly blessings, which may take the form of healing, protection, or the removal of obstacles. The exchange of money for saintly intercession seems to be an exchange of currency on both sides. In a conversation with Bābā Musāfir, Bābā Palangposh states that "'I [Bābā Palangposh] do not take *nadhr* from anyone for nothing.'"[16] In other words, Bābā Palangposh does not demand or accept *nadhr* unless he foresees that his intercession is or will soon be necessary. As such, through the exchange of *nadhr*, the patron is giving a fiscal contribution in exchange for some kind of religious service. This is a critical point because it demonstrates a relationship of economic reciprocity and suggests the commodification of such spiritual favors.

The Economic Relationship Between Sufi Saints and the Mughal Empire

The Exchange of Nadhr for Barakat

These financial offerings of *nadhr* are key to understanding the economically reciprocal relationship between the saint and the Mughal government, as depicted in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*. In order to win a saint's favor, members of the Mughal stately

[15] Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 159.
[16] Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 88.

apparatus, such as soldiers, military leaders, and political elite, would contribute material offerings to the saints. In the *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, the most common example of such an interaction would be between Bābā Palangposh and the Mughal military, specifically Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān's forces. In his role as a spiritual *pīr*, Bābā Palangposh frequently demanded and received *nadhr* from Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān and the Mughal soldiers in exchange for protection in battle. For instance, Bābā Palangposh warned Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān that "the Hand of the Unseen" helps the enemy forces and recommended that Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān "'give a nadhr for God's sake, so that the calamity may be lifted!'"[17] While some of his soldiers paid *nadhr* for their own protection, Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān ignored Bābā Palangposh's advice and failed to offer the demanded *nadhr,* unlike previous exchanges. As a result, Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān lost the conflict and the lives of 10,000 soldiers. Notably, the soldiers who offered the *nadhr* were spared. This anecdote emphasizes the importance of presenting *nadhr* when demanded. The saints may have had a divine insight into future calamities that would befall the patron, and thus foresee that their protection and intercession would soon be necessary. In this way, this story also underscores the superior divine power of the saint, compared to the powerful political leader. Despite Ghāzī al-Dīn Khān's military prowess and intellect, he did not have Bābā Palangposh's saintly powers, such as the ability to predict the future. By emphasizing the unique powers of the saint, this story underscores the value and importance of the Sufi saint in aiding the politically powerful.

The Uses of Nadhr for Charitable Endeavors

With many Sufi saints upholding principles of asceticism, one may wonder how the saints used the money that they earned from these spiritual favors. Across Sufi orders, many saints have embodied holy poverty by renouncing material wealth, which they instead invest in shrine infrastructure or redistribute to members of their community. Indeed, as prescribed by Khwāja Bāqī Billah, one of the Naqshbandī principles is *qan*ʻ*at*, or resignation from

[17] Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 88.

worldly desires.[18] As explained in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, Bābā Musāfir lived in holy poverty, and thus did not have any material possessions or income of his own. Rather, all of the money he obtained went to the maintenance of the *takya* or to providing for the poor. He said "'a faqīr should not own anything. If God…sends something from somewhere, he should spend it immediately. If anything remains, it is the custom of a faqīr not to keep it with him.'"[19] As frequently described in *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, Bābā Musāfir was especially generous in distributing the money he received to the community, such as providing allowances of money and resources to orphans and widows.[20] Similarly, Bābā Palangposh also dedicated the money he earned as *nadhr* to charitable obligations. In *The Life and Works of Simon Digby*, Digby explained that the *nadhr* collected by Bābā Palangposh was given to the poor, *faqirs*, widows, and orphans.[21] Therefore, the financial compensation that the Sufi saint received in exchange for their spiritual intercession played a key role in facilitating the Sufi's community-oriented social aid.

As members of the Naqshbandī order, these charitable endeavors would have been very important for Bābā Palangposh and Bābā Musāfir to serve and support their community. Under the leadership of Khwāja Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1389) during the 14th century, the Naqshbandī order took a more active role within the community, "favouring fellowship (*suhbat*) over seclusion (*khalvat*)."[22] Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn 'Ubaydullah Aḥrār (d. 1490) expanded upon this community-oriented focus, encouraging social and political participation. In his view, Sufis should become more involved with political leaders because such leaders have immense influence over the lives and affairs of many Muslims. By influencing these leaders, Sufis could therefore better support more members of the Muslim community.[23] This political involvement would remain an important goal for the Sufi order

[18] Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *History of Sufism in India - Vol. II From Sixteenth Century to Modern Century*, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1983, 189.

[19] Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 106.

[20] Mahmūd, *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, 105.

[21] Digby, *The Life and Works of Simon Digby*, 56.

[22] Foltz, "The Central Asian Naqshbandī Connections," 230.

[23] Hamid Algar, "The Naqshbandī Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and Significance," *Studia Islamica*, no. 44, 1976, 137.

into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Although altruism is a key value of Sufism, the Naqshbandī Sufis were especially unique in their extensive political and social engagement. While political activism was a key value of the Naqshbandiyya, the *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya* focuses more on the social impact of Naqshbandī saints in providing support and charity to the community. In *Malfūẓāt-i Naqshbandiyya*, this social involvement largely materialized in the social services provided at the *takya*, such as providing food and clothing for the poor.

In Awrangzeb's Deccan, such charitable works and community-focused political efforts would have been vital, given the major socioeconomic disparities in the region. Green explains that despite the imperial grandeur of Mughal Awrangabad, there was still a major wealth gap as many citizens lived in poverty. Green conceptualizes Sufis "as the sources and recipients of authority," acting as an intermediary "means of brokerage" between the politically powerful and the politically disenfranchised.[24] Observing the struggles of the marginalized and the poor, Sufi saints therefore had an obligation to interface with the politically powerful in order to provide material help for the politically and economically weak. The Sufi saints held a unique position that allowed them to act as advocates for the destitute. Sufis would frequently interact with the poor when providing charitable services at the *takya*, thus providing the Sufis with exposure to existing problems and inequalities within the community. Additionally, given their religious power and respected social status, the Sufi saints also had the political influence to communicate these problems to political leaders and encourage charitable support. Due to the economic inequalities rife in Mughal Awrangabad, the role of the Sufi saint as both a political advocate and a provider of charity made the Sufi an incredibly important source of aid to the poor. Furthermore, such immense wealth gaps also demonstrate the importance of Sufi almsgiving in providing for the community, as facilitated by *nadhr*.

Additional Sources of Economic Support from the Mughal State

In addition to *nadhr*, Sufi spiritual activities could be economically supported by members of the Mughal state through land grants or donations. Beyond charitable

[24] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 6.

endeavors, such economic contributions to the Sufi saints could be allocated to the maintenance of *takyas* and the construction of new religious infrastructure, including shrines and *madrasas* (Islamic educational institutions). Shrines and mausolea were often constructed alongside *khanaqahs* (Sufi lodges) and mosques, forming impressive religious complexes.[25] Such infrastructure was incredibly important for Sufi religious activities, providing spaces for religious study, prayer, rituals, gatherings, and social services. Land grants and donations allowed Sufi shrines to operate independently. Additionally, they also established social and political relationships with the Mughal elite. As a result of this courtly patronage, some donors expected spiritual favors in return, such as the permission to be buried near a saint.[26] Despite these expectations, the economic relationship between the donors and the saints largely left the sanctity of Sufi religious activities untainted, and instead functioned as a crucial source of income that made these activities possible.

The Effects of the Economic Relationship Between the Sufi Saints and the Mughal Empire

Sufi Architecture as a Status Symbol

Beyond serving a religious function in the community, the architecture of religious sites, such as shrines, also functioned as a status symbol for the Mughals. The city of Khirki was re-established by the Mughals as Awrangabad after their conquest in 1681. In such an important city, new building projects would be a crucial way for the emerging Mughal regime to distinguish the city as their own.[27] When Awrangzeb refounded Awrangabad and designated it the Mughal capital, the city already boasted impressive architecture and infrastructure, including mosques, palaces, and marketplaces. However, Green highlights that the city was missing a key element necessary to compete with other great cities of the Deccan: Sufi shrines.[28] Sufi shrines functioned as visual demonstrations of saintly influence.

[25] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 51.
[26] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 52.
[27] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 52; 262.
[28] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 47.

Therefore, the need for Sufi shrines as a symbol of legitimacy indicates the important role of Sufi saints within the community. Green further explains that the construction of both imperial buildings and sub-imperial structures, including Sufi shrines, served as an expression of immense wealth in the Deccan under the Mughals. Such expressions of affluence would serve as a source of legitimacy for the new Mughal dynasty, demonstrating their successes and prosperity.[29] In these ways, the construction of Sufi religious spaces contributed to Mughal political and economic legitimacy in the Deccan.

Importantly, the construction of such new religious spaces would also be valuable to the Sufi saints. The Sufi saints would benefit from the funding of new religious infrastructure projects because this new infrastructure provided more spaces to engage in religious activities. Furthermore, the presence of such religious infrastructure solidified the Sufi's influence and social status, acting as tangible proof of Mughal support. The Sufis would be intentionally granted valuable space and infrastructure from the Mughal government, therefore demonstrating their importance in the community. Therefore, these mutual benefits of the construction of Sufi architecture substantiates the reciprocal nature of the relationship between the Sufi saint and the Mughal state.

Preserving a Historical Legacy of Muslim Rule and Identity in the Deccan

These new religious spaces also acted as physical evidence of an enduring Muslim presence in the Deccan. Given the significance of an enduring religious identity in the region, such religious legitimacy also served a political purpose. Babur's conquests and the establishment of the Mughal Empire in 1526 did not involve a change in religion between the ruling dynasties. Like the Mughals, the Lodi dynasty and the preceding Delhi sultanates were Muslim. As explained by Green, the Mughal conquests were "not so much a Muslim colonization of a Hindu region as a Mughal colonization of a region governed for centuries by other Muslim powers."[30] In this way, the shared religion acted as a common thread across

[29] Nile Green, *Making Space: Sufis and Settlers in Early Modern India*, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2012, 262.

[30] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 3.

the changing ruling powers in the Deccan, from the Mamluks in the thirteenth century to the Mughals in the sixteenth century. Although the establishment of the Mughal Empire involved the emergence of a new ruling dynasty, this regime change still maintained the long-lasting legacy of Muslim rule in India. The preservation of a Muslim identity and presence in the Deccan would therefore help solidify Mughal legitimacy in the region by preserving an existing identity and religious affiliation in the region.

The Sufi saints played an important role in preserving this enduring Muslim presence in the region, both through the presence of Sufi architecture and through the very presence of the Sufis themselves in the region. Green cites the construction of shrines as playing a major role in maintaining the memory of Sufi saints, which would provide significant religious value and maintain the memory of a saint's presence, even after death. By sustaining a saint's memory, shrines would also act as a physical preservation of an ongoing Muslim history. Additionally, the religious activities and presence of Sufis in Mughal India would also help solidify an enduring Muslim identity in the Deccan, thus further legitimizing Mughal rule. Through their religious influence and miraculous deeds, Sufi saints contributed to a type of "spiritual conquest of an earlier Muslim sacred geography."[31] In other words, the religious presence of the Sufis helped solidify the new Mughal regime because it emphasized the Mughal role in maintaining and encouraging an enduring Muslim presence in the region. In these ways, Sufi architecture and presence served as tangible evidence of an ongoing Muslim identity and history in the Mughal Deccan, thus acting as a source of political legitimacy for the Mughals. Furthermore, the Sufis would also benefit from Mughal financial and political support, therefore proving the mutually beneficial nature of this relationship.

Conclusion

Following a mass migration from Central Asia to Mughal India during the sixteenth century, the Naqshbandī Sufi order became an influential religious group in the Deccan. The Naqshbandī Sufis and the Mughals shared similar religious, as well as cultural and geographic backgrounds, which helped draw the two groups together. As explained in *Malfūẓāt-i*

[31] Green, *Indian Sufism Since the Seventeenth Century*, 31.

Naqshbandiyya, the unique relationship between the Sufi saint and the Mughal government in seventeenth and eighteenth-century Awrangabad involved social, political, and economic reciprocity. *Malfūzāt-i Naqshbandiyya* tells the stories of Bābā Palangposh and Bābā Musāfir, two Naqshbandī saints from Central Asia whose saintly duties connected them with the Mughal state and the greater Awrangabad community. Their experiences operating in the Mughal Deccan provide important insight into the nature of the relationship between the Sufi saint and the Mughal state. In exchange for saintly miracles and spiritual intercession, the Sufi saints were given material contributions which were then used to fund charitable contributions in the community or to maintain and expand religious spaces. This relationship allowed the Sufi saints to continue their religious activities and fulfill their social obligations to the community. Additionally, this dynamic also allowed the Mughal state to enjoy military and political success, as facilitated by saintly blessings, and to solidify their presence and identity as a Muslim power in the Deccan.

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Defense Against Foreign Threats in the Early Republic: Analyzing the Federalist Case and Searching for an Antifederalist Response

By Nina Dinan

This paper explores the ratification debates over the U.S. Constitution, focusing on one pivotal topic of contention: defense against foreign threats. The paper analyzes the national defense argument made by the Federalists, who supported the Constitution, and seeks to identify a counterargument in the works of the Antifederalists, who opposed ratification. Using *The Federalist Papers* and other pro-Constitution literature and speeches, this paper divides the argument for the Constitution as a barrier to foreign threats into three parts: a diplomatic argument, an economic argument, and a military argument. Analyzing the writings and speeches of the Antifederalists, this paper concludes that the Constitution's opponents failed to establish an effective counterargument to the Federalists' vindication of the Constitution as a bulwark of national security and that historical developments at the end of the eighteenth century proved the validity of the Federalists' argument.

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Introduction

Having endured for 237 years to date, the U.S. Constitution has become so deeply enshrined in American life that it is difficult to imagine the controversy generated by the document upon its introduction in the 1780s. At this time, the United States was governed by the Articles of Confederation, which reserved almost all power for the individual states and left the federal government weak and inefficient. Most leaders agreed that the Articles needed reform, but the strong central government proposed in the new Constitution alarmed many Americans, igniting visions of federal tyranny. Several prominent Founding Fathers, including Patrick Henry, George Mason, and Samuel Adams, vigorously opposed the Constitution. These men and their allies were known as Antifederalists, while proponents of the Constitution were known as Federalists. By studying the extensive debates that occurred between these two factions, modern readers are able to understand the validity of several Antifederalist concerns, especially the lack of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. However, despite the wisdom they showed in seeking an explicit assurance of domestic liberties, the Antifederalists failed to challenge their opponents on the issue of foreign policy.

The Federalists had ample threat-assessment credentials in George Washington and Alexander Hamilton, who had confronted the forces of Great Britain on the battlefield, and in Benjamin Franklin, who had spent years negotiating with France. These men had dealt extensively with both allies and enemies; they understood international relations, and they were well-equipped to formulate foreign policy initiatives for the United States. Recognizing that the Antifederalist vision of limited government could not withstand the complex pressures of international politics, the Federalists argued that a strong central government was necessary to American defense. The Federalist case for the Constitution as a safeguard against foreign threats rested on diplomatic, economic, and military arguments, all of which the Antifederalists failed to refute. The Antifederalists rarely addressed foreign policy, and when they did, they dismissed foreign threats as trivial concerns exaggerated by Federalists for political gain. However, the Antifederalists' claims lacked evidence and never coalesced into an effective counterargument to the Federalists' defense of the Constitution as a necessary barrier to foreign threats.

The Diplomatic Argument for the Constitution

The Federalists' diplomatic argument, founded on a careful analysis of the geographical and political situation of the country, was that the thirteen American states needed a uniform foreign policy. The Federalists recognized that the Atlantic Ocean was not a sufficient barrier to foreign adversaries Britain and Spain, who each controlled extensive territories in North America, giving them easy access to the United States. Alexander Hamilton, who authored the majority of the pro-Constitution essays known as *The Federalist Papers*, warned that "on one side of us, and stretching far into our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain," while Spanish colonies loomed south and west.[1] Furthermore, Britain and Spain each possessed their own powerful navy, an asset the United States lacked. Britain was a formidable enemy in its own right, as the survivors of the Revolutionary War could attest, and a potential alliance between Britain and Spain could prove fatal to the United States. Also, Europe was not the sole danger, as the Indigenous peoples of the Northwest Territory posed a twofold threat: not only could tribes attack U.S. settlements independently, but they could also enhance the force of any European power they chose to support. With British territory to the north, Indigenous territory to the northwest, Spanish territory to the southwest, and powerful British and Spanish fleets to the east, the U.S. was surrounded by potential aggressors. In such a delicate situation, the Federalists believed it was essential for the country to "establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by which the common safety [was] to be secured."[2]

The Federalists recognized that thirteen sovereign states would never be able to create a uniform plan for contending with foreign powers. The Constitution, they argued, would eliminate this problem by giving the federal government sole authority over international relations. John Jay, a seasoned U.S. diplomat and leading Federalist, illustrated

[1] Alexander Hamilton, *Federalist No. 24*, 1787.

[2] Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist No. 23*, 1787.

this idea by analyzing the common causes of war and arguing that a strong Constitution would enable the United States to avoid provoking foreign powers. According to Jay, treaty violations, direct violence, and trade rivalry were all potential causes of war against the United States.[3] By 1787, the United States had signed treaties with six foreign countries, five of which were major maritime powers.[4] A sovereign federal government, if created, would form a single plan for honoring each treaty, while thirteen sovereign states might have thirteen different interpretations of the same agreement, increasing the likelihood of violation. Addressing direct violence, Jay invoked history, writing that "not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government…but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States."[5] Jay implied that, compared to state governments, the federal government would be less likely to commit direct violence against an Indigenous tribe. In Jay's view, the federal government would be removed from the local grievances that caused states to attack their Indigenous neighbors and would be restrained from violence by a sense of collective responsibility for the interests of thirteen states. With respect to trade rivalry, the United States had become Europe's competitor in the shipping and fishing industries; the U.S. had also opened direct trade with China and India, cutting out European middlemen.[6] The Federalists believed that the best way to avoid a trade-provoked war was to maintain a robust defense system, attainable only under a strong federal government. Military strength, John Jay argued, would make foreign countries unlikely to invade even if provoked by the United States. If the new country built a strong military, foreign leaders would hesitate to fight it, even in case of a trade dispute.[7] Thus, in addition to decreasing the chances of local provocation, the strong government offered by the Constitution would give the United States valuable leverage in diplomacy.

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[3] John Jay, *The Federalist Nos. 3 and 4*, 1787.

[4] John Jay, *The Federalist No. 3*, 1787.

[5] Jay, *Federalist No. 3*.

[6] John Jay, *The Federalist No. 4*, 1787.

[7] Jay, *Federalist No. 3*.

The Economic Argument for the Constitution

The Federalists' economic argument for the Constitution involved America's substantial foreign debts. The U.S. owed money to the governments of France and Spain, as well as to private Dutch investors, and the federal government's inability to levy taxes under the Articles of Confederation left the country in danger of insolvency. The Federalists recognized that nonpayment of debt was perilous in international relations. The Swedish-born Federalist Nicholas Collin warned that foreign creditors would not wait indefinitely for repayment, and that America's inability to repay even "a generous loan" was a stain on the country's reputation.[8] Nonpayment also marked America as easy prey. The Federalists knew that a country with no regular army, no navy, and no money would make an especially poor opponent.

David Ramsay, a prominent South Carolina Federalist, argued that the consequences of insolvency would be most dire to the Southern states. He warned that Southern export products, such as tobacco, rice, and indigo, would be vulnerable to seizure by foreign creditor states if the U.S. remained in arrears. "Our exports," he argued, "would be the first objects of capture on the high seas [if debts went unpaid]; or descents would be made on our defenceless coasts, till the creditors of the United States has paid themselves at the expence [*sic*] of this weaker part of the union."[9] As Ramsay's warning reveals, the risk of nonpayment was compounded by another deficiency in the Confederation government: the lack of a federally-funded navy to protect the country's merchant marine. Under the Articles of Confederation, the United States was incapable not only of repaying its debt, but also of defending its assets against seizure by foreign creditors. As Ramsay understood, this was especially dangerous to the export-dependent South, whose products were vulnerable to attack at sea.

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[8] Collin, Nicholas, "An Essay on the Means of Promoting Federal Sentiments in the United States": XXIV, XXV, XXVIII, 1787, in *Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists, 1787-1788*, ed. Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).

[9] David Ramsay, "An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Subject of the Federal Constitution," February 4, 1787, in *Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists, 1787-1788*, ed. Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).

One problem that provoked both economic and diplomatic concerns was the ability of individual states to establish trade relations with foreign nations. Given the diverse economies and industries of the thirteen states, their ability to make their own trade deals had the potential to lead to conflicting foreign alliances—a diplomatic disaster. As John Jay noted, a trading partner of the mercantile North could easily go to war against the agrarian South.[10] Jay voiced the sobering truth that commercial ties could be a stronger bond than the "league of friendship" binding the states when he wrote: "it would be more natural for [groups of states] to apprehend danger from one another than from distant nations," raising the possibility of individual states making alliances with European countries to protect themselves from one another.[11] The Federalist scholar and jurist James Wilson agreed, warning that a collection of contiguous sovereign states could easily fall victim to "foreign force, foreign influence, and foreign intrigue," as well as "mutual rage, rancor, and revenge."[12] The Federalists understood that a league of friendship was a precarious unit, and that mutual support among thirteen sovereign states could not be guaranteed. The more independence these states had, the more power they would have to harm each other in the case of interstate disputes. Under the Constitution, the thirteen states would be forced to present a united front in foreign affairs, and the Federalists maintained that the states would be at their strongest when unified.

The Military Argument for the Constitution

The military argument for the Constitution sprang from a fundamental discrepancy in the Articles of Confederation: in the realm of defense, the federal government had more obligations than it had the means to fulfill. Federalist politician Olliver Ellsworth summarized the situation, saying: "If we mean to have our natural rights and properties protected, we must first create a power which is able to do it."[13] Under the Articles of

[10] John Jay, *The Federalist No. 5*, 1787.

[11] Jay, *Federalist No. 5*.

[12] James Wilson, "Speech," November 24, 1787, in *Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists, 1787-1788*, ed. Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).

[13] A Landholder, "The Letters: I-V, VIII," 1787, in *Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists, 1787-1788*, ed. Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).

Confederation, the responsibility for defense lay within the federal government, but the power to pay for defense belonged to the states. The federal government could requisition troops and funds, but if the states refused to comply with an order, the federal government had no recourse. The solution, argued Alexander Hamilton, was to allow the federal government to create an army and navy.[14] This claim was controversial; many Americans distrusted professional armies, considering them instruments of monarchical tyranny. The Federalists, however, presented a candid assessment of the weaknesses of U.S. defense under the Articles of Confederation and argued that a nationally-controlled army was indispensable to the country's security.

Alexander Hamilton, who had fought British regulars on the battlefield, insisted that "[t]he steady operations of war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind."[15] Hamilton recognized that the militia, hailed in America as the noblest and most republican type of armed force, was woefully inadequate to defend the United States. Overreliance on the militia during the Revolutionary War, wrote Hamilton, had nearly cost the United States its independence.[16] The Federalists did not seek to disband the militia, but to increase its effectiveness by placing it under federal oversight. John Jay argued for a federal government that would dictate the training of the militia and combine the military units of the thirteen states into a single force.[17] George Washington declared that "the formation and discipline of the Militia of the Continent should be absolutely uniform," and he warned against the "difficulty, expense, and confusion" that came from relying on a disunited collection of state militias.[18] Washington, like Hamilton, knew from years of military experience that federal management of the armed forces was essential to America's defense.

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[14] Hamilton, *Federalist No. 23*.

[15] Alexander Hamilton, *The Federalist No. 25*, 1787.

[16] Hamilton, *Federalist No. 25*.

[17] Jay, *Federalist No. 4*.

[18] George Washington, "Circular to the States," 1783, in *Friends of the Constitution: Writings of the "Other" Federalists, 1787-1788*, ed. Colleen A. Sheehan and Gary L. McDowell (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988).

The Need for a U.S. Navy

The Federalists argued that in addition to a federally-managed army, the United States also needed a navy. The federal government was authorized by the Articles of Confederation "to build and equip a navy," but two features of the Articles made this task impossible. The first issue was the government's inability to levy taxes, which left it without sufficient funds to build a fleet. Second, the states' ability to evade requisitions for military supplies meant that, even if the federal government had been able to afford a fleet, it might not have been able to obtain the necessary materials. The Articles permitted individual states to use warships to defend their trade, but the Federalists doubted that any combination of state fleets—if such could even be built—would be capable of defending the United States against European maritime powers.

According to the Federalists, the Constitution would allow the U.S. to establish a strong maritime defense system. The Constitution would enable the government to levy taxes and enlarge its budget, and it would allow the government to harness its shipbuilding resources in full, as Great Britain did.[19] In Hamilton's summation, "A navy of the United States, as it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would only embrace the resources of a single part."[20] A federal navy could incorporate the best resources from every region: wood, pitch, and tar from the South, iron from the Mid-Atlantic, and sailors from New England.[21] This type of integration would be impossible for a state or regional navy.

The need for an American fleet was closely tied to the diplomatic and economic arguments for the Constitution. As Hamilton argued, a federal navy would be a powerful diplomatic tool, "a resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us."[22] A fleet from the United States could intervene in Europe's quarrels over the West Indies, and this diplomatic leverage would help the U.S. secure "commercial privileges" from European

[19] Jay, *Federalist No. 4*.
[20] Hamilton, *Federalist No. 11*.
[21] Hamilton, *Federalist No. 11*.
[22] Hamilton, *Federalist No. 11*.

states in exchange for neutrality.[23] The U.S. desperately needed such leverage; trade rivalry in fishing and shipping, combined with the enticingly low prices of other American exports, had led European countries to attempt to exclude U.S. products from their markets.[24] The Federalists were insistent that the United States could not retaliate against Europe's measures without a strong navy.

The Antifederalist Response: Dismissal of Foreign Threats

The Antifederalists, who opposed ratification, failed to provide a convincing response to the Federalists' argument for the Constitution as a barrier to foreign threats. The Antifederalists were more concerned with domestic politics than with international affairs, and they feared tyranny within the U.S. government more than they feared foreign empires. The Antifederalists adopted a tone of airy dismissal when addressing the Federalists' foreign policy concerns. "[T]here is no real danger from Europe," declared Patrick Henry, a leading Antifederalist; "that country is engaged in more arduous business…you may sleep in safety forever for them."[25] This vague claim treats Europe as a single unit, ignoring the diversity among British, Spanish, French, and Dutch interests with respect to the United States. Henry's statement also presents international relations as static, hence his reference to everlasting safety. The Federalists recognized that policies and relationships were in fact dynamic, and that Europe would not be occupied with its ill-defined "arduous business" forever. Henry's dismissal of foreign threats cannot have allayed the Federalists' concerns over the defects of the Articles of Confederation.

Another Antifederalist who attempted to address the issue of foreign threats was a prolific essayist known pseudonymously as the "Maryland Farmer." This unidentified author, believed by some scholars to have been the Maryland politician John Francis Mercer, shared Patrick Henry's sanguine attitude about America's safety from foreign attacks. According to the Maryland Farmer, it was "not to be expected" that a foreign empire would attack a

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[23] Hamilton, *Federalist No. 11*.

[24] Jay, *Federalist No. 4*.

[25] Patrick Henry, "Patrick Henry Speech Before Virginia Ratifying Convention," Teaching American History, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/patrick-henry-virginia-ratifying-convention-va/.

collection of small, allied American republics.[26] The Farmer believed that, because the wealth of the United States was dispersed over a large area and not concentrated in a single capital, the country was simply not tempting enough to attract invaders.[27] This reasoning was belied by the tenacity with which Britain had fought to control the thirteen states. Considering the effort Britain had expended to retain control over America's vital crops, diverse industries, and immense human capital, the United States was clearly more tempting to foreign empires than the Farmer implied. Additionally, his assessment failed to mention the vulnerability created by the states' inadequate defense system. The "Maryland Farmer" likely never considered, or possibly even read, John Jay's analysis of the potential causes of war—treaty violations, border disputes, and commercial rivalries—that threatened the United States despite its widely-dispersed wealth.

In addition to dismissing the danger of foreign invasion, the Antifederalists rejected their opponents' concerns over the diplomatic significance of the national debt. The pseudonymous Antifederalist "Agrippa," who may have been the prominent Massachusetts scholar James Winthrop, argued that land sales were already solving this debt problem. Congress, wrote Agrippa, had already arranged to sell an amount of western land sufficient to cover most of the foreign debt.[28] Agrippa returned to this theme many times, arguing that "the western lands, won from Britain by the sword, are an ample fund for the principal of all our publick [*sic*] debts."[29] Agrippa's reference to the sword is peculiar in this context: if anything, the sacrifices America had made to win the western lands from Britain would make the U.S. government *less* willing to sell them off. Americans had won these lands for settlement, not for sale. Furthermore, even if the sale of land could bring in enough revenue to cover the national debt, it would not be sufficient to address the federal government's other financial burdens. The U.S. did not have infinite land, and selling off large pieces of the

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[26] "Maryland Farmer No. 3, Part 1," Teaching American History, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/maryland-farmer-essay-no-3-part-1/.

[27] "Maryland Farmer No. 3, Part 1."

[28] "Agrippa 7," Teaching American History, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/agrippa-vii/.

[29] "Agrippa XII Part 2," Teaching American History, https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/agrippa-xii-part-2/.

country was not a long-term solution to the federal government's poverty. The Federalists insisted that direct taxation, authorized by the Constitution, was a much more efficient and durable solution to this problem.

Conclusion

The Federalists argued that the Constitution would strengthen the United States diplomatically, militarily, and economically. By making the federal government responsible for foreign policy, the Constitution would ensure that treaties were uniformly interpreted and honored, and it would prevent individual states from signing their own trade agreements with foreign powers. Moreover, by allowing the federal government to tax citizens directly, the Constitution would enable the United States to pay off its debt and avoid commercial or military punishment from foreign creditors. Finally, by permitting the federal government to raise an army, fund a navy, and supervise state militias, the Constitution would increase the United States' military preparedness. While the Antifederalists claimed that foreign threats were insignificant, they failed to support this view with evidence, weakening their overall argument against the Constitution.

Soon after the ratification of the Constitution, international events ultimately validated the Federalists' concerns over foreign threats. In the 1790s, France declined to honor U.S. neutrality in the French Revolutionary Wars, seizing over 300 American ships and provoking the Quasi-War (1798-1801).[30] During this undeclared war between France and the United States, Congress benefited from the revenue-raising power and military authority granted by the Constitution. Realizing the need for robust maritime defense, Congress expanded the size of the U.S. Navy from six vessels to approximately thirty, preparing the country to defend itself against future assaults.[31] This would soon be put to use; a mere decade after the Quasi-War, Britain provoked the War of 1812 by crippling the U.S. economy,

[30] "Quasi-War with France (1798-1801)," https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nmusn/explore/photography/forgotten-wars-19th-century/quasi-war-france.html.

[31] "Quasi-War with France (1798-1801)."

seizing hundreds of neutral American merchant ships.[32] The War of 1812 further vindicated Federalist doctrine, showing Congress the necessity of expanding the Regular Army rather than depending on state militias. The Quasi-War with France and the War of 1812 proved that, contrary to Antifederalist belief, the U.S. was not immune to foreign threats. Only the military strength championed by the Federalists and implemented by the Constitution would enable the young country to preserve its sovereignty.

[32] "War of 1812 Overview: U.S. Navy & America's Second Fight for Independence," https://ussconstitutionmuseum.org/major-events/war-of-1812-overview/#:~:text=Under%20the%20authority%20of%20the,ships%20between%201803%20and%201812.

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Palestine Pre-1948:
Competing Nationalisms,
Diplomatic Failures, and Mass Expulsion

By Nathan Goldstein

This paper examines the various manifestations of Palestinian and Jewish nationalisms in pre-1948 Palestine, focusing on their respective causes, methods, and effects on the land and the population. It accounts for the rising tensions both within the region and internationally, highlighting events of particular importance to each national identity. The paper divides the period into three eras: 1881-1917, the rise of nationalism and the start of Jewish immigration into Ottoman Palestine; 1917-1936, the establishment of the British Mandate of Palestine and the increase of Jewish-Palestinian tensions; and 1936-1948, when hostilities boiled over and resulted in the Great Revolt, the Arab-Israeli War, and the Nakba. Through its examination of these periods and the dual narratives that have emerged as a result, this paper explores how the Palestinian refugee crisis originated, particularly in relation to—and even as a direct product of—the establishment of Israel and Jewish national identity.

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Introduction

From the late eighteenth through the twentieth centuries, the world was fundamentally reshaped by significant social and political transformations. Emerging cultures of nationalism fostered collective identities among populations, often to great unifying and revolutionary effect. From the American and French Revolutions to the Indian Independence Movement, the era of nationalism left a profound and lasting impact on the international landscape, boldly forging new states while collapsing others. Few cases illustrate this fundamental tension more clearly than the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Referred to by prominent Palestinian journalist Yusuf al-Isa in 1914 as "a nation threatened by disappearance,"[1] and conversely by the first Israeli President Chaim Weizmann that same year as "a country without a people, and, on the other hand… the Jewish people [which] has no country,"[2] Palestine's very history has been hotly contested by Zionists and Palestinians since the conflict's inception.

Although there is considerable debate over when the conflict began or how it evolved, both sides' national movements have been deeply entwined since the early 1880s—the result of nearly seventy years of political disputes and violent hostilities leading up to 1948. As this essay will argue, the dismantling of Palestine and its people did not happen overnight. Rather, it was the product of decades of political and military asymmetry, involving foreign occupation, bad-faith actors, and a calamitous rivalry within the Zionist movement.

1881-1917: The Early Zionist and Palestinian National Period

Largely a byproduct of European nationalism, Zionism originated slightly earlier than Palestinian nationalism. With antisemitism steadily mounting, as evidenced by devastating waves of Russian pogroms and later the infamous Dreyfus case in France, the Jewish community faced a difficult question about its future in Europe, notably whether peaceful

[1] Rashid Ismail Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance, 1917-2017*, 27.

[2] Chaim Azriel Weizmann, *The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann: August 1898-July 1931*, 115.

existence was even feasible without assimilation into broader society. Assimilation would mean giving up one's Jewish identity in favor of the dominant culture—an idea that was not well-received by contemporary Jews. To address these concerns, many turned to Western intellectual movements, such as utopian socialism, romanticism, and nationalism, for answers.

As a result, nineteenth-century European Jewish consciousness underwent two key developments. The first was the adoption of a culture of nationalism uniquely tied to Judaism, in which Jews developed a stronger sense of community rooted in ideas of nationhood. Unlike earlier forms of Jewish life, this extended beyond religious or cultural spheres and into everyday existence, including education, media, and public discourse, fostering a cohesive national consciousness.[3] The second development was the Haskalah, or the Jewish Enlightenment of the nineteenth century. Originating in Germany and quickly spreading throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire and into the Pale of Settlement in Russia, the Haskalah was a social, political, and economic transformation of Jewish life that promoted emancipation and a more secular, modern approach to Judaism.[4] It did not take long for Haskalah ideas to combine with the emerging culture of nationalism, instilling in many Jews a sense of nationalist unity and a desire for statehood.

The driving catalyst for the first surge of Jewish immigration to Palestine, also known as the First Aliyah, was a wave of antisemitic pogroms across Russia following the assassination of Alexander II in March 1881.[5] This led to the rise of Practical Zionism, a branch of Zionism advocating for the immediate colonization of Palestine. Inspired by the renewed ties between Jews and their historical and religious homeland in the Holy Land, many Practical Zionists considered the aliyot, of which there were five in total, to be a return to their ancestral roots. Because of this, the aliyot were often glorified or romanticized as a spiritual "ascent," reflected in the direct translation of the Hebrew word "aliyah."[6] However,

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[3] James Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict: A History*, 43-45.
[4] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 50-51.
[5] Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 9.
[6] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 59-60.

life in rural, arid Palestine was far from romantic for these largely metropolitan European Jews. Many struggled to establish even simple farms and had to adopt local Palestinian techniques, such as subsistence farming practices, to survive. Additionally, Jewish entrepreneurs like Baron Edmond de Rothschild instituted sprawling plantation systems, often preferring to hire Palestinians over Jews due to their labor being significantly cheaper.[7] This made it equally difficult for Jewish workers to find employment within the settler economy. As a result, about 65% of the immigrants from the First Aliyah returned to Europe by its conclusion around 1902—the result of impractical planning and an idealized fantasy.[8]

As Zionists began to realize the failures of the First Aliyah, they arrived at a crossroads: continue immigrating to Palestine, or search elsewhere for a national home. One of the most influential voices in this conversation was Theodor Herzl, a Viennese Jewish cosmopolitan writer often regarded as the father of Zionism. Herzl initially had doubts about the colonization of Palestine, proposing alternatives such as Argentina and Uganda as more feasible targets.[9] Much of his ambivalence was due to anxieties about challenging the Ottoman Empire, which controlled Palestine at the time. As a Political Zionist—a Zionist who was less interested in finding a home with spiritual weight and more focused on a diplomatic solution to the "Jewish question" in Europe—he was much less concerned with colonizing Palestine than with simply finding a region with the fewest obstacles. He was also deeply invested in acquiring a strong international ally for Zionism to assist with immigration, another key trait of Political Zionism, yet this could not be found in the Ottomans.[10] However, by the time of the first World Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, in 1897, most Zionists had already firmly set their sights on Palestine. There, a committee under Chairman Max Nordau instituted the Basel Program, which explicitly declared that "the aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by law."[11]

[7] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 64.
[8] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 66.
[9] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 56.
[10] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 54.
[11] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 55.

With the direction of the Zionist movement officially settled, Zionism began to expand its influence as a more unified body, attempting to bring as many Jews and non-Jewish government officials to its side as possible.

At this point, most Jews harbored mixed, if not outright hostile, feelings toward Zionism. In their efforts to escape persecution, the vast majority immigrated to the United States, Britain, or other parts of the Western world, drawn in by the various freedoms and economic prospects there. Other Jews disputed the idea of colonization, citing religious or ethical concerns. In fact, the first World Zionist Congress was originally planned to take place in Munich, Germany, but ultimately was forced to switch locations when the German Union of Rabbis issued a decisive letter: "The efforts of the so-called Zionists to create a Jewish National State in Palestine are antagonistic to the messianic promises of Judaism… Judaism obliges its followers to serve the country to which they belong with the utmost devotion, and to further its interest with their whole heart and all their strength."[12]

Although the Zionist movement did not gain support from the majority of Jews until well into the twentieth century, several Zionist proponents launched a powerful propaganda campaign in its favor, often employing language synonymous with "civilizing" missions of the past. Many referenced acclaimed writer Mark Twain's visit to Palestine in 1867, which he described as "a desolate country whose soil is rich enough, but is given over wholly to weeds—a silent, mournful expanse, wherein we saw only three persons—Arabs, with nothing on but a long coarse shirt…"[13] Other notable Zionist writers directly adopted his rhetoric, such as Weizmann and his aforementioned description of Palestine as a land without a people. Herzl himself wrote in an 1896 essay that a Jewish state in Palestine "would form a portion of the rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism," explicitly vilifying Palestinians as unsophisticated barbarians threatening Western civilization.[14] This language would continue to be the prominent voice

[12] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 57.
[13] Mark Twain, *The Innocents Abroad*, 216.
[14] Theodor Herzl, *A Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question*, 12.

of Zionism in the coming decades, as demonstrated through both its key leaders and prominent antagonistic attitudes toward Palestinians.

Contrary to Zionist claims, Palestine was far from uncivilized or underdeveloped. Until 1917, it was one of the Ottoman Empire's many territories and underwent significant social, political, and economic change throughout the century. In reality, Twain's "silent, mournful expanse" experienced mass urbanization. Technologies such as the telegraph, electricity, and steam-powered transportation, along with increased involvement in the global market through its growing cash crop and wage labor systems, all contributed to Palestine's extensive modernization.[15] Additionally, from the late 1830s to the 1870s, the Ottoman Tanzimat period led to the establishment of crucial programs to assimilate Palestinian culture into the rest of the Empire. For instance, the 1869 Regulation of Public Education standardized the education system by instituting a variety of state, private, and missionary schools. Concerned about the influence of foreign missionaries on its subjects, the Empire heavily prioritized state schools, which served the majority of Palestinians.[16] This, in conjunction with the over thirty new newspapers and periodicals established throughout the early twentieth century, drastically improved Palestinian education and literacy rates, particularly among wealthy notables.[17] The Ottoman government also increased efforts to officially integrate Palestine into the Empire through a series of reforms, including the establishment of representative councils run by local elites and the standardization of their legal code. Arguably, the two most important of these new laws were the 1839 Hatt-i Sharif of Gulhane and the 1856 Islahat Fermani, which promised all Ottoman subjects "perfect security for life, honor, and property" and religious liberty and equality, even for non-Muslim residents.[18] By expanding economic participation, public education, and legal standardization, these reforms effectively transformed Palestinians from merely Ottoman

[15] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 15.
[16] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 16.
[17] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 18.
[18] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 35.

subjects into full-fledged citizens. This development laid the foundations for a distinct Palestinian national consciousness in the coming decades.

There were also many unforeseen consequences of the Tanzimat period. Most notably, in an attempt to increase revenue, the 1858 Ottoman Land Code mandated that Palestinians register land in their own names, thereby ensuring further assimilation into the Empire and shifting land possession from primarily state-controlled to largely individual-based, allowing for more efficient taxation.[19] However, much of the Palestinian village structure was incompatible with this new land-registration method, as most farmland was communal and moderated by local elites. This ultimately led many Palestinian peasants to transfer ownership of their land to absentee landowners, usually the same wealthy, well-connected elites willing to pay their land tax in exchange for rent.[20] These elites would later sell this same land to Jewish immigrants without telling their Palestinian tenants during the first several aliyot. This began the trend of Palestinian displacement that would only grow in scope and severity as the Zionist project evolved, eventually resulting in a small but significant Jewish immigrant population in Palestine collectively known as the Yishuv.

It did not take long for the Palestinians to recognize the threat that Zionism posed. As the Jewish presence grew and the displacement of Palestinians intensified, many began turning to the Ottoman Empire for support. Already aware of Zionism's growth before the First Aliyah, Ottoman authorities were preparing for an unprecedented surge in immigration. They issued a series of conditions for Jewish admission into the Empire: firstly, Jewish immigrants would be required to renounce their European citizenship and become Ottoman citizens; secondly, they would also be unable to settle specifically in Palestine.[21] Through this ruling, they hoped to curb the impact of Zionism on the overall population in Palestine. In reality, however, their inefficiency as an administrative body stopped them from monitoring and ultimately preventing the aliyot in any meaningful capacity. In desperation, others voiced their plight to Zionist leaders themselves, one of the most famous being the Mayor of

[19] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 32.
[20] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 33-34.
[21] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 56.

Jerusalem, Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi. In 1899, he pleaded in a letter to Herzl, "Somewhere else must be found for this unfortunate people. This would be the fairest and most just undertaking. But… the world is big enough, there are still uninhabited areas… in the name of God, let Palestine be left alone."[22] However, al-Khalidi's plea fell on deaf ears, as Herzl rejected it as a sufficient reason to halt the Zionist project. Thus, by the conclusion of the First World War, nearly two decades later, Jewish immigration had reached unprecedented levels and only showed signs of rising.

1917-1936: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Establishment of the British Mandate

World War I was a crucial turning point in Palestine's internal and external politics. The first and most important event was the transfer of power from the Ottoman Empire to the British Empire, which began in 1917 with the British capture of Jerusalem and lasted until 1923, when the British Mandate of Palestine was officially established. The newly formed League of Nations, which issued the mandate, claimed it was predicated on Britain administering former Ottoman territories, namely Palestine and Transjordan, until they were adequately prepared for sovereign statehood. In practice, however, the mandate often proved exploitative and oppressive, favoring imperialist interests abroad rather than the well-being of the local inhabitants.[23]

One key foreign interest was the Zionist movement, which was steadily on the rise by the Second and Third Aliyot. Although the Second Aliyah, which spanned from 1904 to 1914, was technically within the previous era, it had much more in common with the subsequent Third Aliyah than with its predecessor. Most notably, unlike the cash crop plantation systems of the First Aliyah, the Second and Third Aliyot engaged in mixed farming, producing a diverse range of agricultural products on communal farms called kibbutzim and cooperative farms called moshavim. These kibbutzim and moshavim were also sites of the growing Labor Zionist movement, a socialist, egalitarian form of Zionism

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[22] Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi, Letter to Theodor Herzl.

[23] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 8-9.

that emerged during the Second Aliyah. Labor Zionism promoted cooperation and a pioneering spirit among its followers, who made up approximately 14% of the total 85,000 Jews residing in Palestine.[24] The Second Aliyah was an overwhelming failure though, with almost 90% of all immigrants returning to their countries of origin.[25] However, the powerful, unifying symbolism of the kibbutzim and moshavim enabled the institutions left in their wake to endure. These institutions remained throughout the Third Aliyah and the following decades, when Labor Zionism would grow to unparalleled prominence among the Yishuv.

After learning of the British occupation of Palestine, Zionist organizations lobbied intensely in favor of Britain establishing a Jewish state. They spoke in front of both Parliament and the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission, presenting a variety of offers from capital investments to military support.[26] These appeals were profoundly influential on British policy toward Palestine, leading the Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur Balfour to issue the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The declaration affirmed that the British Mandate would be dedicated to "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people… it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."[27] Zionists rejoiced at this declaration, as it represented a clear step forward in their national project. Palestinians, on the other hand, grew increasingly alarmed by Balfour's general disregard for their own national claims. His offhanded statement about the "existing non-Jewish communities," which nevertheless composed the overwhelming majority of Palestine's total population compared to the Jews' mere 6%, did little to quell their anxieties.[28]

With the Third Aliyah well in progress by the early 1920s, many Palestinians grew restless toward the British Mandate, its deceptively vague and appeasing language, and the swell of Jewish immigration. In addition to the Balfour Declaration, Palestinians were

[24] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 73.
[25] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 75.
[26] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 53-54.
[27] Arthur James Balfour, "Balfour Declaration."
[28] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 23.

outraged by Britain's apparent disregard of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence from 1915 to 1916, which had affirmed that Arab support in overthrowing the Ottomans would be met with British backing for their independent statehood.[29] In response to these concerns, the British created a series of institutions specifically engineered to manipulate political divisions and foster social confusion. Some examples include the establishment of the Grand Mufti position in 1918 (previously, there were four separate mufti positions to maintain a balance of power) and the Supreme Muslim Council in 1921 to administer community affairs. Furthermore, the British appointed wealthy Palestinian elite Hajj Amin al-Husseini as both Grand Mufti and head of the Muslim Council, solidifying the al-Husseini clan's dominance over rival families like the al-Nashashibis and al-Khalidis while also sowing internal conflict among the al-Husseini clan's ambitious members.[30] Although these tactics had moderate short-term success, exacerbating clan rivalries and fueling infighting within Palestinian society, they ultimately failed to distract the population from the growing British colonial presence and influx of Jewish immigration.

The Fourth Aliyah occurred between 1924 and 1928. As fascism took hold across Europe and entry to destinations such as the United States and mainland Britain became increasingly restricted, Jewish immigration to Palestine reached unprecedented levels. In total, approximately 82,000 new immigrants arrived during this period, about half of them from Poland after the passing of various antisemitic legislation.[31] A key difference between these immigrants and their more ideologically motivated predecessors is that their intention for immigration was far more akin to that of a refugee with hopes of escaping oppression than that of a settler with a colonizing mission. Many were small businessmen and entrepreneurs, rather than the young, idealistic middle-class socialists of the previous three aliyot. This was evident in their tendency to settle in larger, more commercial cities, such as the coastal, economy-driven Tel Aviv, rather than on agrarian kibbutzim and moshavim.[32] In

[29] Anita Shapira, *Israel: A History*, 71.
[30] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 42-43.
[31] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 76.
[32] Shapira, *Israel*, 105-106.

addition to reshaping the demographic breakdown of Jewish settlers, this sudden and drastic influx of new immigrants, as well as the lack of British interference to curb it, further demonstrated to Palestinians a difficult but important reality: they were alone in their fight for independence.

With the Palestinian plight seemingly ignored and partition in favor of a Jewish state likely soon underway, many Palestinians began to take matters into their own hands. In a critical miscalculation, the British underestimated the gravity of the al-Husseini clan's history of militarism and nationalism, which quickly found expression in its rhetoric and policy over the unfolding years. In a multitude of his public statements, Grand Mufti Amin al-Husseini not only condemned Jewish immigration but also vilified Jews themselves: "After the [First] World War… Jewish excrement from all countries assembled there [Palestine], rascally striving to seize the land from Arabs. And indeed, they succeeded in buying land from the poorest of the poor and from unscrupulous landlords. By doing so, they… robbed many families of their livelihood and threw the families into misery and troubles."[33] Notably, al-Husseini conveniently failed to mention his own landlord family's "unscrupulous" legacy of selling Palestinian peasant land to Jewish immigrants, thereby downplaying his complicity in their dispossession.[34]

Nevertheless, encouraged by the al-Husseinis with their newfound political power and influence, antisemitic riots ensued from the late 1910s to the late 1920s. For Palestinians, they were a symbolic gesture of their rejection of British and Zionist colonial rule, while for Jews, they signaled growing Palestinian hostility toward the Jewish minority. The most violent of these riots was the 1929 Hebron Massacre, during which Palestinian mobs rampaged through the town, murdering nearly 70 ultra-orthodox non-Zionist Jews and fomenting a collective fear among the Yishuv.[35] The seemingly indiscriminate manner of the massacre and other antisemitic killings led to the establishment of the Haganah in 1920, which served as the primary Jewish paramilitary and defense force during the pre-1948 period. During its

[33] Boris Havel, "Hajj Amin Husseini's Anti-Semitic Legacy," 3.

[34] Efraim Karsh, *Palestine Betrayed*, 17-19.

[35] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 10.

existence, it was primarily directed by David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Labor Zionist Party and, upon its founding, future prime minister of Israel. Additionally, the Haganah would later lay the foundations for the Israeli Defense Forces, more widely known as the IDF.

Another effect of both the rising popularity of Jewish nationalism and the antisemitic riots that followed was the advent of Revisionist Zionism, a right-wing extremist offshoot of mainstream Zionism that advocated for a "Greater Israel" with a Jewish majority and sovereignty over all of Palestine and Transjordan, along with various other territories in the region.[36] This ideology, pioneered by Russian Jewish journalist Ze'ev Jabotinsky and his Irgun militia, focused its argument on Palestinians' general unwillingness to negotiate with Zionists. Jabotinsky himself wrote that "every native population in the world resists colonists as long as it has the slightest hope of being able to rid itself of the danger of being colonised… As long as the Arabs feel that there is the least hope of getting rid of us, they will refuse to give up this hope in return for either kind words or for bread and butter, because they are not a rabble, but a living people."[37] Ironically, he acknowledged the unreasonable position the Palestinians were placed in, referencing both Zionism's colonial nature and the threat it posed to Palestinian nationalism, but also declared his unwillingness to sympathize with their plight over Zionism's own success.

Among the rest of the Zionist movement, Revisionism was often maligned by its contemporaries for its aggressive, expansionist foundations. This even led to Jabotinsky's resignation from the Zionist Executive, the official organization responsible for implementing Zionist policy, due to his political disagreements with Weizmann and his constituents.[38] For this reason, these Revisionists remained a small minority for the following decades. However, they did gain notable support from many capitalist-oriented immigrants from the Fourth and Fifth Aliyot, remaining a vocal and ever-present opposition party to the now-dominant Labor Zionism. Additionally, as violence and extremism only intensified in

[36] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 15.
[37] Ze'ev Jabotinsky, *The Iron Wall: We and the Arabs*, 3-7.
[38] Shapira, *Israel*, 124.

the coming decades, the growing Revisionist presence posed an escalating challenge to Palestinian society.

1936-1948: Unprecedented Violence, the Failure of the Mandate, and Palestinian Expulsion

By the 1930s, the situation in Palestine had become dire, with relations between British authorities, Zionists, and Palestinians marked by deep tension and distrust. The British were at a total loss as to how they should address rising Palestinian unrest. With the Fifth Aliyah well underway, spurred by antisemitism and fascism in Europe, Zionists became increasingly concerned about the potential security risks Palestinian nationalism might pose to a Jewish state. Meanwhile, Palestinians were outraged at the utter lack of recognition by the British, whose primary purpose throughout the mandate period was supposedly to assist them in becoming a sovereign nation. Ultimately, these deteriorating conditions gave way to the Great Revolt, which spanned from 1936 to 1939.

Initially, the revolt consisted of a largely peaceful six-month general strike to demonstrate Palestinian dissatisfaction with British occupation and the Zionist project. This strike was supported by al-Husseini and his Arab Higher Committee, which was explicitly established as the primary Palestinian representative council for the strike's duration. The committee demanded a halt to Jewish immigration and land sales, in addition to the establishment of a government better representing the Palestinian majority.[39] The strike was effective in catching both the British and the Zionists off guard, demonstrating the Palestinians' faltering but continued grip over the territory's economic and political proceedings. The following year, the British Chairman of the Palestine Royal Commission, Lord William Robert Peel, responded with the Peel Commission, an analysis of the strike's causes and a proposal for a potential solution. In summary, the Peel Commission recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state, which would make up nearly 20% of the total territory, and an Arab state, which would comprise slightly over 80%, with

[39] Shapira, *Israel*, 84.

the remaining land—notably Jerusalem and Bethlehem, due to religious reasons—remaining in the hands of the British.[40]

Although this proposal was a significant landmark on the road to partition, it failed to solve many critical issues. Firstly, even though the theoretical Jewish state would only make up about one-fifth of the mandate's total land, a sizable portion of its population would remain Palestinian. Citing this, Peel also recommended the "transfer," or rather expulsion, of over 200,000 Palestinians to the theoretical Arab state, which would then be ruled over by British client Emir Abdullah of Transjordan.[41] Most fundamentally, the majority of Palestinians were against the idea of partition altogether, arguing that the British occupation and the Zionist project were existential threats, not only to their statehood but to their people as a whole. As a result, while the Yishuv generally supported the Peel Commission as at least a framework for possible partition, the Arab Higher Committee thoroughly rejected the proposal, reiterating its original demands with increased severity: the termination of the mandate, the withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration, and complete independence for an Arab Palestine.[42] Following its rejection, a second, significantly more violent phase of the revolt began, as Palestinian determination for sovereign nationhood and freedom from colonial occupation further intensified.

Over the years leading up to 1939, violence erupted across Palestine. In addition to the obvious Palestinian-Jewish and Palestinian-British battle lines, a small but significant minority of Palestinians also actively opposed the Arab Higher Committee's decisions. They were led by the al-Nashashibis, who were always eager for an opportunity to renew rivalries with the al-Husseinis. The al-Nashashibis often secretly met with Zionist representatives and even supported British and Zionist forces militarily.[43] This triple alliance, despite being highly unstable given each party's opposing interests, was nevertheless effective in combating the revolt. Both the Haganah and the Irgun conducted vicious strikes against Palestinian rebels.

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[40] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 46.

[41] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 43-44.

[42] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 126.

[43] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 22.

The Irgun especially took a far more aggressive stance, violating several key regulations that prohibited terrorist attacks against Palestinians, which further dampened their relations with the broader Yishuv.[44] The British also responded with their own escalation tactics, utilizing brutal counterinsurgency techniques developed from putting down past revolts in their other colonies, particularly during the 1919-1921 Irish War of Independence. These tactics included instituting martial law, carrying out mass executions, demolishing critical infrastructure, and tying prisoners to the front of armored cars and locomotives as a form of deliberately instilling terror and intimidation.[45]

Their combined brutality succeeded in quelling the revolt, and by 1939, most rebels had either been killed or surrendered to British authorities. In total, over 3,000 Palestinians were killed, and much of the Palestinian countryside was devastated by unmitigated warfare.[46] From a political perspective, both the al-Husseini and al-Nashashibi clans' participation left them economically and militarily drained. Amin al-Husseini was promptly removed from his various roles in the Palestinian authority and later moved to Nazi Germany, where he resided for most of the Second World War. Although his influence on Palestinian society and politics continued, particularly through his strong familial connections and assistance with antisemitic propaganda during the war, it was significantly reduced due to his geographical and legal limitations in exile, putting an end to his active leadership in the Palestinian national movement.[47] The effective annihilation of organized political representation would haunt Palestinians throughout the rest of the mandate period (and arguably up to the present day), as they were essentially left at the mercy of British-Zionist diplomacy, with little to no prospects of improvement.

The brutal events of the revolt led Yishuv leadership to grow more supportive of Palestinian expulsion, citing the chaos and antisemitic violence as ample evidence of the necessity for Jewish safety. Ben-Gurion, who had previously opposed such measures, became

[44] Shapira, *Israel*, 128.
[45] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 44-45.
[46] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 123.
[47] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 128-129.

a staunch supporter of what he and his constituents commonly referred to as "transfer," affirming that "[i]n many parts of the country new settlement will not be possible without transferring the Arab peasantry… Thankfully, the Arab people have vast empty areas… this system embodies an important humane and Zionist idea, to transfer parts of a people [i.e., Palestine's Arabs] to their country [i.e., Transjordan and Iraq] and to settle empty lands…"[48] It is important to note that, at this point, expulsion was merely a theoretical solution to a multifaceted problem, similarly used throughout the early twentieth century to address population imbalances in Turkey and Greece, India and Pakistan, the various Balkan states, and elsewhere. Zionists had only agreed *in principle* that "transfer" was ethical and beneficial for those involved, arguing that it would be, in a sense, reuniting the transferred Palestinians with their fellow Arabs in Transjordan.[49] However, they had not yet settled on how it would be executed in practice. The failure to agree on this measure would become evident in the following decade, as the lack of a clear plan or even a reasonable moral framing would lead to devastating consequences for the Palestinian population.

The British response to the Great Revolt was heavily mixed. While they decimated Palestinian social, economic, and political infrastructure, they were also forced to recognize the origins from which this hostility stemmed. This came in the form of the 1939 White Paper, in which the British officially acknowledged their fault in favoring the Zionist movement over Palestinian independence. As both compensation and appeasement, the White Paper declared that "[t]he objective of His Majesty's Government is the establishment within 10 years of an independent Palestine State" and that it would "allow of the admission… of some 75,000 immigrants over the next five years."[50] In turn, it also declared that the British government was under no further obligation to facilitate the development of a Jewish national home, restricting land sales and focusing entirely on building the foundations of Palestinian sovereignty.

[48] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 48.

[49] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 51.

[50] Great Britain Colonial Office, *Palestine: Statement of Policy (Cmd. 6019).*

The White Paper ultimately failed to satisfy either party. With the brutality of British counterinsurgency techniques still fresh in public consciousness, Palestinians were highly distrustful of the White Paper and demanded their own independent nation as soon as possible. In one of al-Husseini's last decrees, the Arab Higher Committee officially rejected the paper and called for an immediate Palestinian state that "shall forever remain Arab."[51] On the Zionists' end, the White Paper was received with widespread outrage. Not only had immigration to Palestine become significantly more difficult, but other countries had been rapidly restricting entry since the start of the Fourth Aliyah. With the outbreak of World War II and the Holocaust in Europe, the international Jewish community desperately began searching for any means of escaping genocide. To address the impending chaos, Ben-Gurion declared in a speech to the Labor Party's Central Committee: "We shall fight the war against Hitler as if there were no White Paper, and we shall fight the White Paper as if there were no war."[52]

Over the following years, the Yishuv invested heavily in the war effort against Hitler, lending their military, economic, and political support to Britain. By the war's conclusion, a total of 27,000 Jewish soldiers had enlisted in the British Army to assist in the fight overseas, strengthening their ties with Britain.[53] Despite their efforts, however, the Holocaust tragically resulted in the mass slaughter of six million Jews across Europe, therefore quickly shifting Jewish collective consciousness in favor of Zionism. The vast majority of Jews were now calling for their own state as both a safeguard against future antisemitism and as compensation for the Allied Powers' initial passivity in their genocide. Within Palestine, the Irgun and the recently established and like-minded Lehi launched a series of terrorist attacks against British institutions in the name of national establishment throughout the post-war period. The most infamous of these operations was the 1946 King David Hotel Bombing, which was executed by future Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin.[54] Ultimately,

[51] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 127.
[52] Shapira, *Israel*, 88.
[53] Shapira, *Israel*, 88.
[54] Gelvin, *The Israel-Palestine Conflict*, 133.

overwhelmed by collective guilt over the Holocaust and desperation to end further conflict, the international powers of the newly formed United Nations were compelled to oblige Zionist demands.

In 1947, Britain announced that it would conclude the mandate the following year, effectively handing the issue to the UN, which then tasked their Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) with discussing potential solutions. After a brief visit to Palestine, during which UNSCOP members witnessed numerous instances of antisemitic and anti-Palestinian violence, they concluded that partition into a Jewish state and an Arab state was the best possible solution. This plan was then voted on by the UN General Assembly Resolution 181, which officially accepted the proposal to divide Palestine into a Jewish state, covering about 56% of the territory; a smaller Arab state, making up about 43%; and an international enclave around Jerusalem.[55] This plan was distinctly similar to the Peel Commission's proposal, only even more in favor of the Zionist agenda and with less consideration of Palestinian national claims.

What followed was a period of intense conflict within the collapsing British Mandate. Zionists eagerly accepted Resolution 181 and wasted no time in preparing for the evacuation of British forces so they could establish the State of Israel. Conversely, Palestinians were outraged by the idea of not only partition, but one so brazenly in favor of the Jewish minority. As a whole, relations between both groups had become irreconcilable, and on November 30, 1947, total war broke out across Palestine: for Jews, a battle for Israeli independence, and for Palestinians, an ethnic cleansing of catastrophic proportions.

The 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli War had two main phases: an initial civil war from December 1947 to May 1948 and a regional war shortly after from May 1948 to March 1949. Upon the Palestinians' rejection of the partition plan, both Zionist and Palestinian militias began to mobilize, each supported militarily and economically by benefactors abroad. For the Zionists, this was primarily via arms smuggling and financial support from Western countries such as Czechoslovakia and the United States. For the Palestinians, their primary

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[55] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 73.

source of assistance came from the surrounding Arab League, including regional powers like Egypt and Transjordan, which were both eager to expel the Jews and stake their own claims to the land.[56]

Zionists and Palestinians perceived each other as existential threats to their nationhood and ethnic identities, and they were determined to do whatever it took to achieve victory. However, the bitter internal divide between the al-Husseinis and al-Nashashibis greatly hindered the Palestinian militias' ability to unite as a singular, organized body like the Yishuv. Lacking critical military cohesion, the Palestinians' main fighting forces were merely disconnected groups of, at most, several hundred troops, despite their population advantage.[57] They paled in comparison to the Zionist paramilitaries, who mobilized with exceptional efficiency and vigor. The Haganah remained their main fighting force, composed of tens of thousands of well-armed, well-organized, and highly motivated Jewish soldiers. However, it initially took a defensive, reactive stance, intending to hold out until the mandate fell and British troops evacuated.[58] This passive strategy left many crucial areas vulnerable to attack, including coastal cities like Jaffa and Haifa, as well as various convoy routes, such as in the case of the Hadassah Medical Convoy Massacre on April 13. The Jewish quarter in Jerusalem, a key historical and religious relic of Jewish culture, was also aggressively besieged and starved into submission by Arab forces. Despite this, the failure of Palestinian militias to effectively coordinate gave Zionists enough time to consolidate and counterattack nearly 200 Palestinian villages by mid-May.[59]

Palestinian mass displacement began some months before the second half of the war. This was demonstrated predominantly by Plan Dalet, an intricate outline of how Zionist paramilitaries would repel Palestinian forces and establish the framework for Jewish statehood. There is an ongoing debate as to whether Plan Dalet was centered specifically around intentional ethnic cleansing or simply aimed at cultivating the proper conditions for a

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[56] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 35.
[57] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 29-30.
[58] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 65-66.
[59] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 34.

secure Jewish state. This discourse mainly hinges on whether Zionism was opposed to Palestinians due to fundamentally racist principles or because of the ethno-political circumstances of the region. What is generally agreed upon, however, is that much of the plan echoed, if not directly mirrored, the sentiments of "transfer" from previous decades. This was almost certainly by design, as many of the most vocal and ardent supporters of expulsion (i.e., Ben-Gurion, Weizmann, Begin) were also among the highest-ranking government and military officials during this period. Thus, implemented from March until the fall of the mandate in May, this plan enabled Zionist forces to sweep through the aforementioned nearly 200 villages, including Tiberias, Haifa, Safad, and Beisan, through prolonged military sieges and mass expulsion of the Arab populations.[60] Additionally, Zionist forces conquered many cities not included in Resolution 181, such as Jaffa in May, in clear violation of the UN partition plan, and did so largely unchecked.

Beyond the Haganah's direct authority, the Irgun and the Lehi also conducted additional, even more brutal terror attacks on Palestinian villages. The most infamous and pivotal of these events was the Deir Yassin Massacre on April 9, when roughly 130 Irgun and Lehi fighters invaded the town in an attempt to break through the blockade of Jerusalem. Under their commanders' explicit orders, they decimated the small town and killed 110 inhabitants, many of whom were women, children, and the elderly. Furthermore, there is ample testimony from soldiers at the massacre detailing flagrant war crimes, including execution-style killings and burnings well after the fighting had ended.[61] Most alarmingly, much of the Yishuv leadership and later the Israeli government went to great lengths to prevent the public release of the tragedy's full severity, indicating an apparent self-awareness of the atrocities that were committed and the possibility of additional war crimes not documented in testimony.[62]

[60] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 74-75.

[61] Ofer Aderet, "Testimonies From the Censored Deir Yassin Massacre: 'They Piled Bodies and Burned Them.'"

[62] Aderet, "Testimonies From the Censored Deir Yassin Massacre."

These tactics only intensified come May, when a far different and bloodier series of events unfolded in Palestine. First, the mandate period ended, followed shortly thereafter by the establishment of Israel and the consolidation of Zionist paramilitaries, namely the Haganah, Irgun, and Lehi, into the IDF. This directly led to the forced exodus of over half of all Palestinians from the land, an event preserved in Palestinian consciousness as the Nakba, or "catastrophe" in Arabic. After Israel's establishment, the campaigns of the previous year only grew in scope and brutality, such as Operations Dani, Hiram, and Yoav, all contributing to the same goal: securing a Jewish majority and Israeli dominance through the expulsion of Palestinians.[63] Over the year and a half of warfare, entire villages were razed, thousands of people were massacred, and in total, nearly 750,000 of the 1.3 million Palestinians became international refugees, uprooted from their homes either forcefully via military expulsion or preemptively out of fear of violence. In addition to the 56% of the territory outlined in Resolution 181, Israel also gained control of an additional 22% and subjected the 160,000 Palestinians who remained in its borders after the Nakba to strict military rule until 1966.[64]

Over the following decades, relations between Israel and the Arab world continued to deteriorate. Most of the surrounding countries expelled their Jewish populations, and as a result, these refugees often fled to Israel, further reinforcing its political and cultural identity as a Jewish state. At the same time, much of the Palestinian national movement has revolved around the Nakba, which has become widely regarded as the primary catalyst for the "Palestinian refugee problem," a term popularized by New Israeli Historian Benny Morris.[65] Others, like Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi, argue that the Nakba has not yet ended, as Israel's continued displacement and marginalization of Palestinians are more reflective of an ongoing ethnic cleansing rather than a single, isolated event.[66] What is certain above all else is that the Nakba has firmly embedded itself in the Palestinian narrative as a catastrophe with

[63] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 78.
[64] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 59-60.
[65] Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 1-2.
[66] Khalidi, *The Hundred Years' War on Palestine*, 77.

devastating and lasting impacts, including mass displacement, land dispossession, and the collapse of any potential Palestinian statehood for the half-century to follow.

Conclusion

One of the most divisive topics surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is its origin—when it officially began and what its primary causes were. Although this essay only scratches the surface of Palestine's pre-1948 history, some factors offer crucial insight into the conflict's contentious beginnings. Early nineteenth-century Zionism began by launching a vast propaganda campaign in favor of colonization, which was soon reflected in the imperialist, bad-faith policies of the British Mandate. Simultaneously, Amin al-Husseini and his ultra-nationalist, antisemitic leadership on various Palestinian councils fostered a collective opposition to British occupation, Zionist colonialism, and Jewish immigration. Bilateral intransigence on both sides was exacerbated by the impact of the Holocaust—which spurred Jewish immigration and support for Zionism—as well as by the failure of the UN to adequately address Palestinian fears of ethnic cleansing. Finally, the actions taken by Zionist paramilitaries during the 1947-1949 Arab-Israeli War resulted in the Nakba, a cataclysmic and defining event that derailed any hope for a Palestinian nation for the next several decades.

When considered together, these developments demonstrate the deeply entangled nature of Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms, each responding to and influencing the other in the development of this tragic and ongoing crisis. Most importantly for the future of this conflict, their interwoven complexity highlights the necessity of understanding the region's history to provide a framework for effectively engaging with Israel-Palestine in the modern political landscape.

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National Survival or Liberation:
Gendered Perspectives on Women's Education Reform
in the Late Qing Reform Period, 1898-1907

By Jaden Thacker

This paper addresses gendered perspectives on women's education reform during the Late Qing Reform Period, discussing how men and women understood the purposes of reform, what aspects of Western education Chinese education should emulate, who should be a role model, and, most importantly, what the ideal woman should look like going into the 20th century. The writings of prominent male and female reformers, actions taken by the Women's Study Society, and previous scholarship by Rebecca E. Karl, Dorothy Ko, Joan Judge, Anais Fang, Xiaoyi Liu, and Nanxiu Qian, display the varying ways men and women envisioned education reform. They reveal that male reformers were primarily concerned with national survival, designing women's education to produce competent citizens and advance the aims of the state; yet, female reformers were more concerned with advancing women's individual interests through education reform, seeking political participation and personal liberation. These differences paved the way for a generation of politically active women beyond the Late Qing Reform Period and into the politics of a new republic.

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In the wake of China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, national survival became the most important issue among Chinese intellectuals. This war proved that the modernization of the military was not enough to save China from crisis; instead, a far more systemic and radical change proved necessary. Intellectuals saw deficits in China's political systems, economy, culture, and educational institutions in comparison with those of the West and Japan. As a result, from 1898 to the end of the Qing dynasty in 1912, scholars such as Liang Qichao and Kang Youwei, in collaboration with the Guangxu Emperor—and later, Empress Dowager Cixi—led reform movements in hopes of saving China from destruction. Among these reforms, education, specifically the education of women, became a national issue spearheaded by prominent male intellectuals, namely Liang Qichao and Jin Tianhe. However, it was not just men who sought to reform women's education in China, as women took a prominent role in reform as well. They formed women's schools, created curriculum, and engaged with male reformers through their own essays and journals, becoming active political participants through the education movement. While both male and female reformers saw the importance of women's education, their visions clashed over fundamental differences in their gendered perspectives.

To understand precisely how this ideological conflict manifested itself in the issue of women's education, this paper will first address the differing purposes of women's education in the eyes of male and female reformers. Then, it will examine the different ways in which men and women utilized Western ideals, role models, and academics to create and justify their reforms. Finally, it will illustrate how ideal womanhood changed in the era of reform and how that ideal was profoundly shaped by gendered perspectives. At the heart of the debate within the women's education reform movement of the Late Qing Dynasty lay a fundamental difference in perspective held by male and female reformers—a debate which shaped not only the education system of the period but also forged a generation of politically active women. The male reformer asserted that women's education in China should mirror that of the West in order to create a powerful and prosperous nation, with the ideal woman born out of it able to uplift China through the products of her labor. Female reformers, however, sought to uplift women—not the nation—through education, believing that this was what would truly create the ideal woman who would deliver China from crisis by her own political efforts, side by side with men.

Background Information

By 1898, when the Hundred Days' Reform began, the Qing dynasty had been mired in crisis for 56 years, stemming from their defeat in the First Opium War in 1842. That year marked the beginning of the so-called "Century of Humiliation," a period during which China was the victim of intensifying foreign imperialism and a domestic crisis. Following the Opium Wars and the Taiping rebellion, the Qing dynasty began its first reform movement of this period, the Self-Strengthening Movement.[1] Li Hongzhang described the Self-Strengthening Movement as "the biggest change in more than three thousand years,"[2] though, in reality, the movement was rather limited in scope, focusing only on technological and military reform to better combat internal and external threats. However, the Self-Strengthening Movement ultimately ended in failure. Thirty-four years of military and technological reform was unable to save China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. Thus, scholars across China, with the backing of the Guangxu Emperor, began the Hundred Days' Reform, which called for and enacted profound changes in politics, economics, culture, and education.[3] In this period, reform was the primary focus of the government, occurring in nearly all sectors of society in an attempt to revitalize China at a fundamental level. While the Hundred Days' Reform met an untimely end, it established a precedent of radical social and political change in China—a precedent restored in the reform movement of 1901, following defeat at the hands of the Eight Nation Alliance, and that was brought towards its logical conclusion with the overthrowing of the Qing dynasty in 1912.

Of the many reformers of the Late Qing Reform Period, a few stand out as the most notable in the world of education reform, namely Liang Qichao, Jin Tianhe and He-Yin

[1] Nanxiu Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender in Late Qing China : Xue Shaohui and the Era of Reform*. (Stanford University Press, 2015), 5.

[2] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender*, 5.

[3] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 5-6.

Zhen. Of these, Liang Qichao was regarded as the foremost intellectual of China during this period. Trained by Kang Youwei, the most prominent leader of the Hundred Days' Reform, Qichao was—like his master—a leader in the Hundred Days' Reform. An avid writer of political essays and the founder and editor of multiple major progressive newspapers, Qichao's works profoundly shaped all aspects of the reform period both before and after his 1898 exile.[4] Liang Qichao's essay *On Women's Education* was published in 1897 in his series of essays, *On Institutional Reform*, which were written in response to China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War.[5] Jin Tianhe was a prominent writer born to a wealthy family and the recipient of a traditional education. After failing the civil service exam, Tianhe turned towards "statecraft" (*jingshi*) scholarship which led him into the world of reform.[6] Tianhe, a more radical figure than Qichao, was an active advocate for the anti-Qing revolutionary movement, and following the revolution, he served in education-related government posts.[7] *The Women's Bell* is one of his most famous works; written in 1903, it quickly became one of the most widely spread texts on feminism and women's education.[8] He-Yin Zhen provides the most radical perspective of these three thinkers. After moving to Tokyo in 1907, He-Yin Zhen became associated with multiple exiled Chinese revolutionaries. With them, she founded the Society for the Restoration of Women's Rights and its associated journal, *Natural Justice* (*Tianyi*).[9] While *Natural Justice* only ran for one year, it was the most influential source of socialist, Marxist, anarchist, and feminist thought at the end of the Qing Dynasty.[10]

The Purpose of Women's Education According to Male Reformers

Men like Liang Qichao and Jin Tianhe were motivated to become involved in education reform primarily for the sake of national survival. After China's defeats to both

[4] Lydia Liu et al., *The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory (*Columbia University Press, 2013), 187-188.

[5] Liu et al., *Birth of Chinese Feminism*, 187-188.

[6] Liu et al., *Birth of Chinese Feminism,* 205.

[7] Liu et al., *Birth of Chinese Feminism*, 205.

[8] Liu et al., *Birth of Chinese Feminism*, 205.

[9] Liu et al., *Birth of Chinese Feminism*, 51.

[10] Liu et al., *Birth of Chinese Feminism*, 51.

the West and Japan, the need for sweeping national reform in all sectors of political, social, and cultural life was evident in the eyes of national reformers who believed that China's lack of success was the result of a fundamental inferiority, emphasized following the failure of the Self-Strengthening Movement. One of the methods of reform they stressed was education, specifically women's education. In Liang Qichao's essay *On Women's Education*, he directly argued that women's education is integral to national survival, saying that it "fundamentally determines whether a nation will survive or be destroyed."[11] In fact, Qichao maintained that women's education reform is the single most important reform for the nationalist, declaring "when I seek out the root causes of national weakness, I find that they inevitably lie in women's lack of education."[12] Qichao was not alone in his belief that women's education is fundamentally tied to the fate of the nation. Jin Tianhe, in his essay *The Women's Bell*, stressed that without education reform, China and its people will be destroyed.[13] The idea that education should serve as a means for national survival became the bedrock of women's education reform movements, and this ideology profoundly affected the shape of women's education in practice. Qichao's *On Women's Education* was used as the foundation for the first school for girls in China, the Shanghai Girls' School, where Qichao and men who shared his beliefs attempted to establish a Western-style education system that would enhance China's military and economic power, all in the name of protecting the nation from crisis.[14] Additionally, during the 1898 Hundred Days' Reform, reformers juxtaposed the state of women's education with the strength of the nation.[15] To Tianhe, the state of China at the time was one of 'slavery,' to which he rhetorically asked, "What is the method for liberating slaves?" and argued "only education."[16] Tianhe went on to assert that "Education is a

[11] Liang Qichao, "On Women's Education," in *The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory*, ed. Lydia Liu et al. (Columbia University Press, 2013) 194.

[12] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 190.

[13] Jin Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," in *The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory*, ed. Lydia Liu et al. (Columbia University Press, 2013), 241-242.

[14] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 125.

[15] Xiaoyi Liu, "The Rise of Women's Modern Schooling in Late Qing China (1840-1911)," *Education Journal* 37, (2009): 89-117.

[16] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 242.

machine for manufacturing a national people," demonstrating that, in the eyes of the male nationalist reformer, education was the means of national liberation from crisis and the factory in which a powerful nation state would be produced. Tianhe and Qichao's nationalism ultimately overruled the interest of the individual; they believed the nation-state was paramount—and therefore women's interests were secondary[17]—illustrating how men's involvement in education reform was driven by nationalism alone and that, to them, reform's principal function was to save China in its time of crisis.

Liang Qichao also argued that the purpose of women's education was to provide women with the necessary skills for professional careers in order to ease the economic burden on men and strengthen the national economy. Qichao contended that the poverty of China and its people stemmed from the fact that individual men had to support multiple family members.[18] His solution to this problem was to give women jobs, something he claimed could only happen if women were able to receive a practical education.[19] The goal of training women for work in this new nation profoundly shaped women's education. Male reformers devalued education in the arts, instead promoting subjects that they believed would benefit China directly—a concrete consequence of the national survival-minded male reformer.[20] Both Qichao and Tianhe argued for women's education to focus on subjects they deemed most practical for the professional careers of women. Tianhe clearly laid out his vision for what women should study in his essay *The Women's Bell,* arguing that economics, law, and philosophy should be the cornerstones of women's ideals as national citizens and that physics, chemistry, and map-making should be taught in the name of practical careers.[21] Tianhe even provided a three-year curriculum, one that almost completely disregarded the

[17] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 245.

[18] Qichao, "On Women's Education", 191.

[19] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 191.

[20] Joan Judge, "Reforming the Feminine: Female Literacy and the Legacy of 1898," in *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period,* eds. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow (Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 169.

[21] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 246.

art and literature based education women had traditionally received[22] in favor of his so-called practical education.[23] Liang Qichao and Jin Tianhe were among—if not the—most important men in the women's education reform movement, and their writings doubtlessly inspired reformers across the nation, establishing an education system dedicated solely to the creation of professional women who could uplift China from poverty through work.

In the eyes of the male reformer, work was just one of the ways in which women could indirectly contribute to the success of the nation. One of the most important beliefs held by male reformers was that women must be educated to be mothers in order to raise new national citizens, an ideal that was held to be crucial to national survival. The education of men was central to the endurance of China; men were to be citizens of the nation and thus needed to be properly educated. For men like Qichao, however, women's education reform was emphasized because mothers would be the first to educate their children.[24] Qichao argued that if a mother was a good teacher then her child would be raised properly educated. Therefore, the education of the nation and its new citizens would stem from women.[25] Tianhe echoes this sentiment, asserting that "education is a calling very naturally suited to women!" and hence his desire to teach psychology to turn women into better teachers.[26] Tianhe further emphasized the importance of educated women becoming educators in turn; three out of four of his suggested positions for learned women to take on were in education.[27] Once again, Tianhe and Qichao aligned on their ideals, demonstrating that male reformers believed that the duty of the educated woman was to educate. In other words, they argued that national survival would emerge from intellectual citizens and that education would come from knowledgeable mothers, therefore resulting in the next

[22] Traditional forms of women's education that were based in literature were exclusively for elite women, however this form of education did produce groups of scholarly women that grew into organizations such as the Women's Study Society, as in the case of Xue Shaohui.

[23] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 245 [table of his three year curriculum].

[24] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 193.

[25] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 193.

[26] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 246.

[27] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 246.

generation of educated men—ultimately the more important citizens in the eyes of the male reformer.

The Purpose of Women's Education According to Female Reformers

While they did care about national survival, women like He-Yin Zhen believed that women's education and liberation should be done by women and for the benefit of women, not primarily for the benefit of men or the nation. He-Yin Zhen, a radical reformer and feminist, was highly critical of men who argued for education along the lines of economic improvement, such as Qichao. She contended that men's interest in education reform came from self-interest and comfort, citing the focus on household management and the creation of skilled workers and teachers in women's education as a way to alleviate men's burden.[28] She also believed that men should not be the ones to liberate women, asserting that women's rights must come from women themselves[29] because, as she reasoned, male reformers had no intention of actually benefiting women, despite taking actions that—at first glance—may have seemingly facilitated women's liberation.[30] The ideological conflict between male and female reformers manifested itself in the issue of economic independence, which followed from education. Qiu Jin and He-Yin Zhen argued that the issue of women's economic independence was not, as men contended, a burden holding the nation back, but rather a problem for women. Qiu Jin, He-Yin Zhen, and other feminist-minded female reformers campaigned for economic independence to make women into individuals, not agents of the state economy.[31] Female reformers argued that prioritizing the empowerment of women as opposed to the nation would ultimately produce greater benefits to China as a whole while simultaneously achieving their goal of true liberation.[32]

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[28] He-Yin Zhen, "On the Question of Women's Liberation" in *The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory*, ed. Lydia Liu et al. (Columbia University Press, 2013)*,* 61-62.

[29] Zhen, "On the Question of Women's Liberation," 63.

[30] Zhen, "On the Question of Women's Liberation," 62.

[31] Rebecca E. Karl, "'Slavery,' Citizenship, and Gender in Late Qing China's Global Context," in *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period,* eds. Rebecca E. Karl and Peter Zarrow (Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 169.

[32] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 245.

Female reformers believed that the purpose of women's education was to create active female participants in politics and the nation. This was contrary to the objectives of men such as Qichao and Tianhe, who saw women not as political participants, but as the mothers and educators of them. To female reformers and students, women's education reform was an issue of utmost importance; however, unlike men, they thought that education reform would be advantageous to the nation by enabling women to participate in national politics.[33] In this way, education reform became intertwined with other women's rights issues. Education developed into a way for women to struggle for political and social positions;[34] an educated woman could become a proper citizen and use her knowledge to fight for herself and the nation. Joan Judge, a historian of modern China at York University, argues that women, like men, "drew a direct link between women's learning and the national project." However, Judge explains that, unlike men, women believed that education would "not be merely for that nation…but of the nation…a means of empowering women to participate personally in the national struggle."[35] From the perspective of female reformers, the salvation of China did not lie in educated women raising a generation of educated male leaders; rather, it would be educated female leaders, fighting alongside men, who would deliver China from national crisis. In the words of Yin Qin, a writer in overseas women's journals, women would "bear the daggers to defend the nation,"[36] demonstrating that in the eyes of these female reformers, education reform would create independent, politically active women, who consequently would benefit the nation through their roles in national politics.

Western Influence and Ancient China

Both men and women looked to the West for inspiration regarding reform, yet the Western ideas they embraced differed between them. Western influence also further complicated domestic reform by introducing conflicting ideologies among Chinese education reformers. The central Western concepts that men elevated were social Darwinism

[33] Judge, "Reforming the Feminine", 173.
[34] Karl, "'Slavery,' Citizenship, and Gender", 230.
[35] Judge, "Reforming the Feminine", 173.
[36] Judge, "Reforming the Feminine," 174.

and republican motherhood. As previously discussed, men had an interest in women's education as a means to create mothers who would teach the next generation of male citizens. This matches with the Western—more specifically French and American—idea of republican motherhood, wherein well-educated mothers were necessary to educate the citizens of the new republic. Liang Qichao and other reformers who held this view were inspired by this concept of republican motherhood.[37] Qichao, when seeking to prove his claim that women's education is necessary for national survival, argued that, for Westerners, mothers handle 70% of a child's education. He continued by asserting that "If the mother understands the fundamentals of education and is skilled in applying them…her children will be able to comprehend the rudimentary principles of scholarship,"[38] a notion he directly borrowed from republican motherhood. Social Darwinism proved to be another serious influence among male reformers, and it became a cornerstone of Qichao's understanding of education reform, which he derived from Western race science.[39] To Qichao, education was a slow, evolution-like, process that would eventually transform China into a noble and civilized nation. Likewise, Tianhe based his education on Darwinist notions of the survival of the fittest. He opened his discussion of women's education in *The Women's Bell* with the claim that "China and other countries, then, can only submit to and obey England, becoming her slaves, or the slaves of her slaves" because England's schools produced "self-respecting, self-reliant people."[40] Tianhe went on to claim that unless China is able to move on from its "slave education," the "Chinese race" would die out.[41] His message was clear: education is a Darwinist process that determines if a nation, like a species of bird, is capable of survival or if it would die out in natural selection, being subordinated to the 'superior' entity. The fear of China being selected out of the population, inspired by Social Darwinism, spread to other reformers across China who, similarly, argued that education reform was a necessary means

[37] Judge, "Reforming the Feminine," 171.

[38] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 194.

[39] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 195.

[40] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 241.

[41] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 214.

for China to be fit enough to survive its competition with the West.[42] Both Social Darwinism and republican motherhood shaped the curriculum created by reformers. Liang Qichao utilized Social Darwinist thought as a reason to promote physical education in women's schools, a mindset shared by Tianhe, who included calisthenics as a core aspect of his proposed three-year study plan. Republican motherhood was the foundational ideology behind both Tianhe's and Qichao's curriculum, which strove to educate women to be the subsequent educators of men. For these men, the Western ideas of social Darwinism and republican motherhood served to enhance and inspire their own ideologies, which, in turn, significantly altered the shape of women's education.

Men looked to the West as the ultimate ideal for society, admiring the educational institutions of the United States and Western Europe as well as the national power that followed from such institutions and the scholars they produced; to Qichao, America epitomized the ideal path to follow. He praised the U.S. for being the closest to his vision of equal education and therefore having the most equal employment, which was seen as essential for national strength, leading him to conclude that America stood as the strongest nation in the world.[43] Qichao himself drew the connection between national strength and women's education by concluding that "a country with the best women's education is also the strongest."[44] He then proceeded to claim that the other Western powers and Japan had worse education than America and were therefore weaker, and China naturally fell to the bottom of his list for both education and national power.[45] Qichao's argument—that the strength of Western education is the cause of Western power—demonstrates how nationalist education reformers desired to emulate Western women's education as a means to achieve power comparable to that of the West. Tianhe was much more direct in his idolization of the West, praising the state of women's education in Europe, specifically in the sciences and

[42] Joan Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation: Chinese Nationalisms and Female Subjectivities in the Early Twentieth Century," *The American Historical Review* 106, no. 3 (2001): 775-776.

[43] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 201-202.

[44] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 202.

[45] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 202.

languages.[46] Tianhe cited the Netherlands as a prime example of women's education, because all girls received education at the age of six, creating a society in which young women were more educated than most Chinese men.[47] He then criticized Chinese scholars for having less practical knowledge than regular Westerners, both male and female. Tianhe's case studies served to contrast the "old national people" and the new, who were educated like Europeans.[48] To Tianhe, the new national people were the ones with the substance to forge a new nation, a substance derived from a European education. Qichao and Tianhe's praise of the West perfectly illustrates how male scholars looked up to the West because of both their model of education and the power that follows from it.

Women looked to the West more critically, admiring Western feminist movements but also offering criticism—rooted in their cultural and political ideologies and biases—which shaped the ways in which these women sought to accept or reject Western ideas. While Tianhe wholeheartedly and blindly praised the West, He-Yin Zhen argued that Western feminist movements were flawed. She did praise Western women for their efforts, such as Finnish and Norwegian women for fighting for political participation and suffrage. However, she criticized Western women for not targeting the root of social issues, which she identified as power itself. She believed the ultimate goal of women's liberation should be "to free the world from the rule of man and from the rule of woman…the eventual abolition of government."[49] This critique came from her position as a communist and anarchist, leading her to criticize the Western feminist movements that resulted in a minority of women attaining power;[50] this shows that female reformers were influenced both by their position as feminists and by their political ideologies. Additionally, her challenge of Western movements displays how radical female reformers were more critical of the West than their male nationalist counterparts, which altered how women's education was perceived by men as

[46] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 244.
[47] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell, 244.
[48] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell," 244.
[49] Zhen, "On the Question of Women's Liberation," 64-65, 70.
[50] Zhen, "On the Question of Women's Liberation," 66.

opposed to women. While Qichao or Tianhe sought to emulate Western education systems, He-Yin Zhen explicitly stated that the American system should not be followed, claiming that it would lead to a "sham equality deprived of true freedom."[51] Though He-Yin Zhen does not provide a curriculum like Tianhe, it is still clear that her ideal form of education would hardly resemble the one pitched by her male counterparts.

Another way in which female reformers differed from male reformers regarded the focus of their Western inspiration. While men looked to educational institutions as a path towards national power, women looked towards cultural institutions that gave women a place in academia and politics, such as the French salon, which served as a model for equal participation. To Xue Shaohui, a prominent reformer involved in the Women's Study Society and the *Nu Xuebao*, French salon culture was an archetype that expanded women's space and gave them a voice in intellectual discussions, art, and literature;[52] this was a space women did not have in China, where gender segregation was still upheld in both cultural and academic institutions. She sought to bridge divides by emulating these cultural institutions in women's writing culture and the Women's Study Society.[53] Notably, the Women's Study Society included multiple European women,[54] illustrating that, despite their criticisms, female reformers worked closely with their Western counterparts in order to achieve their ideals of equality in education and politics. To female reformers, the West was a model for a society that was less segregated, and these women strove to implement that culture into a Chinese context.

Both men and women integrated Western learning with traditional Chinese education to shape education reform. Men related the ideas of Chinese scholars to those of the West while women related Western exemplars to Chinese ones. Liang Qichao frequently connects his Western inspirations with the writings of ancient Chinese scholars. For example, when discussing republican motherhood and the importance of childhood education in the

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[51] Zhen, "On the Question of Women's Liberation," 59.

[52] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 172-173.

[53] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender*, 129-130, 173.

[54] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 131-132.

West, he cited *The Family Instructions of Master Yan*, a sixth century text;[55] he also did this when referring to Western economic principles.[56] Female reformers took these connections further. Joan Judge refers to this as an archaeomodern approach: a combination of archaic tradition and foreign modernity.[57] The addition of Western heroines into the female exemplar genre epitomizes the archaeomodern approach of female reformers. These additions gave women conceptions of independence and political action through figures like Joan of Arc and Madame Roland, who were related to characters like Mulan. Women used traditional symbols to show devotion to education reform inspired by the West.[58] The impact of Eastern and Western contributions to education reform is most clearly displayed through the actions of the Women's Study Society, who combined Western and Chinese learning, teaching scholarship, and the arts into the curriculum of the Girl's School in Shanghai after men relinquished control of the institution.[59] This combination of Western ideals and Chinese learning was contrary to the desires of men who wanted to embrace Western scholarship and reject Chinese learning.[60] Tianhe's total omission of any poetics or literary arts in his curriculum concretely demonstrates the effects of the ideological divide between male and female reformers in practice. Tianhe's work, when contrasted with the work of the Women's Study Society, illustrates how the divide in attitude regarding the West and the ancient past manifested itself in more than just debates and essays; rather, it had a profound impact on the construction of curriculum for women's school and strained relations between female educators and male reformers.

[55] Qichao, "On Women's Education", 193.

[56] Qichao, "On Women's Education," 190.

[57] Joan Judge, "Blended Wish Images: Chinese and Western Exemplary Women at the Turn of the Twentieth Century", in *Beyond Tradition and Modernity: Gender, Genre, and Cosmopolitanism in Late Qing China* (United States: Brill), 102.

[58] Judge, "Blended Wish Images" 134.

[59] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 128-9.

[60] Judge, "Reforming the Feminine", 169.

Womanhood

Education reform created a new ideal womanhood by giving women new roles in society, as well as a new national purpose; however, the ideal womanhood was envisioned differently between men and women. Among male reformers, ideal womanhood was one in which virtuous women would privately play a role in the nation through the raising of educated male citizens and strengthening the nation indirectly through professional careers that benefited the economy. Tianhe best reflects the male position as he explicitly listed his goals for women's education and the ideal womanhood that he hoped to create. Tianhe asserted that education would create women who give birth to healthy children and would be pure in morality, become models of the nation, and promote public morality.[61] These points may have given the ideal woman a role in the affairs of the nation, but an indirect one, as this male model of womanhood was not one in which women themselves were political actors. Rather, it was a model in which the products of women's work benefited the nation, not women themselves. Qichao likewise saw ideal womanhood as involving a Western education and a "useful profession,"[62] as well as in adopting the model of republican motherhood. It is clear that men saw this ideal womanhood resulting from education as one in which women supported the nation indirectly, rather than as direct political participants. Despite this, it still represented a shift from previous periods, in which the ideal woman was one shrouded away from the world entirely.

Women took a different approach to ideal womanhood; they saw the ideal woman as one who was an active participant in the nation—an author who spread their beliefs through journals or a member of an association that advocated for reform. In other words, a woman who was herself a political actor. He-Yin Zhen provided a clear example of this ideology. To He-Yin Zhen, this ideal came in the form of women working towards anarchism and communism. Qiu Jin shared this view; she saw women as pillars of society who should take active roles in politics and social change. She explicitly argued for a shift away from the

[61] Tianhe, "The Women's Bell", 250.
[62] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 153.

cloistered ideal womanhood of the past to this new ideal, claiming that she would "waken the ones dreaming in the inner chambers to talk about equal rights."[63] Finally, Xue Shaohui also argued for the increased political participation of women, contending that the input of women was essential in politics, and that women must stand equally to men in the political world.[64] Broadly, the womanhood of female reformers was one in which women had a direct, often political, role in the nation. Women worked towards this through the creation of journals and organizations that became incredibly influential in the reform movement and beyond. He-Yin Zhen was the founder of the Society for the Restoration of Women's Rights, and despite its short run, the journal of this society became one of the most influential among radicals. Xue Shaohui did the same; her journal, *Nu Xuebao*, disseminated feminist ideas, spread arguments for women's education reform and mobilized women to take part in said reform.[65] Additionally, the Women's Study Society took a central role in the management of the Shanghai Girls' School, illustrating that the womanhood of female reformers was one that held real power and influence during the Late Qing Reform Period.

Beyond Gender

It is important to note that this divide was not as simple as male versus female. Some women held the nationalist position that is associated with male reformers in this paper, and vice versa. For example, Shimoda Utako, a Japanese woman who ran a school for Chinese women, utilized virtually the same rhetoric as men like Qicaho and Tianhe.[66] The students she taught became writers and educators themselves, with many ultimately embracing the same nationalist ideology as their particular teachers.[67] These women, despite promoting a nationalist ideology over a feminist one, were still activists who cultivated female political

[63] Anais Fang, "Female Education in the Late Qing Dynasty: The Formation of a New Womanhood," *International Forum of Teaching and Studies* 18 (2), 35.

[64] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender,* 147.

[65] Qian, *Politics, Poetics, and Gender*, 136.

[66] Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation", 772.

[67] Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation," 797. An example of overseas students holding views similar to male reformers.

participation in China, just as their feminist counterparts did.[68] The contributions of these nationalist women are equally important, despite not being the central focus of this paper. Indeed, there is certainly more room for scholarship on how gender shaped the political ideologies of reformers, as well as the role women's education reform held in broader political ideologies and movements within the Late Qing Dynasty.

Conclusion

Both men and women became concerned with the state of China in the late 19th and early 20th century, and they turned to education reform, not as merely a reform of the education system for women, but as a reform of womanhood itself. Reformers asked themselves what the ends could be of a reformed women's education system. What should be taken from the West? From the ancient past? What should be incorporated, and what should be left behind in the shimmer of China's distant horizon? The logical conclusion of their questions was thus: what should the Chinese woman of the 20th century look like? What could these women do for the nation? What could they do for themselves? In the Late Qing Reform Period, these were the central questions to all education reformers, male and female, nationalist and anarchist. However, it is evident that male and female reformers fundamentally disagreed over the answers to these questions. These conflicts were born out of the men's focus on nationalism and the salvation of the nation, rather than the interests of women, feminism, and the advancement of women's rights, the priority of female reformers. This conflict of ideology primarily played out in education reform, fundamentally altering the development of schools and curriculum for girls. However, more importantly, it was the debates over women's education that allowed women to attain a voice in the new nation as a result of education reform associations, journals, and political connections with male reformers and Western women. These developments, rooted in education reform, ultimately paved the way for women's desired political and social roles in the new nation, laying the groundwork for a generation of politically active women who went beyond the Late Qing Reform Period and into the politics of a new republic.

[68] Judge, "Talent, Virtue, and the Nation," 796-797.

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The Ottoman Embedded Economy: The Social and Political Contexts Shaping Good Exchange in the 17th-Century Ottoman Empire

By Alice Gao

This paper examines the exchange of goods in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire through the framework of Karl Polanyi's conception of the embedded economy. Rather than treating economic activity as an autonomous, profit-driven system, it argues that Ottoman markets were inextricably linked to the social, political, and religious institutions in which they operated. Drawing on examples from Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatnâme*, Ottoman law codes, and advice literature, this paper analyzes three patterns of integration identified by Polanyi: redistribution, reciprocity, and exchange. It explores how the imperial state and institutions, such as vakıfs, redistributed goods and resources in order to provide for subjects and maintain political stability; that reciprocal practices such as gift-giving reflected and reinforced social hierarchies and relationships; and that even market exchanges were shaped by local customs, communal expectations, and religious motivations. These examples show how economic behavior in the Ottoman Empire was not governed solely by profit-maximization, but was instead embedded within a broader network of social relations and institutions. Therefore, understanding the 17th-century Ottoman economy requires a holistic approach that accounts for the social contexts that structured and gave meaning to the exchange of goods.

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Within the Ottoman Empire of the 17th century, the exchange of goods cannot be understood simply using a strictly economic frame of reference. Examining various examples of how goods changed hands can offer insight into the mechanisms behind these interactions and thus an understanding of the factors that shaped how the Ottoman Empire functioned. Evliya Çelebi, an Ottoman explorer who recorded his travels in his travelogue, *Seyahatnâme,* chronicled examples of various forms of economic activity throughout the 17th-century Ottoman Empire, ranging from political gestures to guild prices to individual exchanges. Ottoman advice literature describes commodity exchanges shaped by state intervention, illuminating the non-profit driven motivations for state arbitration of markets, with the Ottoman Law Codes outlining the extent of these interventions. The examples drawn from these sources ultimately demonstrate that a market fueled by purely economic forces did not exist in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire. Rather, these examples offer support for economic historian Karl Polanyi's conception of the embedded economy: the idea that economies are not autonomous subsystems, but rather intimately connected to social structures. Polanyi's framework can be extended to this particular context, highlighting the social and political factors that shaped the exchange of goods. This paper proposes that redistribution, reciprocity, and exchange all critically shaped economic activity in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire, and therefore, the 17th-century Ottoman economy can not be disentangled from existing social institutions.

This paper will specifically examine the 17th-century Ottoman economy through the framework of Karl Polanyi's idea of the embedded economy. As historian Joseph Stiglitz explains, "Polanyi saw the market as part of the broader economy, and the broader economy as part of a still broader society."[1] Polanyi does not consider economic institutions as existing independently of social institutions. Instead, he stresses the importance of considering social status, relationships, and systems when considering the exchange of goods within economies prior to the 19th-century push towards laissez-faire markets. The embedded economy is, as Polanyi describes, "embedded and enmeshed in institutions, economic and noneconomic.

[1] Joseph Stiglitz, "Foreward," in *The Great Transformation*, (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001), xv.

The inclusion of the noneconomic is vital."[2] Thus, Polanyi rejects the neoliberal idea that economic activity is driven exclusively by profit-maximization. Polanyi specifies three patterns of integration, or three common themes that economic activity were driven by: redistribution, reciprocity, and exchange, with "exchange" being in reference to the third pattern of integration and defined as the exchange of goods at bargained rates. As a result, his paper will consider the 17th-century Ottoman economy by examining good exchange within these three themes.

Redistribution in 17th-Century Ottoman Economy

The first frame is redistribution. According to Polanyi, "redistribution designates appropriational movements towards a center and out of it again."[3] This paper references the center as any individual or institutional actor that holds some sort of authority over peripheral actors, which are, for example, state subjects or welfare recipients. Appropriational movements can include the flow of goods and money. The recipients of redistributive material do not necessarily have to be contributing to the movement towards the center.

One center of redistribution was the Ottoman state, which took steps to ensure that their subjects had basic, necessary provisions. The imperial state would sometimes distribute food at public events and even import basic food goods from outside the empire if necessary.[4] These actions are significant because they demonstrate the ways in which the Ottoman Empire strove to provide for their subjects. By distributing food at public functions, the imperial state was achieving the end goal of guaranteeing that their subjects were fed by mediating the market. Additionally, by importing goods from abroad, they used the wealth they collected through taxation for a redistribution of goods to their subjects.

Another prominent way that the state took economic action through redistribution was by setting price controls on basic foods, utilizing both price ceilings and price floors.

[2] Karl Polanyi, "The Economy as Instituted Process," essay, in *Trade and Market in the Early Empires* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1957), 250.

[3] Polanyi, "The Economy," 250.

[4] Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, "The Consuming City," in *A Social History of Ottoman Istanbul*, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 158.

The Ottoman state demonstrated an imperial provisionist impulse by setting prices for some basic goods, such as wine, to ensure that their subjects had access to basic necessities. For example, the Ottoman Law Codes written by Sultan Mehmed II in the mid-seventeenth century explain, "If he has wine left over, he is not to force the infidels to buy it, but to sell it only if the infidels agree at the local fixed price (*narh*)."[5] This section of the law codes discusses wine regulation in the Empire. The wine prices are not being set, but rather casually referenced. This indicates that the local wine price, and specifically the process of the Ottoman state setting wine prices, was both widely known and accepted. Additionally, the reference to the "local fixed price" suggests that the imperial state had not set one fixed price for wine across the Ottoman Empire. Thus, this reference indicates multiple centers of redistribution were more localized than the imperial state. In addition to price ceilings, the Ottoman law codes also reference price floors. The codes discuss standardized cereal prices, explaining, "The prices of cereals being publicly known in the various areas, the sancaḳbegis and subaşıs are not to make villagers accept lower prices."[6] The codes are referencing the public, standard cereal prices. By discussing the price floors for the cereal, the imperial state is intervening in order to ensure that the villagers are being paid more—or at least equal—to the amount that they would otherwise receive. The two examples, wine and cereal, demonstrate two ways in which the Ottoman state intervened in price-setting markets and suggest that redistribution played a notable role in economic activity.

In order to understand the state's motivation behind these actions, it is necessary to consider the noneconomic incentives that illuminate how the state's tendency to favor redistribution was linked to social institutions. The imperial state's interventions cannot be understood as simply a conglomeration of economic forces. By making these interventions, the state did not aim to regulate market activity; rather, it was the provision of food to Ottoman subjects that was the ultimate goal. As Stiglitz explains, the embedded market views "the market economy not as an end in itself, but as means to more fundamental

[5] Ménage, V.L., *Ottoman Historical Documents: The Institutions of an Empire,* ed. Colin Imber (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 97.

[6] Ménage*, Ottoman Historical Documents,* 114.

ends."[7] The fundamental end that some officials in the Ottoman state aimed to meet was providing food to their subjects. This is demonstrated in a 1518 advice book to the sultan where Mustafa Ali discusses how the sultans can control government officials to universally regulate prices for basic goods. He explains, "it is the pious sultan's, the world-dominating monarch's, responsibility to take pains to avert such public disasters and abolish [the custom of] taking stores under protection."[8] Ali is a disgruntled government official addressing a supposed epidemic of corrupt administrators receiving free goods from merchants and allowing them to defy state-set prices in return. Rifa'at Abou-El-Haj explains that advice literature of this nature was partisan and was "political tracts that reflect a struggle among the ruling elite."[9] Thus, Mustafa Ali is writing to argue that his solution is the most aptly suited to meet this commonly accepted end: providing food to Ottoman subjects. Therefore, he is assuming that this is a goal that the sultan is interested in achieving. This indicates that he believed—and expected the sultan to believe—that providing subjects with food was an important sultanic duty in and of itself. The goal was not market regulation; the paramount aim was instead supplying the Ottoman subjects with the ability to have food. Not only did some government officials believe that it was imperative for the imperial power to provide their subjects with basic goods, Evlyia Çelebi's travelogue suggested that Çelebi agreed with these recommendations. When describing all the praiseworthy practices in Tabriz, he includes, "Animals and slaves also are sold at prices determined by the law of Safi and transactions are supervised by professional assayers." Çelebi commends Sheikh Safi's control over the prices in the markets of Tabriz. By extending the praise beyond the Ottoman Empire, it is clear that Çelebi did not see the role of providing for one's subjects to be specific to the Ottoman sultan, but saw this to be the inherent role of the central authority in any political system.

[7] Stiglitz, "Foreward," xv.

[8] Mustafa bin Ahmet Âli, *Mustafā Âli's Counsel for Sultans of 1581*, trans. Andreas Tietze (Wien: Verlag der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1982), 25-27.

[9] Rafia'At 'Ali Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2005), 23.

While food provision was a sultanic duty, there were also external factors, such as political power, that motivated the Ottoman state to set market prices. Historians Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet claim that the state's survival depended on maintaining a political equilibrium, which required them to have the ability to feed the population,[10] suggesting different motivations for price setting. For example, the political survival of the ruling powers could be affected by their ability to feed Ottoman subjects. Because some subjects, like Çelebi, viewed setting prices as one sultanic duty, the rulers thus had an incentive to make sure that these expectations were met. Feeding the population was the primary goal, rather than ensuring that the market ran smoothly.

Another center of redistribution in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire was the vakıf, an institution central to Istanbul that served as a system of welfare. Vakıfs were often funded by endowments from wealthier subjects. Consequently, the vakıf did not provide services to the people of Istanbul in order to earn a profit, but rather for social motivation. Boyer explains how the vakıf institution "fed, educated, housed, washed and gave medical treatment to the population."[11] Thus, the vakıf is another example of the exchange of goods and services by way of redistribution rather than economic market. However, vakıfs did not just redistribute their wealth; they also used it to create grand structures like complexes surrounding mosques. Boyar argues that "The vakıf was not only a matter of religious duty… to build a magnificent mosque… was also a matter of prestige, an act aimed at displaying and legitimising power."[12] In order to maintain their system of redistribution, vakıfs needed to assert their authority. As a result, the economic activity that this generated was not aimed at profit-making, but rather at establishing and maintaining social relationships that centered and uplifted vakıfs. Their ultimate goal was provision, and reaching this goal required spending money to maintain social status. Therefore, the economic actions cannot be understood without considering the unique social position that the vakıfs occupied.

[10] Boyar and Fleet, "Welfare," 158.
[11] Boyar and Fleet, "Welfare,"129.
[12] Boyar and Fleet, "Welfare," 140.

Reciprocity in 17th-Century Ottoman Economy

In addition to redistribution, reciprocity motivated other good exchanges in the 17th-century Ottoman Empire. As Polanyi describes, "reciprocity denotes movements between correlative points of symmetric groupings."[13] This paper interprets this to mean the movement of goods and money between individuals or institutions in different social groups or classes. Symmetry can refer to the groups belonging to the same social classification. For example, two actors of different income levels, occupations, and government rankings would be included.

In some instances, goods would be gifted in order to strengthen social ties between the two parties. Good exchange could reflect social ties and reciprocal relationships without an equal material exchange. Describing an interaction at the parade of guilds, Çelebi narrates that Süleyman Khan required an Ottoman high official to provide a large gift to the chief goldsmith at each of these parades, since Süleyman Khan had apprenticed under the master goldsmith years prior. Süleyman Khan did not provide the guildmaster with money, as he was expecting that he would receive an equal value in goods. This exchange instead reflects the social ties that he had to the goldsmiths' guild. His gift also reflects the service that Süleyman had previously received from the guildmaster, even though there was no price he was required to continually pay for this apprenticeship. Reciprocal relationships were not necessarily based upon the perceived value of the good or service, but instead upon their lasting social ties. Because this is not an exchange of goods and services of equal value, the interaction demonstrates how social institutions, rather than economic forces, had the potential to shape economic activity.

In other instances, rather than strengthening social connections, gifting would reflect the social hierarchy between different groups. Exchanges of goods could reflect differences in social status when those of a lower social standing gave goods to those of higher or equal social standing without an equal material exchange of goods in return. In his travelogue, Evliya Çelebi provides his observed accounts of those of higher social standing giving gifts

[13] Polanyi, "The Economy," 250.

to those of lower social standing; for instance, he describes the sultan giving a guildmaster gifts or direct donations to the poor. However, Çelebi also describes gifts from people of lower to higher social standing as commonplace. Çelebi recounts that, "all the great notables and small tradesmen" offered the Pasha, a high-ranking Ottoman aristocrat, gifts as soon as he arrived.[14] Çelebi specifies that the Pasha received gifts from people of all social classes, despite them all still being of lower social statuses than the Pasha. He does not provide a reason for these gifts. This indicates that gifts from lower to higher ranking individuals naturally occurred as a result of their difference in social status. The Pasha did not give these people gifts in return, and the interactions suggest that across this wide breadth of social classes, gifts were not given with the goal of profit maximization, but were rather ingrained in the customs of the society. Giving goods to the Pasha also made them more inclined to favor the gift-giver, which would be beneficial because of the Pasha's authority. These gifts were not anonymous, but they also did not stem from personal connection. Thus, this is once again an example of good exchange centered around social institutions, reflecting a pattern of reciprocation.

However, an instance of the Pasha giving a gift does suggest that these arise between actors of similar social status, not exclusively in the direction of lower to higher social status. The Pasha, while not giving gifts to those of higher status or tradespeople that gifted him, nevertheless gave goods to the khan in Tabriz. Çelebi says, "'The noble pasha your brother greets you,' I said, 'and sends these tokens of his love to your majesty so that you will not go empty-handed.'"[15] Çelebi references the Pasha as the "brother" of the khan, indicating that the two are of similar social standing. In the previous example, subjects of lesser social standing were the ones giving gifts to the Pasha. Here, the Pasha's gift is given to a high-ranking government official outside of the Ottoman Empire who is of comparable prestige. This indicates that the movement of goods could flow up and at the same level of

[14] Evliya Çelebi, *An Ottoman Traveller: Selections from the Book of Travels of Evliya Çelebi*, trans. Robert Dankoff and Sooyong Kim (London: England, 2011), 70.

[15]Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, p 56.

the social hierarchy. Because the giver and the recipient's social statuses shaped the movement of goods between hands, these examples indicate that these exchanges cannot be explained solely by a supply-and-demand economic model. Rather, they suggest that it is necessary to contextualize these exchanges in the larger social customs and institutions that they took place in.

Reciprocity was not restricted to gift-exchanges; it could also affect the prices at which goods were exchanged. Even in formal and established markets, sellers and buyers would have some flexibility in price-setting, again allowing their discretion to play a role in the price of goods. In the Ottoman Empire, there were many guilds for laborers of crafts such as hunting, acrobatics, and fur-trapping. These guilds were organized and sometimes even sultan-recognized. Çelebi explains that, "[The hunters of the hunters' guild] are the furriers' hunters and possess sultanic rescripts exempting them from taxes."[16] Even among these more institutionalized sellers, members of these guilds had some flexibility in what prices they accepted when selling their goods. As Çelebi writes about the butchers' guild, "'We make our living with such a lawful trade, and are known for our generosity (cömerdlik). It is we who make Istanbul plentiful and cheap.'"[17] The butchers describe their actions as helping make meat in Istanbul cheaper. This clearly indicates that the seller can play a role in the exchange rate of meat. Sometimes, price-setting would not be solely based upon maximizing profit but would also consider its social implications and consequences. Specifically, it could be influenced by the reciprocal relationship between the guilds and the communities they served. The economy that Çelebi observed was embedded in the social relationships and institutions of its locale. The butchers were not solely motivated by possible profit; they were advertising their generosity for the viewers of the guild parade. This indicates that the butchers were not functioning in anonymous markets, but they were instead considering how their community viewed them, particularly regarding the way they practiced their trade when setting prices for their meat.

[16] Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, 27.
[17] Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, 44.

This reciprocal relationship between guilds and Ottoman subjects stemmed from the integration of occupational guilds into the communities and societies in which they existed. These guilds did not just exist as economic unifiers for subjects with the same occupation. Rather, they also reflected shared social and religious identities and relationships between their members. While detailing the different guilds that he encountered, Çelebi elaborates on each of their members' religions and the guilds' patron saints. When discussing the guild of sable merchants, Çelebi explains, "all of them Rumelian Greeks – from the cities of Serfice, Florunya, Liçista and Gölikesri – with no religion and no patron saint."[18] Çelebi's inclusion of the merchants' origin and common lack of religion indicates that these guilds were not simply economic actors. Instead, Çelebi deemed their shared religious and cultural identities notable enough to warrant a description. Additionally, the guild parade that Çelebi recounted implies that occupational guilds served a social role more than merely an economic one. At the parade, the guilds were not selling their products, but rather showcasing the service and value that each guild added to their community. Even when deciding which guild should lead the guild parade, leaders cited the Hadith saying, "*The best of men is he who is useful to mankind*." The sultan consequently allowed the Egyptian merchants to go first.[19] The leader of the parade is decided not based on profit, but on the perceived use of their guild to society. This demonstrates how a shared cultural value can compel decisions to be made considering factors other than economic motivations.

Exchange in 17th-Century Ottoman Economy

The third frame of reference is other exchanges of goods that are solely fueled by profit-maximization. Exchange here may not describe the movement of goods away from a center or between symmetric groups, as redistribution and reciprocity respectively do. Rather, exchange in this framework is the movement of goods that is influenced by social

[18] Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, 27.
[19] Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, 25-26.

institutions, customs, and relationships. In other words, this frame includes the swap of goods as driven by noneconomic forces.

Local customs and cultures could often shape the way that economic exchanges took place, affecting things like price and acceptable payment. Not only could the method of price-setting be influenced by local culture but also the means by which buyers paid for their goods. Çelebi recounts his experience in Trabzon. Trabazon was an Ottoman city where a particular fish, hapsi, was so desired and valued that the village developed a mythology surrounding its origins and significance to the city. While cash was commonly used when exchanging goods, there were times in which credit-based payments would be accepted. However, in Trabzon, hapsi was not able to be paid for via credit. Evliya Çelebi discusses the ways the villagers offered to pay for the hapsi. He explains, "The fisherman demanded payment, but since the men were naked and had no money on them they offered a pledge."[20] Buyers expected to be able to receive the fish in exchange for a promise of a later payment, indicating that pledges were accepted in other situations. For this specific fish, deeply valued in the culture of Trabzon, the sellers were unwilling to take pledges, even if that meant they would not be able to sell to these men. Additionally, also regarding Trabzon hapsi, Çelebi narrates, "People joke that they are sorry to see the brine dripping from the wrapping, and say: 'Hey, you're letting the fish juice drip out, why don't you toss in a little pilav!'" While this remark is in the context of a joke exaggerating the value of hapsi, it nevertheless indicates that the buyer expects the seller to add rice. This expectation is based on the value of the fish to the community. In this case, the seller is not gaining any additional value from including pilav; in fact, the seller is losing value. However, there is a shared understanding that the hapsi juice is too sacred to the community to be wasted. This challenges the assumption that exchanging goods necessitated an antagonistic relationship between the buyer and seller. The pair in fact worked together to maximize value for both parties involved. This demonstrates how the social kinship between buyer and seller in addition to local customs could shape the exchange of goods.

[20] Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, 45.

In addition to social relationships between individuals, the movement of goods could also be shaped by the political context of the interaction. While Polanyi, as asserted earlier, addresses the social contexts of economic activity, he includes the political and religious relationships within these societies. When describing the concept of the embedded economy, Polanyi explains, "For religion or government may be as important for the structure and functioning of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools." While the Ottoman state would sometimes set prices for goods, in practice, the enforcement of these prices—often paradoxically—artificially increased prices. The officials tasked with enforcing uniform prices could agree not to enforce the state-set price in exchange for the merchants' goods. In Ottoman advice writer Mustafa Ali's 1518 Counsel for Sultans, he explains that merchants would give their goods for free to the government officials in charge of setting prices. In turn, these officials would look the other way when merchants increased their prices. Ali was writing from a place of dissatisfaction and discontent with imperial authority. While this phenomenon of protection-for-goods occurred, his attribution of the failure of Ottoman markets to corrupt officials may certainly be overexaggerated. Thus, this exchange serves as an example of how political power could influence price-setting, but may not have been as ubiquitous or consequential as Ali claims.

Other times, Ottoman subjects would give money with the expectation of a divine reward. These exchanges would occur between a wide variety of actors including religious institutions, impoverished individuals, and Sufi dervishes. In Çelebi's travelogue, he recounts how, "I paid my votive of 100 guruş, distributing it among the dervishes at the convent of Bayram Veli, and receiving their benedictions in exchange." The convent received Çelebi's money without providing any material goods in exchange. Rather, this exchange is dependent upon the dervishes' place of religious authority in society. Çelebi's offering is contingent on the trust that he has for this convent to give him a religious blessing. This practice of giving money in exchange for religious rewards was not specific to Islam. When describing the Echmiadzin Cathedral, Çelebi notes how, "They fill jars and bottles with [oil] and send these as a blessing to Frengistan and throughout Christendom. In return they receive votive offerings from those places." By characterizing the money that the cathedral receives as "votive offerings," Çelebi suggests that the Christians receiving the cathedral's oil send in money in exchange for religious blessings. At the same time, this indicates that the cathedral is not distributing the oil at a set price. This exchange of goods is instead based on religious identity and the role that the cathedral serves within the surrounding Christian community. By maintaining this regular exchange with the cathedral, the Christian community was preserving their social and economic ties to a religious center, strengthening their spiritual community. This, not profit-maximization, drove their exchange of goods. In other instances, the expected blessings would not be given directly from the entity receiving the good or the money, but rather from the divine as a reward for a good deed. Çelebi describes how, upon selling one of his mules, he gave away the profit he received to the poor in expectation of a divine reward. Çelebi did not expect a blessing from the poor who received his money. He nevertheless exchanged his mule and gave away the money in order to receive good fortune. These are all examples of good exchanges that are either dependent upon or shaped by social relationships, not solely based on profit considerations.

At other times, the political, social, and religious contexts of an interaction could uniquely combine to shape the movement of goods. In other words, it was necessary for the movement of goods in the Ottoman economy to be understood with a holistic view of the society. In his travelogue, Çelebi recounts an instance when the Ottoman sultan was building a mosque and had to halt construction. Tauntingly, the Safavid shah sent large amounts of money to suggest that the Ottoman sultan had halted construction because of insufficient funds. Instead of using the money that the shah sent towards the mosque, the sultan instead "distributed the 1000 purses of money to the Jews in Istanbul, and not a grain was left," explaining: "The heretic on judgment day will be an ass beneath the Jew."[21] This exchange depended on each ruler—the sultan and the shah—asserting political and economic dominance over the other and cannot be understood without examining the political tension between the two rulers. Additionally, the role of religion in this exchange had a double effect.

[21] Çelebi, *Ottoman Traveller*, 12.

For one, the sultan explicitly cited the difference in religion between himself and the shah as his reasoning for not using the shah's funds towards the mosque. This is an instance in which the relationship between the religious identity of the entity presenting the funds—combined with the religious significance of the construction work—led to the sultan making an economically irrational decision. Simultaneously, both the social and the religious identity of the recipient, Ottoman Jews, contributed to them receiving the shah's funds. By giving the funds to Jewish people, the sultan made a statement about viewing the shah as religiously inferior to Jewish individuals. Therefore, the religious and social standing of Judaism gave this gift significance; the sultan allocated this money based on these noneconomic conditions. This interaction demonstrates how religious, political, and social considerations could shape economic activity.

Conclusion

In the 17th-century Ottoman Empire, economic life was not isolated from social considerations. Rather, the mechanisms that molded economic activity in the empire can be fully understood only when considering the social, political, and religious contexts of these interactions. Thus, profit-making was not the sole motivation behind economic activity. The state and vakıfs redistributed goods and money to Ottoman subjects, and gift-giving and price-setting were influenced by notions of reciprocity between both individuals and institutions. Other factors like local customs, political authority, and religious community influenced good exchange independently of profit maximization. Therefore, understanding the Ottoman economy in its entirety necessitates approaching economic transactions with a holistic approach and recognizing that Ottoman markets were inextricably linked to the social institutions in which they existed.

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