

New Opportunities for Military Women

*Effects Upon Readiness,
Cohesion, and Morale*

Margaret C. Harrell

Laura L. Miller

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PREFACE

RAND's National Defense Research Institute was asked to assess the performance of each military service in integrating women into previously closed military occupations and military units and the effects of this integration on defense readiness and morale. This study resulted from an item of special interest in the House Report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997. Our study is a short analytical effort to evaluate the progress of these changes and the effect of this integration on selected units.

This study was sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, and it was carried out in the Forces and Resources Policy Center of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the defense agencies.

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SUMMARY

BACKGROUND

The role of women in the military has steadily been increasing since the early 1970s. The most recent changes occurred between 1992 and 1994, when both legislative and policy changes expanded opportunities for women. Congress has taken a keen interest in this process, and the House report for the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 included as a special interest item a direction to the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the performance of the military services in integrating women into occupations previously closed to them. The report also asked for an assessment of the effects of this integration on readiness and morale.

PURPOSE AND APPROACH OF THIS STUDY

In response to the congressional direction, the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) asked the National Defense Research Institute to assess the extent and effect of the integration of the women. To meet the congressional deadline, the study had to be completed in the relatively short time of three months. Thus, the study is not a comprehensive analysis of the integration of women into the services. Instead, it is a short-term analytic effort that evaluates the progress of integrating women into occupations and units previously closed to them and the effects of that effort on selected units.

The study has three components. The first determines how each service implemented the guidance to open new skills and organiza-

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tions to women. Each service interpreted the guidance differently, and it is important to understand those interpretations before assessing the progress in implementing the congressional guidance. The second component assesses the progress of what we refer to as gender integration. In this component, we determined the extent to which the services carried out their interpretations of the congressional direction. The third component assesses the effects of gender integration on the readiness, cohesion, and morale of units.

To complete the third component, we relied on a series of visits to military units. We visited 14 units, chosen to provide the broadest possible view of the effects of the policy changes.¹ We used three techniques during field visits to gather information about gender issues and their effects on readiness, cohesion, and morale. We interviewed commanders and other senior leaders, conducted a series of focus groups with unit personnel, and administered a survey to focus-group participants and other unit personnel. Almost 500 people participated in the focus groups, which were organized by rank and sex.

RESULTS

In response to the policy and legislative changes, the services have opened more occupations and organizations to women. Table S.1 shows the change in the number of positions open to women. The movement of women into these positions has varied, depending on such factors as the number of women in each service, their interest in these positions, training or retraining times, and whether facilities or systems had to be reconfigured.

Clearly, progress has occurred in all services. Some of the changes were numerically small but significant. Women now fly combat aircraft and serve on combat ships. As a result, they will have opportunities to acquire the type of experience that leads to the most senior positions. However, limitations still exist, and some of them

¹We did not visit any Air Force units. Because of the time available and the way the Air Force had implemented the guidance, we could not get valid results in the time available and could not guarantee confidentiality and anonymity. Chapter Two contains a more detailed explanation.

Table S.1
Positions Opened to Women by Law and
Policy Since April 1993 (percent)

Service	Positions Open	
	Before April 1993	After Law and Policy Changes
Army	61.0	67.2
Navy	61.0	91.2
Air Force	97.0	99.4
Marine Corps	33.0	62.0
DoD Total	67.4	80.2

operate in complex ways. Certain units and skills are still closed to women; these are primarily those that engage in direct ground combat or collocate with units that do. In other cases, the skill is open to women, but only at certain organizational levels, e.g., brigade or higher. Some assignments that are officially open to women may actually be closed because the position is coded to be filled by someone in an occupation closed to women, e.g., infantry. Unfortunately, there is no other way to determine the actual availability of positions formally open to women except to examine the prerequisites for those positions that have been established at the local level. Finally, some limitations are informal, e.g., the commander who will not have a driver or an aide of the opposite sex because of concern about rumors or potential charges of sexual harassment. In other cases, a commander may have a woman assigned to a nontraditional position, but actually performing duty in another.

Effects on Readiness

A major finding of this study is that gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale in the units we studied. Members of the units we visited, which included both recently opened units and units with recently opened occupations, said that integration of women had not had a major effect on readiness. Both men and women contended that women perform about as well as men. This is not to say that integration has no effect; it does. However, other influences, such as leadership and training, are perceived as being far more influential. Effects on

readiness do occur. For example, pregnancy can affect the availability of women. The effect is greater when the unit has many women or when it is understaffed; therefore, the limitations pregnancy imposes are both more visible and have a disproportionately greater effect.

Effects on Cohesion

Perceptions about cohesion tend to vary by rank more than anything else. Higher-ranking men and women reported more cohesion than junior personnel. Any divisions caused by gender were minimal or invisible in units with high cohesion. Gender appeared as an issue only in units with conflicting groups, and then it took a back seat to divisions along work group or rank lines. When gender negatively affected cohesion, it was generally because gender is one way that people break into categories when conflict surfaces, because structures or organizational behavior highlighted gender differences, or because dating occurred within a unit. Gender integration was also mentioned as having a positive effect, raising the level of professional standards.

Effects on Morale

In recently opened units and units with recently opened occupations, gender did not figure prominently in issues cited as affecting morale. Leadership was regarded as the overwhelming influence. Insofar as gender was an issue, it focused on two areas: sexual harassment and double standards. Most reported that sexual harassment did not occur in their units. Of those women in the units studied who have been harassed (considerable confusion exists about what constitutes sexual harassment), most did not report it. Most frequently, they regarded such incidents as minor and handled them on their own. Less frequently cited reasons included a fear of overreaction by the institution, resulting in draconian punishment; a belief that such reports will be used against the case for women in the military; and a belief that nothing will happen to the offender. The fear of unsubstantiated or false sexual harassment charges was prevalent among men surveyed. The perception of a double standard was held most widely by men and tended to revolve around such things as different physical standards and a perceived unwillingness of male

supervisors to demand as much of women as they do of men. Finally, dating and sexual relationships, even those not forbidden by the regulations, can pose problems for morale within a unit.

Other Findings About Gender

The study provided an opportunity to gain insight into related aspects of the integration of women into units that had recently opened or included recently opened occupations. These are relevant to the public debate, so we report them here:

- While 25 percent of women and 39 percent of men preferred segregated basic training, a majority of both sexes preferred integrated training.
- While a small percentage (14 and 18 percent, respectively, for men and women) favored concentrating women in fewer units, the rest were split between assigning women across all units or having a gender-blind assignment process.
- Most study participants did not care whether they reported harassment to a man or a woman. However, 22 to 35 percent did have a preference, most often for someone of the same sex.
- Over half of surveyed men in the enlisted ranks favor some relaxation of the ground combat exclusion policy; only one-third of male officers agree, and Army and Marine Corps men of all grades are more likely to prefer the current policy. A change in the policy is supported by over 80 percent of the women surveyed. Those who support change differ on allowing women to serve voluntarily in ground combat positions or requiring them to do so, as men are.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

During our visits, we were given numerous suggestions for remedying issues that related to gender. Some suggestions were very specific, such as ways to improve how women are supervised and kept informed when they are in female berthing areas on ships. Others were broader, such as to evaluate how much discretion commanders and supervisors should exercise in how they use the women assigned

to their units. We have been careful to incorporate both types of suggestions in this report.

The personnel in these units did perceive some differences in the availability and physical abilities of the women the units, compared to men. However, it is not clear which differences are perceptions due to women's greater visibility and which would be borne out by systematic data. Better information would clear up any misperceptions and identify areas in which policies might be developed to minimize differences that do occur.

Double standards are a major problem area. We heard repeatedly how double standards (e.g., different performance expectations, different responsibilities) undermine women's credibility and generate hostility from junior enlisted men, who believed that they are afforded the fewest privileges of anyone. Therefore, new policies should avoid establishing double standards for men and women in the same positions and, where possible, eliminate double standards that exist now. In fact, another consistent message we heard was the call for a screening process that would help the military to assign qualified personnel to heavy-labor occupations and remove the need for a double standard.

Navy personnel were highly satisfied with the practice of assigning women leaders in advance of or in conjunction with the assignment of junior women. Their presence helped with transitional issues, provided a positive role model for female behavior, and contributed overall to the discipline on the ship. In Army and Marine units that lacked female leadership, both junior and senior personnel found this situation undesirable, or less preferable to a more balanced representation of women. A policy of ensuring senior female leadership in integrated units may not be feasible in all cases, but the experience of the units we studied suggests that it is desirable when it is feasible.

Especially during the transition period, new norms are required when men and women work together. The military's sexual harassment programs and policies on interpersonal relationships among servicemembers continue to be evaluated. Our study adds to the evidence pointing to areas needing the most focus: clearer guidance on what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior, more

emphasis on the “do’s” than on the “don’ts” in instructing men and women about working together, and ensuring that sexual harassment complaints are—and are perceived to be—handled as fairly as possible.

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ABBREVIATIONS

MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty
NCOs	Noncommissioned officers
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
WAAC	Women's Army Auxiliary Corps
WAVES	Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service

BACKGROUND

Women's participation in the military has been restricted since gender integration began. About 33,000 women served in World War I—20,000 of them in the Army and Navy Nurse Corps, which were separate from the regular Army and Navy. In World War II, manpower shortages and reports of valuable performance by women in other countries' armed forces led the United States to utilize approximately 350,000 women for its own military effort. The attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in the creation of the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) and Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service (WAVES). Women typically filled nursing and administrative jobs, which were consistent with civilian women's work, although they also served in all other noncombat jobs. The 350,000 women who served in World War II were regarded as temporary support that would free more men for combat.

After the war, women's future role with the military was called into question. In 1948, the year President Truman mandated racial integration, Congress passed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act, which placed highly specific limits on the women who would now be allowed to join the Army. Women could make up no more than 2 percent of the total enlisted ranks; the proportion of female officers could equal no more than 10 percent of enlisted women. No woman could serve in a command position, attain the rank of general, or hold permanent rank above lieutenant colonel. This act specifically prohibited women from being assigned to aircraft or vessels engaged in combat missions. While these combat assignment

restrictions did not apply directly to the Army, the Secretary of the Army developed policies to exclude women from direct combat, based upon the implied congressional intent of the Navy and Air Force statutes.¹

The doors for women have opened gradually over the past four decades. In 1967, the 2-percent cap on enlisted women and some restrictions on promotions were lifted; in 1972, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) was opened to women; in 1976, the first women entered the service academies; in 1978, Navy women were assigned to noncombatant ships, and the separate Women's Army Corps was dissolved; in 1989, two women led their units into combat in Panama; in 1990, the first female commanded a Navy ship; and in 1991, in the Persian Gulf War, large numbers of women moved forward with their units into combat zones. A Department of Defense Task Force on Women in the Military recommended a "risk rule" to bar women from units and positions in which the "risk of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, or capture is equal to or greater than that experienced by associated combat units in the same theater of operations."

The department's policy on the assignment of women has proceeded in three phases—first with a focus on aviation, then on assignment to naval combatants, and, most recently, on ground assignments. In April 1993, following congressional repeal of the law that prohibited women from being assigned to combat aircraft, then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin directed the services to open additional occupational specialties and assignments to women. In particular, women began to compete for assignments in aircraft that engage in combat. Secretary Aspin also directed the Secretary of the Navy to open more assignments for women on noncombatant vessels and to develop legislation to repeal the naval combatant exclusion law. One important qualification in the implementing memorandum was that women were not to be assigned to units that engage in direct combat on the ground.

Congress made the second phase possible in November 1993, when it repealed the naval combatant exclusion law. The November 1993

¹For a detailed history of women in the military, see Holm (1992).

law also prohibited opening additional combat positions to women without congressional review. The law requires 30 days advance notice for proposed changes to assignment policies to combat units, combat aircraft, and combat vessels and 90 days advance notice for changes to any "Direct Ground Combat Exclusion Policy." The Secretary of Defense has submitted three such reports. The secretary reported opening combat aviation and additional noncombatant ships on January 21, 1994. A February 4, 1994, report informed Congress of the department's intent to allow women to be permanently assigned to surface combatant vessels as a result of the repeal of the Naval Combatant Exclusion Law. That change would open more than 136,000 new positions in the Navy to both men and women. At the same time that Congress repealed the naval combatant exclusion law, it established important guidelines for the integration of women into previously closed occupations when it also required the Secretary of Defense to

- Ensure that qualification for and continuance in occupational career fields is evaluated on the basis of a common, relevant performance standard and not on the basis of gender;
- Refrain from the use of gender quotas, goals, or ceilings, except as specifically authorized by Congress; and
- Refrain from changing occupational standards simply to increase or decrease the number of women in an occupational career field.²

In January 1994, the Secretary of Defense promulgated a definition of direct ground combat and an associated assignment rule and announced that he was rescinding the "risk rule," with these actions to be effective October 1, 1994. Direct ground combat was defined as

engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel. Direct ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield

²Quoted from Legislative History, House Report No. 103-200 Section 542—Gender Neutral Occupational Performance Standards. Bullets added.

while locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, maneuver, or shock effect. (House Report 103-200.)

The memorandum also directed that this guidance be used only to expand opportunities to women and not be used to close units or positions that had previously been open to women.

On July 28, 1994, Congress was notified that the DoD Risk Rule would be rescinded and the services would open additional noncombat positions and career fields to women effective October 1, 1994. This guidance established the framework for the utilization of women under which the department now operates.

Under the current policy, women are eligible to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, except that they are excluded from assignment to units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground.

Two kinds of opportunities resulted from these legislative and policy changes in the 1992–1994 period. First, new positions, or skills, opened to women. Second, units that had been previously closed to women because of the risk rule opened to women.

PURPOSE OF STUDY

Given these changes, the House Report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 directed the Secretary of Defense

to obtain an independent study by an FFRDC evaluating the performance of each military service in integrating women into military occupations previously closed. As part of this study, the FFRDC shall evaluate the effect on defense readiness and morale of integrating women into newly-opened occupations and positions as well as factors affecting the pace at which military services are integrating women.

The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management Policy asked RAND to undertake this study. Because we judged unit cohesion as critical to morale, we expanded the study to address the effects of gender integration upon readiness, cohesion, and morale.

The study has three components. The first determines how each service interpreted the guidance to open new skills and organizations to women. Each service had interpreted the guidance differently, and it is important to understand those interpretations before assessing the progress in implementing the congressional guidance. The second component assesses the progress of what we refer to as gender integration. In this component, we determined the extent to which the services carried out their interpretations of the congressional direction. The third component assesses the effects of gender integration on the readiness, cohesion and morale of units.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This study is a short-term analytical effort to evaluate the progress of gender integration in the services and the effects of this integration on selected units. While further study is recommended to determine the extent of the trends identified during this research and to evaluate specific gender-related policies, this effort provides important insights about the effects of gender integration in previously closed units and units with previously closed occupations, in the context of unit readiness, cohesion, and morale.

This effort did not include an extensive literature review. However, both authors have research experience in this area, and an extensive research bibliography is included in this document.

Units were carefully selected to provide the broadest possible view of the issues within our constraints of time and resources. The compressed schedule limited the number of locations that the research team could visit and also, for some units, reduced the number of people available to the researchers. Nonetheless, we believe enough individuals participated to provide satisfactory research results. The methods used, the types of units studied, and the representative proportion of individuals included in the study are briefly described below and are discussed in greater detail in Appendix A.

Research Methods

Our first task was to assess the pace at which the services were integrating women into the recently opened units and occupations. To

do so, we established contact with experts in each of the four services' headquarters manpower offices.

We interviewed our contacts about the process for determining positions to be opened and how the integration was planned to proceed. These contacts referred to us additional people who were involved in this process in the 1993–1994 time frame, many of whom we were also able to interview. The service contacts also provided information about which units and occupations had been opened, number of positions those entailed, and locations where we would find those units and occupations.

To answer the question about the effects on readiness and morale, we selected some of those locations for site-based research. We were not able to visit overseas locations or ships at sea. From the CONUS locations, we selected the ones that had the greatest range of variance in characteristics. Because we could not undertake a random sample of all relevant units, we followed a tradition for exploratory research, which is to attempt to capture as many different types of cases as possible. Thus, we included ships, aviation, and ground units; east and west coast locations; and units that only recently included women, as well as those that already had women but now had them in new occupations. Once we had the data indicating where women had been placed, it became apparent that we could not fairly assess Air Force units. Most had only one woman in newly opened positions, and we could not visit enough locations to protect the women's anonymity and make conclusions that we could assert were due to gender rather than personality.³

To assess readiness, we relied primarily on the perceptions of unit commanders, who regularly track indicators of readiness over time and have a larger organizational picture than individual members might have. Interviews with unit leadership focused on current assessments of readiness and whether they had noticed a change in readiness levels due to the recent integration of women. We also asked unit personnel for their perceptions of gender-related influences on readiness, however, as their perceptions may be linked to other attitudes and behaviors relevant for this study.

³This is explained in greater detail in the Air Force discussion in Chapter Two and in Appendix A.

To assess morale, we also had to examine cohesion, because previous research has identified morale as inextricably linked with cohesion. While we interviewed commanders about their perceptions of overall cohesion and morale, the bulk of the data for this question came from the people whose levels of cohesion and morale we wished to discover. We chose focus groups as the method to probe people for their opinions about the effects of recent changes on their unit cohesion and morale. Our topics focused on gender issues, and groups were divided by gender and rank to allow for greater freedom in responses. Where someone asserted that something was the result of recent integration, we encouraged the individual to tell us how this unit differed from his or her previous unit, which had either been traditionally all-male or highly integrated for most people. Through reference to prior units, people also indicated which issues they thought were servicewide, rather than singular to a particular command or integration transition.

Since we could only include about 10 people per focus group, we gave each person a survey, then scheduled additional time to survey a larger number of individuals serving in the same units. Although surveys are limited in that they cannot communicate the complexity and depth of responses that interviews can, they allowed us to broaden our database, ensure that the views we heard in the focus groups were representative of the unit as a whole, and connect opinions to demographic variables. We encouraged respondents to write comments on their surveys if they wanted to make additional points or clarify the reasons behind their responses. The questionnaire was also considered key because it would allow people to express anonymously something they might feel uncomfortable revealing in front of their peers.

For small units, our sampling strategy was to attempt to include everyone in the survey who would be available the day of our visit. In larger units, we sought as many people as we could process surveys for in our given time frame. In those locations, we asked that people from a variety of work groups be represented.

For each questionnaire item, we ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) and tested for significant variation along the lines of gender, rank, race, unit, and service. Significance levels reported in the text are

based on the F score. Open-ended questions were systematically coded, and responses are presented in tables within the document.

Quotations that appear in the text were selected because they represent a commonly expressed view either on questionnaires or in focus groups. We did not include quotations that communicated ideas that were only rarely or singularly made.

Military Units Selected for Field Research

We surveyed and conducted interviews and focus groups with individuals from five Army units, seven Navy units, and two Marine Corps units. Although we originally intended to include Air Force units in our field research, our preliminary research results indicated that, because of the way women had been assigned to the newly opened occupations and units, we could not be sure of obtaining valid research results, and we could not include them without potentially violating the confidentiality and anonymity of the individuals interviewed.⁴

In addition to the five Army units with which we conducted interviews, focus groups, and surveys, we also interviewed command personnel from other Army units. We included units in the study that had been traditionally open to women, units that had been open to women but included recently opened Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), and units that had been previously closed to women. The units visited included combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units.

We visited three Navy combatant ships and four Navy aviation units, three of which recently opened to women. To sample the Navy population, we identified already integrated combatant ships, then made our final selection based upon their availability (i.e., were in port at the time of our scheduled research visit). Our sample included different-sized ships, ranging from destroyer to aircraft carrier, and different types of aviation units. The ships we visited

⁴This is explained in greater detail in Chapter Two, which explains the Air Force interpretation of the policy and its resulting assignment policy, and in Appendix A, which details our methodology.

also differed in the amount of time since their last deployment and included vessels based on both the east and west coasts.

We selected two Marine Corps units: One had been open to women prior to the legislative and policy changes, but had women in newly opened occupations, and the other had previously been closed to women. We visited fewer Marine Corps units than Army or Navy units, but we were able to sample a larger percentage of their unit personnel.

Table 1.1 indicates the total number of individuals who participated in the survey and the division of study participants by service. Of the 934 survey respondents, 492 individuals participated in focus-group discussions, including 320 men and 172 women. Approximately 40 percent of female focus-group participants were junior enlisted women, whereas the men who participated in focus groups were evenly distributed among the grades. More detailed demographics are provided in Appendix C.

The average percentages of unit personnel who participated in the study are shown in Table 1.2. For example, of all the personnel assigned to the Army units that we visited, we spoke to 43 percent of all the female personnel in grades E1-E4 and 23 percent of their male peers. We spoke to 44 percent and 20 percent of female and male Army E5s and E6s, respectively. Sixty-seven percent of the female Army personnel in grades E7 to E9 in these units participated in our study, as did 25 percent of the men in these same grades. There were very few female Army officers in these units, and they were not available to us, but the data represent 21 percent of the male officers.

Table 1.1
Individuals Represented by Written Survey

	Percentage of Study Sample	Total
Army	21	195
Marine Corps	22	202
Navy Aviation	13	121
Navy Ships	45	418
Total	100	934

Table 1.2
Percentage of Unit That Participated in Focus Groups
and/or Written Survey

	E1–E4		E5–E6		E7–E9		Officers	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
Army Units	23	43	20	44	25	67	21	0 ^a
Marine Corps Units	32	54	44	83	62	0 ^a	58	80
Large Ship(s) ^b	3	29	4	39	7	56	8	46
Small Ship(s)	36	78	42	64	29	100	27	100
Naval Aviation Units	7	38	8	58	30	50	12	60

^aThere were very few women in these pay grades, and they were not available.

^bUnit for ships is taken to be the entire ship, so the measurement of sample size appears very different.

ORGANIZATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

The next chapter of this document describes how the services implemented the new guidance and legislative changes regarding gender integration into service policies. Specifically, Chapter Two examines the types of occupations and of units that became available to women, and the current status of women in these occupations and units. Chapter Three examines the effects of gender integration on readiness. Chapters Four and Five address the effects of gender integration on cohesion and morale. In Chapter Six, we draw upon the experiences of those personnel serving in recently integrated units and occupations to address issues related to gender integration: generational differences and military culture, integration of basic training, the reporting of sexual harassment, and the units and occupations that remain closed to military women. Conclusions and recommendations appear in Chapter Seven. The appendixes include a more detailed description of our methodology, additional data regarding the opportunities available to or closed to women in the services, the demographics of the individuals studied, and the men's and women's versions of the questionnaire.

Chapter Two

POLICY INTERPRETATION AND CURRENT STATUS OF OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE TO MILITARY WOMEN

This chapter describes the processes by which the services implemented the legislative and policy guidance into specific assignments and occupations and skills available to women. This chapter begins with a summary of the changes in each of the services and an evaluation of the process of integration. Then, the specific factors that affected the rate of progress for each of the services, as well as the current opportunities open to women, are summarized below. More detailed data are located in Appendix B and are referenced throughout this chapter.

SUMMARY OF SERVICE CHANGES

Overall, the changes in policy and legislation opened more than 250,000 positions in the Armed Services to women, and over 80 percent of the total jobs in the services are open to women. Table 2.1 summarizes the total number of positions opened to women since April 1993. It is notable from this table that, while the Navy alone had opened by far the most positions to women, both the Navy and the Marine Corps had a considerable percentage of overall positions become available. In addition, the difference between the percentages of positions now available to women is also interesting. The Navy can assign women to 91.2 percent of its positions, and almost all Air Force assignments are open to women. However, it is important to note that, while 91.2 percent of all Navy positions are available to women, only approximately 13 percent of all shipboard bunks will be female berthing at the end of the current embarkation plan. Thus, the number of Navy positions that could be simultaneously

Table 2.1
Positions Opened to Women by Law and
Policy Since April 1993

Service	Total New Positions	Percentage of Positions Open	
		Before April 1993	After Law and Policy Changes
Army	41,699	61	67.2
Navy	145,500	61	91.2
Air Force	13,000	97	99.4
Marine Corps	59,000	33	62.0
DoD Total	259,199	67	80.2

filled with women is far less than 91.2 percent. Roughly one-third of Army and Marine Corps assignments are still closed to women.

Additionally, the percentage of positions in newly opened occupations (as opposed to newly opened units) that is filled by women remains very low. Table 2.2 indicates the degree to which women are represented among newly opened occupations. There are multiple factors for this low representation, including the number of women in each service, their interest in newly opened occupations, the training or retraining times, whether facilities or systems had to be reconfigured, and the rate of movement (both male and female) into that occupation. Our study did not determine whether the recruitment, selection, or assignment practices of the services limit these numbers.

Table 2.2
Representation of Women in Newly
Opened Occupations

Service	Personnel in Newly Opened Occupations			Percentage Female
	Male	Female	Total	
Army	2,062	124	2,186	5.7
Navy	25,705	515	26,220	2.0
Air Force	8,799	26	8,825	0.3
Marine Corps	10,175	178	10,354	1.7

OVERALL EVALUATION OF SERVICES' PROGRESS INTEGRATING WOMEN INTO NEWLY OPENED OCCUPATIONS AND UNITS

An important change for military women has been made in the integration of the Navy's surface fleet. The Navy is incorporating as many women as it can into combatant vessels, given the limitations of the berthing conversion schedules and the small number of female leaders available for assignment. Sea duty is now expected of both men and women, and women will be competitive for command positions onboard combatant ships and in aviation wings. At the unit level, we were not told about any barriers to women serving in Navy combat aviation assignments.

In the Army units and enlisted occupations that opened to women, we were told that women do not always have full career opportunities and that this situation is not transitional but based on official and unofficial assignment policies. The integration of women into newly opened occupations is especially problematic in the Army because the ground combat exclusion policy keeps many units and organizational levels officially closed to women. Therefore, the number of women who will be able to progress in some career fields will be limited by the small number of command positions that are open to them. For example, although field artillery MOSs opened to enlisted women, women cannot serve in field artillery units below the brigade level. In field artillery, interacting with infantry and armor units is perceived to be extremely valuable to one's career, but women are precluded from this opportunity. The only field grade command opportunities available to women in field artillery are in training units, which are not perceived to be as career-enhancing as other command opportunities.

Additionally, both male and female focus-group participants and command personnel told us that Army women's integration into newly opened units has been restricted unofficially. Reportedly, some local commanders resist having more than a few women in these units, and thus send "surplus" women to work elsewhere. Second, some local commanders will not assign women to certain newly opened units because they have made their own interpretations of the collocation restriction and concluded that some assignments that are officially open to women should be closed.

The Marines have integrated women into new positions, even though they cannot be deployed on ships that have not yet been integrated. As this limitation is transitional, the Marines have made plans to increase the percentage of Marines who are women over the next few years.¹ However, the percentage of female Marines will still be considerably lower than the percentage of women in the Army. Additionally, because the Marine Corps also has a large percentage of units that remain closed to women in the newly opened occupations, opportunities in the Marine Corps may be limited to the same extent that they are for Army women in these occupations (although we did not observe this during our limited research).

The Air Force has lifted the barriers to women's careers in combat aviation, and women are being integrated as quickly as they enter flight school, as they qualify for and choose combat aircraft, and as those aircraft become available.

We should also point out that it was beyond the scope of this short-term study to examine whether recruiters in each of the services made any effort to encourage women to enter the newly opened occupations or units, or how women in training schools for these new positions were treated. Further study would be needed to determine the effects of these practices on the number of women entering the new fields. This further study should pay especially close attention to the recruitment and training of women for aviation roles in all the services, as this entry level is most crucial in determining the future progress of the aviation integration.

POLICY INTERPRETATION AND ACTIONS BY EACH OF THE SERVICES

Air Force

At the time Secretary of Defense Les Aspin wrote the April 28, 1993 memorandum repealing combat aircraft restrictions for women, 97.3 percent of the Air Force's 472,484 positions were already open to women. Fighter, bomber, and special operations aircraft made up the majority of the remaining closed positions. Secretary of the Air

¹The berthing modifications will be completed over the next 5–10 years.

Force Sheila Widnall had just distributed a memorandum to open all Air Force positions to women, and thus Air Force staff were already in the process of determining how best to implement full integration. This advance work greatly eased the integration process following Aspin's guidance. Prior to 1993, 12,654 positions were closed to women; currently, 2,244 are closed, which means that over 99 percent of Air Force positions are currently open to women. Tables listing the currently closed or restricted skills are included in Appendix B.²

Although the Air Force had initially planned to open all positions to women, a few positions were closed or restricted after consultation with the Army to determine the correct application of the Secretary of Defense's new guidelines for change. Such positions as combat aircraft control were closed because they deploy with all-male Army combat troops engaged in direct ground combat. A few specialties that are open to women have restrictions in assignment for the same reasons. For example, air liaison officers deploy with ground units and coordinate close air support for the Army and therefore cannot be assigned below battalion level with units engaged in direct ground combat. Few enlisted positions are currently closed or restricted.

The positions that remain closed to women are in small career fields not viewed as critical to an individual's career advancement. This differs from the other services, where most of the currently closed positions are perceived as elite, such as SEALs, submarines,³ Special Forces, infantry, and armor. In the Army and Marines, the closed positions are often considered the primary, central roles of each service: to fight the enemy through direct ground combat.

Most of the changes in the Air Force affected officers' opportunities. The last of the elite and most coveted positions in the Air Force were opened when women were allowed to choose bomber and fighter aircraft. Women can now be pilots and navigators in F-15, F-16, and

²This subsection benefited from the assistance and review of the Air Force office of Force Structure Plans and Policy, which also provided a helpful review of this subsection.

³Submarines are closed because of berthing restrictions.

A-10 fighter aircraft; in B-52, B-1, and the new B-2 bomber aircraft; and in AC-130, HC-130, and MC-130 Special Operations aircraft.⁴

The Air Force had a policy of only training aviators for combat aircraft who could serve in combat. Thus, unlike the Navy, which had trained and developed an inventory of experienced noncombat female aviators (e.g., flight instructors), the Air Force had to start from scratch in training women to operate previously prohibited aircraft.

The initial female candidates for assignments to combat aircraft were selected from previous flight-school graduates. Previously, women went through the same basic flight school as men. Upon flight school graduation, all students were ranked, and the top student had first choice of available aircraft; the second had second choice; and so on. However, women had been prohibited from selecting combat aircraft, the most desirable choice for many pilots. So, in 1993, the Air Force examined the flight-school graduate lists since 1990 (when the merit assignment system was established) to identify women who would have qualified to select a combat aircraft. There was a rich pool of qualified women to offer Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve combat aircraft positions.

From that point on, a gender-neutral assignment policy was adopted: As women and men graduate from flight school, they compete under the same standards for combat aircraft. Of the 8,825 pilot and navigator positions that were previously closed to women, 26 are currently filled by women, who are spread out over 22 locations. Another 15 female students are currently in training for these positions.

The Air Force relied upon the existing system to assign women to units. Pilots fall under the Officer Assignment System, which means they can request where they would like to serve based on available slots. The result is that the female combat aviators are distributed in small numbers across many units, and most are the only female aviator in their units.

⁴We should note that the B-52 bombers are currently being phased out and thus are not equal in career opportunity to the other recently opened positions.

One concern with integrating women in these aircraft was whether aircraft equipment (e.g., support equipment, g-suits, urinary relief devices) would need redesigning for average female anatomy. But many of these concerns were already being addressed for other reasons. American women may have a smaller average weight and height than American men, but this is also the case with many men from other countries that Americans train and equip. Aircraft were being redesigned to fit smaller people because many clients, such as Asian men, were lighter in weight and had shorter arms and legs than the average American male pilot.

In general, the transition was simpler for the Air Force than for the other services for several reasons. First, because the vast majority of positions were already open to Air Force women, fewer positions and individuals were affected by the newly opened positions and units than was the case in the other services. Second, although some minor aircraft and equipment modifications were under consideration, these changes were minimal compared to the modifications required on many Navy combatant ships. Third, equal standards and an organizational process for selecting women for combat aircraft were already in place. Fourth, the Air Force did not have as many occupational areas or numbers of units that qualified for ground combat exclusion as did other services. Further, the positions that were restricted under the new guidance are few and are not viewed as critical to overall career advancement in the service. The rate of gender integration into the previously closed positions now depends on four factors: the number of women entering flight school, the number of women who score high enough in flight school to be able to choose combat aircraft, the number of those women who actually choose combat aircraft, and the number of combat aircraft available.

Army

As in the Air Force, the Army had existing plans to expand women's roles further before the Department of Defense mandated service-wide changes. The Army Chief of Staff at the time, General Gordon R. Sullivan (now retired) was already planning to open combat aircraft to women when the Department of Defense asked him to put such changes on hold until its new policy for all the services was

formulated and announced. The opening of those aviation positions was thus delayed for nearly a year.⁵

The Army was also modifying its gender-based policies at the training level. A September 28, 1994 letter to Senator Strom Thurmond⁶ from Secretary of Defense William J. Perry explained the process:

In the fall of 1992 the Commanding General, TRADOC initiated a plan to study the feasibility of integrating the [basic training] programs. Between February 1993 and June 1993 Ft Jackson conducted a gender integrated training test (at squad level). The results were positive. The research found no significant difference in training performance outcomes and the Army leadership made the decision to integrate basic training in June 1994. Additionally, as assignment opportunities for women are expanded, the Army has recognized the importance of training male and female soldiers together as a cohesive team.

Once Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released his memorandum setting a certain date for redefining the combat exclusion policy and the rescinding of the "risk rule," Army staff began working to determine which units and occupations would be affected, as women were still prohibited from serving in direct ground combat.

The Department of Defense provided further exceptions to opening roles to women, including the option to restrict the assignment of women "where job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members." Some Army personnel took this opportunity to propose closing occupations women already filled, such as mechanic and cook, arguing that most women could not lift 150-lb. toolboxes or 100-lb. sacks of potatoes. The Army rejected such claims, citing that toolboxes can be mounted on wheels and that lifting and carrying around an entire 100-lb. sack of potatoes at once is too infrequent an occurrence to exclude all women from the job. Perhaps anticipating such proposals, the secre-

⁵These data were provided by the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel. This subsection benefited from reviews conducted by the office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel, as well as the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (M&RA).

⁶Then-ranking Republican of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services.

tary's memorandum declared that "No units or positions previously open to women will be closed under these instructions."

The Secretary of Defense guidance rescinding the risk rule purposefully left room for interpretation in its definition of collocation (how close is close?), recognizing that the services would need to make determinations within the context of policy and based upon their own doctrines for employment. As a result, however, the Army's interpretation and implementation plans were difficult to determine. The Secretary of the Army, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Service were all involved in the discussions on what units and positions should be opened to Army women.

Some areas were generally agreed upon, while others spurred a lengthy debate. There was little to no debate regarding opening Washington ceremonial positions (3rd Infantry [Old Guard] Regiment) or combat aircraft (except for Special Forces), and there was no apparent challenge to keeping the infantry and armor closed under the justification that they constitute direct ground combat. One area of debate, however, was whether or not field artillery and combat engineering fell into the definition of collocation with direct ground combat units. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated June 1, 1994, the Secretary of the Army proposed that these units be opened to women, arguing that

the primary mission of the combat engineers is not to engage in direct ground combat, and the battalion headquarters do not routinely collocate with maneuver battalions (they operate independently or from the brigade headquarters).

Similarly, he wrote that

field artillery units are not subject to a "high probability of direct physical contact with the hostile force's personnel." In addition, field artillery batteries do not collocate under a strict definition. Artillery (especially MLRS) operates separately from the maneuver battalions.

In the final outcome of the decision process, however, combat engineer line companies, field artillery battalions, and Multiple Launch

Rocket System (MLRS) occupations remained closed to women under the justification of collocation with direct ground combat units. The Army units that remain closed to women follow:

- Infantry battalions
- Armor battalions
- Field artillery battalions
- Special Forces battalions
- The Ranger regiment
- Ground cavalry squadrons
- Forward air defense artillery batteries
- Combat engineer line companies
- Ground surveillance radar platoons.

The career fields and occupations that opened to women were warrant officer career fields (four opened) and enlisted occupations (three opened); no new career fields opened for officers. As of March 1997, out of 2,157 personnel assigned in those newly opened MOSs or career fields, only 95 (4.4 percent) are women. These women are assigned to 35 of the 491 units that contain such positions. The number of men and women in these newly opened occupations or career fields is presented in Appendix B, as is a list of the fields that remain closed to women.

Army women comprise approximately 13 percent of officers and 14 percent of enlisted personnel. Statistics intending to represent the number of positions open or closed to women soldiers generally only capture a segment of the entire picture, because there is no simple way to represent what is available and what is not. Women can serve in 97 percent of officer career fields and 83 percent of MOSs, but less than 70 percent of all job slots are open to women. This is because approximately 30 percent of the Army's job slots are in combat arms. Approximately 6 percent of women officers and 1 percent of enlisted women are in this aggregated skill grouping. Of the remaining women in the Army, 22 percent of officers and 25 percent of enlisted women serve in combat support skills, and 72 percent of officers and 74 percent of enlisted women serve in combat service support occu-

pations, which include fields traditional for women, such as medical and administrative.

Any listing we might compile of opportunities open to women by MOS using Army databases would overrepresent the actual number of women working in nontraditional roles and units. Likewise, the number of positions formally open to women listed in Appendix B does not reflect opportunities closed due to the informal behavior of commanders. In Chapters Three, Four, and Five, we will discuss in more detail the nature of these informal exclusionary practices and the effects those practices have on those units' morale, cohesion, and readiness.

Navy

Although the Navy had made progress in opening units and occupations to women before 1992, it did so under the premise that the combat exclusion on women serving aboard ships would endure, not just as policy but because of the costs of engineering difficulties associated with modifying ships to accommodate mixed-gender crews.⁷ The Navy first assigned women to combat aviation squadrons following the Secretary of Defense's April 28, 1993 memorandum stating that "the services shall permit women to compete for assignments in aircraft, including aircraft engaged in combat missions." This guidance prompted a gender-neutral assignment policy for Naval aviation. The memorandum also directed the Navy to open additional ships to women within the then-current law and to prepare a proposal to repeal the combat exclusion law preventing women from assignments on combatant ships. That combat exclusion law was repealed in November 1993, and women were first assigned to combatant ships in 1994. This change was dramatic for women in the Navy, as combatant ships constitute 66 percent of the fleet, and many perceive that the tactical employment experience gained from duty on combatants is crucial to a successful career in the Navy. In addition, these changes have eliminated the shore-only

⁷This subsection and the relevant tables in Appendix A benefited from the assistance and review of the Office of the Special Assistant for Women's Policy, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

career path previously available to some women. Serving sea duty is now an expected part of every Navy career.

A working group organized under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs developed the gender-integration plan for the U.S. Navy. This plan had several parts: a matrix that listed and justified those previously closed occupations and units that were to remain closed to women, an embarkation plan to place women aboard combatant ships, and specific precepts for the assignment of women.⁸ These outputs from the working group were sent first from the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, to the Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), and then from the Navy Secretariat to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) during April 1994.⁹

In summary of the changes, the Navy kept submarines and small ships (mine countermeasure, mine hunting craft, and patrol craft) closed because of prohibitive berthing and privacy issues. The other assignments that remained closed are either Special Warfare Forces personnel who engage in direct ground combat or who support personnel who deploy and collocate with Navy Special Forces, Sea-Air-Land (SEALS). The majority of the closed positions are those on submarines.

Despite the occupations that remained closed, over 91.2 percent of all designators and ratings are now open to women. Of the 8.8 percent of positions that are closed, 4 percent of Navy billets are closed to women because of laws regarding direct ground combat (i.e., SEALS) or policy restrictions that are related to the prohibitive cost of habitability modifications. An additional 4.8 percent of billets are closed to women when associated closed ratings, designators, and required Navy enlisted classifications (NECs) are taken into account.

⁸These matrices are reproduced in tables in Appendix B.

⁹Memorandum from Bureau of Naval Personnel, Department of the Navy, to Assistant Secretary of Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs), Subject: Review of Units and Positions Relative to the DoD Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule, April 28, 1994; and Memorandum from the Secretary of the Navy to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) dated April 29, 1994, Subject: Direct Ground Combat Definition and Assignment Rule.

The other notable constraint on available women-at-sea billets is shipboard "bunks" for enlisted Navy women. Enlisted berthing compartments require major habitability modifications to provide "bunks" at sea for women. Currently, 12.5 percent of enlisted personnel are women, and 10.6 percent of shipboard bunks are available to women. Differences in sea-shore requirements (a higher percentage of women are in shore-intensive ratings) mean that there is no direct relationship between the overall percentage of women and the percentage of bunks available to women. Although no direct relationship exists, "bunk" availability is a limiting factor in the assignment and recruitment of enlisted women. This limiting factor is more significant than billets closed by law or policy restrictions. To ensure equitable career progression, assignment of women must be in accordance with sea-shore rotation requirements, and recruitment of women must not exceed the supply of available bunks. Budget limitations and decommissioning of gender-integrated ships has made keeping the women-at-sea program on track more challenging.

Female officers, who constitute 13.6 percent of the officer corps, serve in 24 of 26 officer communities (all but submarine and special warfare), and this was not affected by the recent legislative changes. Instead, the ships to which they could be assigned changed. Enlisted women, who comprise 12.5 percent of enlisted personnel, serve in 91 of 94 skill fields, or ratings. Within the enlisted occupations that were newly opened to women, 515 of over 25,000 positions are filled by women, who comprise almost 2 percent of the personnel in those occupations.

The embarkation plan specified the timeline by which specific ships were to be modified to accommodate female crew members. This plan was designed to coincide with the existing overhaul schedule and thus scheduled the modifications when ships were normally scheduled for overhaul. This approach prevented the ships' operational schedules from being changed and was less expensive than a separate modification schedule would have been. The modifications to permit the assignment of women included both berthing and head facilities. In some cases, the modifications for officers were extremely minor, as officers are berthed mostly in double rooms. Where multiple officer heads were available, one was designated as the female head. If only one officer head was available, significant

modification was required to add a head for female officers. The modifications required for the enlisted personnel berthing and heads were more extensive. The heads are generally modular, and urinal units can be extracted and replaced with additional toilets. However, the location of these heads is a more problematic issue. On some ships, individuals have to walk through berthing areas to access head facilities, other berthing areas, or even working areas of the ship. These structural problems proved more difficult to resolve, and some ships will not be modified prior to their decommissioning.

The working group established several precepts for the gender integration of combatant ships. First, cost effectiveness and mission readiness were to be maintained above all else. Second, senior female personnel, to include both female officers and women in the grades of E7 to E9, were to be assigned to ships prior to junior enlisted women, and women would be assigned to ships *en masse*. Finally, indoctrination training would be provided for male and female personnel of the newly integrated ships, as well as for the spouses of these personnel. Of these precepts, only the requirement for senior female personnel to precede junior enlisted women proved problematic, because of the small number of senior enlisted women in the Navy. Initially, the Navy increased its recruiting target numbers for junior enlisted women. However, it encountered a surplus of junior women who could not be assigned to sea because of the shortage of both modified ships and female chiefs. Now the Navy manages the pipeline to admit only the number of women to whom they can offer full career opportunities.

In general, the Navy has not had difficulty finding women willing to pursue traditionally male occupations in the Navy. Many of these occupations are highly technical, so the training is perceived as more valuable and marketable in the civilian world. Many of these occupations also offer better college guarantees and better financial bonuses. However, the majority of enlisted women remain in traditional occupations.¹⁰ Women constitute only 12.5 percent of the Navy's enlisted personnel and 13.6 percent of officers (Table 2.3). In traditional occupations, however, they account for 21 percent of

¹⁰Data shown in Appendix B.

Table 2.3
Women in the Navy

	Number	Percentage of Total
Officers	7,831	13.6
Enlisted	45,044	12.5

NOTE: As of March 31, 1997; extracted from Navy briefing.

assigned personnel. Nevertheless, a number of women are now serving on combatant ships. Two-thirds of the 99 combatant ships now open to women have been reconfigured. Approximately 3,150 female enlisted personnel and 400 female officers serve on these ships, and they average 6 percent of all enlisted personnel and 12 percent of all officers aboard.¹¹

In conclusion, because everything was open to women in the Navy unless it met guidelines that were relatively easy to interpret, determining which units were or were not to open appears to have been a simpler process than that experienced by the Army or the Marines. The embarkation plan, which followed the existing modification schedule for ships through FY03, slowed the assignment of women in the Navy, but it also provided an opportunity to benefit from lessons learned in the process of integration. The decisions to assign women to ships *en masse* and to assign female officers and female chief petty officers before assigning female junior enlisted personnel were evaluated as well-considered and appropriate by Navy personnel we interviewed. Although this approach has limited the number of junior enlisted women being recruited into the Navy, this limitation is short term and will be resolved as the transition period nears an end.

Marine Corps

The Marine Corps, prior to 1993–1994, had expanded opportunities for women but had done so within the constraints of both the combat exclusion of women serving aboard combatant ships and the risk

¹¹See the data in Appendix B.

rule. Thus, while all occupation fields except infantry, artillery, armor, pilot, and aircrew were open to women, women could only be assigned to units in the rear echelon of Fleet Marine Forces. Three changes in policy or law during the 1993–1994 time frame affected the Marine Corps. The April 28, 1993 guidance from the Secretary of Defense opened the opportunity for female Marines to serve in combat aircraft. Effective October 1, 1994, the Secretary of Defense rescinded the risk rule and instead established a ground combat rule for the assignment of women to military units. In addition, when the combat vessel exclusion law was repealed, the legal restriction against female Marines deploying aboard U.S. Navy ships was removed. These changes had a considerable effect upon the number and types of occupations and assignments available to women in the Marine Corps.¹²

Following these changes in guidance and legislation, the Marine Corps reviewed the occupations and the units that had previously been closed to women. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and the service staffs for both the Marines and the Army coordinated their reviews. The Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Marine Corps Commandant were briefed before the plan was submitted to the Secretary of Defense to ensure consistency between the two services. In general, the proposals were very similar. However, there are seeming inconsistencies that actually result from differences in the ways the services employ certain kinds of units. For example, because the Marine Corps doctrine expects combat engineer battalion headquarters to provide decentralized support to front-line units, the Marine Corps proposed these units remain closed, while the Army proposed to open its similar units. These seeming inconsistencies were addressed in a April 28, 1994 letter from Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to Senator Strom Thurmond¹³:

While the Army Brigade Headquarters and the Marine Corps Infantry Regimental Headquarters appear to be at a similar organi-

¹²This subsection benefited from the assistance and review of the Manpower Policy Branch, Manpower Plans and Policy Division, HQMC.

¹³Then-ranking Republican of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services.

zational level, doctrinally they are employed and organized differently. The Army Brigade Headquarters serves as the command and control element of a composite organization that includes the direct ground combat maneuver battalions and all the combat support and combat service support units required for the Brigade to accomplish its mission. The Marine Corps Infantry Regimental Headquarters is a fighting headquarters that commands only the direct ground combat element of a Marine Corps Air/Ground Task Force (MAGTAF). The MAGTAF Headquarters serves as the command and control element for the Air Combat Element, the Ground Combat Element and the Combat Service Support Element. Therefore, the MAGTAF Headquarters, which is open to women, is the true counterpart to the Army Brigade.

The results of the unit and occupation review are shown in Appendix B. This information was submitted to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) and from there was forwarded to the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). These changes resulted in the opening of a total of 93 percent of Marine Corps officer and enlisted occupations to women, for 101,000 gender-neutral positions. However, this represents only 62 percent of all billets in the Marine Corps. Of the remaining 38 percent, 20 percent are closed because of MOS restrictions, and the remaining 18 percent are closed due to restriction on assignment to those units.¹⁴ The majority (43,000) of the new positions resulted from the change in law permitting women to deploy aboard combatant ships, as this change opened the rotary wing aviation units and AV-8 Harrier squadrons to women.¹⁵

Only 178 women have been assigned to the 34 occupations newly opened to women, and they represent approximately 2 percent of all personnel in these occupations.¹⁶ There are several explanations for this low number. First, while women score generally well on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), they tend to score lowest on

¹⁴USMC Information Paper, 1000, MPP-56, Subject: Gender Equality Efforts.

¹⁵Statement of Lieutenant General George R. Christmas, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, United States Marine Corps, Before the Subcommittee on Military Forces and Personnel on Assignment of Army and USMC Women Under New Definition of Ground Combat, October 6, 1994, p. 4.

¹⁶These numbers, broken down by occupation, appear in Appendix B.

the other, more technical subtests of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), which are used to select candidates for the technical occupations, and the newly opened occupations tend to be technical occupations. Second, while the Marine Corps accession goals for entering women are being met, recruiters are not held accountable for placing women in these newly opened occupations, even when the women do score well on the technical testing. Third, women have not expressed interest in all of the newly opened occupations. In addition, the Marine Corps has decided not to transfer women into newly opened occupations from other units or occupations, because such lateral movement would place women in leadership positions in technical fields in which they have little prior experience.

Some of the occupations show an earlier introduction of women than do others. This resulted in part from similar pipelines that were already open to women. For example, although the helicopter specialist occupations had not previously been open to women, women were already attending school for aircraft mechanics. When the new occupations were opened, women who were already in aircraft mechanic training were able to divert to these occupations.

Given the increased opportunities for female Marines, the Marine Corps planned to increase the percentage of women in the Marine Corps. In FY 94, women constituted 4.4 percent of the total Corps. The target numbers would increase female enlisted personnel in the Marine Corps to 6 percent of the total enlisted population and would more than double the percentage of female officers to 7.3 percent. Table 2.4 indicates the percentage of female Marines in company and field-grade officer ranks as of August 1995 and the projected percentage of female officers. These increases are expected to produce a total population of 10,400 female Marines by the years 2004 to 2010. These are believed to represent a slow, pragmatic approach to recruitment that gradually increases the number of female Marines. The planned increases to these numbers are aggressive, but the Marine officers we interviewed perceived the annual accession goals to be manageable and thus achievable.

The Marines have noted two direct benefits, or areas of increased fairness, from admitting women to these new occupations and units (Christmas, 1994, pp. 4-5). First, when women share the deployment

Table 2.4
Current and Projected Female Marine
Corps Officers
(percent)

Rank	Female Officers (1995)	Female Officers (2004–2010)
Lt	5.3	8.8
Capt	2.8	7.6
Maj	3.3	7.0
LtCol	2.8	6.8
Col	1.8	3.7
Total	3.7	7.3

burden, especially in air squadrons, the personnel tempo of men is expected to decrease. Second, the Marines propose that women now have the opportunity to move into the top positions of enlisted and officer leadership.

In conclusion, while some of the most coveted of Marine occupations remain closed to women because of legislative and policy guidance restricting the assignment of women, the Marines have opened a considerable number of occupations and units to women.

LIMITATIONS TO WOMEN'S OPPORTUNITIES IN THE MILITARY

Despite the increases in the number of positions open to women in the services, women are currently limited in their services in at least four ways.

First, some entire units, occupations, and skills are closed because they are direct ground combat units or collocate with such units.

Second, in both the traditional and nontraditional occupations that are open to them, women are assigned on a restricted basis. Some occupations are open, but women can only be assigned at certain organizational levels. For example, enlisted women in the three newly opened Army MOSs of field artillery surveyor, combat engineer bridge crewmember, and combat engineer senior sergeant can-

not serve at the organizational levels closest to “the front”: field artillery battalions or combat engineer line companies. Other MOSs are only partially open to women because they can only be attached to units that do not engage in direct ground combat or collocate with those units. For example, women who are chemical operations specialists, chaplain’s assistants, and administrative specialists can be attached to medical or transportation units but not to infantry units.

Third, positions may be officially open to women, but indirectly closed because an unknown number of the slots are coded to be filled by someone from an occupation that excludes women.¹⁷ For example, although drill sergeant is a position completely open to women and is coded to reflect a gender-neutral assignment policy, the position is often coded to be filled by someone with an infantry skill coding, which is closed to women. The extent to which this practice occurs cannot be easily assessed and is an effort beyond the capabilities of this short-term project. Clearly, an analysis of all positions coded gender neutral would be necessary in order to quantify the indirect exclusion of women due to codes that specify male-only occupations or skill qualifications.

Fourth, the decisions of some commanders result in an informal limitation of opportunities for women. This final limitation is not recorded in any type of organizational database because it is not formally sanctioned and thus not tracked by the services. These practices can only be discerned through site-based investigations, such as those conducted for this study. One example of this is illustrated by commanders who use their authorized discretion in assigning personnel as an informal way to cut off assignment opportunities to women. A common scenario is the commander who refuses to choose a driver or aide of the opposite sex because of the fear of potential rumors or sexual harassment charges. Through this practice, even more potential slots become unavailable to women. Furthermore, some women have been told by their commanders that, although they train and carry out field exercises with their units, they would be left behind if their units were actually to be deployed.

¹⁷It should be noted that a few positions within certain occupations or units are coded to be filled by women only to ensure that, for example, there are women prison guards to monitor women prisoners.

The greater impact of commander discretion on women's assignments, however, is in units, positions, and occupations that are non-traditional for women. These units and positions may appear on paper to be filled by women, but women may not actually be in those units or performing their MOSs either because (1) supervisors believe they have enough or too many women in a unit already, and thus they send "extra" women away to work elsewhere; (2) supervisors have excluded women based on their own interpretations of the collocation restriction, rather than on what the official interpretations have directed is opened or closed; (3) women are allowed into the unit but are given all the unit's administrative work, rather than learning the duties of the occupations, on which they will be tested for promotion; or (4) women may be "pulled away" from the non-traditional unit by more traditional units for women, such as administration and supply, that are seeking additional personnel.

EFFECTS OF GENDER INTEGRATION ON READINESS

This chapter explores the effects of gender integration on individual and unit readiness. It begins by adopting a working definition of personnel readiness, which includes five attributes: availability, qualifications, experience, stability, and motivation. Next, the results of the survey questions that addressed individual and overall unit readiness are discussed. Finally, this chapter discusses the effects of gender integration on each of the five attributes of personnel readiness.

DEFINING READINESS

The concept of readiness was purposely undefined in the written survey, as we resolved to determine what factors the study participants would highlight as affecting readiness. The diversity of factors mentioned in the written comments illustrates broad variation in the definition of readiness and substantiates the need to break this item down into its components to facilitate further analysis.

Numerous research efforts have examined force readiness. An aggregated examination of this work indicates that there is considerable variation in the definition of "readiness." The term refers to multiple issues, but many attempts to define readiness address the capability of a military force or unit to accomplish specific goals and missions. Previous research, however, does indicate that there is a hierarchy of readiness, whereby the readiness of individual units is one element that determines the readiness of a service, and the readiness of a service contributes to the overall joint force readiness. Unit readiness is the typical level of focus.

However, even unit readiness contains several ratings of readiness. Personnel, materiel, and unit training all contribute to an overall unit rating of readiness. Clearly, the degree to which women are well-trained in their occupations and possess sufficient military experience will affect personnel and unit readiness. Thus, this discussion will concentrate on the effects of gender integration upon the personnel readiness of the units studied, as assessed by the units' commanders and personnel. We will examine the degree to which the presence of women in newly opened occupations or units affects the five attributes of personnel readiness: whether personnel are available, qualified, experienced, stable to the unit, and motivated.¹ *Availability* represents the personnel assigned to the unit and available to deploy. *Qualified* personnel are those trained in their duty skills and capable of performing the job to which they are assigned. *Experienced* refers to the number of people in the unit with senior grades. *Stability* represents the degree to which turbulence or personnel turnover in the unit is minimized. *Motivation* is a subjective measure, which will be evident only from the perceptions and attitudes reflected in interviews, focus groups, and surveys. The effects of gender integration on the motivation of personnel will be addressed in Chapters Five and Six, which discuss the effects on unit cohesion and morale. When examining these factors, we recognized that gender may or may not have an effect upon any or all of them. In addition, we also recognized that, if the data do indicate a correlation between gender integration and lower measures of these attributes, the order of causality of these measures is uncertain. If such a correlation were indicated, one would need to ask whether the assignment of women lowering the readiness of these units, or are women being assigned to less ready units.

OVERALL ISSUES THAT AFFECT INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT READINESS

The combination of interview, survey, and discussion findings indicates that neither gender issues nor the presence of women in the units studied is perceived to have a significant impact on readiness.

¹See Schank, Harrell, Thie, et al. (1997) for the development of these attributes.

Individual Readiness Survey Results

When queried about the state of their individual readiness to deploy on a combat mission, roughly half of the officers and senior enlisted personnel believed their readiness to deploy for a combat mission was very high, and very few people rated their readiness as low. These survey results are shown in Table 3.1. Except for junior enlisted women, women respondents tended to rate their own readiness the same or higher than men of the same grade. Half of junior enlisted women surveyed evaluated their readiness as medium, and less than a third rated it as high. This category of personnel was most likely to rate readiness as low.

Unit Readiness Survey Results

Table 3.2 indicates the responses when queried about the state of unit readiness. Women in leadership roles also tended to evaluate their unit's readiness to deploy higher than men did. The difference is most dramatic between men and women of the senior enlisted grades.

Open-Ended Readiness Survey Results

One of the most important findings gathered from written responses to open-ended questionnaire items was that people believed gender integration was not one of the key factors people attributed to readiness.

When introducing our study at the research sites, we always explained that our mission was to examine the effect that gender integration had upon readiness, cohesion, and morale. In addition, the cover pages of the surveys were titled "Survey to Support the Study of 'Integrating Women Into Previously Closed Military Occupations.'" Thus, if anything, survey respondents were prompted to mention gender as a factor in readiness, cohesion, and morale above all others. Instead, in answer to the question about the perceived reasons for personal readiness and unit readiness, we received very few written comments that identified gender issues or conflicts as salient. Instead, training, leadership, and individual workloads were identified as having the primary effects upon readi-

Table 3.1

Responses to the Question: "How Would You Rate Your Readiness for a Combat Mission?" (by grade and gender, in percent)

	Officers		E7-E9		E5-E6		E1-E4	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
High	59	66	61	63	49	51	50	29
Medium	36	28	35	37	44	40	44	53
Low	5	7	5	—	7	9	7	18
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

NOTES: p is the probability that the null hypothesis (that the variables used to classify the population are independent) is true.

For gender, $p < 0.05$; for grade, $p < 0.001$. Unit was also significant ($p < 0.001$): Personal readiness tended to be rated higher in units that had recently deployed and lower in units that had been in the shipyard or had not recently deployed. Service and race were not significant.

Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

ness. These written comments are presented in Table 3.3. The first two columns organize responses into like categories; the right column indicates the number of comments that mentioned each item as a factor of readiness. The comments have not been coded by negative or positive effect. For example, 275 individuals mentioned training as the reason for their level of readiness. This category rep-

Table 3.2

Responses to the Question: "How Would You Rate Your Unit's Readiness for a Combat Mission?" (by grade and gender, in percent)

	Officers		E7-E9		E5-E6		E1-E4	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
High	50	54	42	68	31	46	47	42
Medium	43	29	43	32	54	40	41	44
Low	7	18	15	—	16	15	12	14
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.01$. Gender alone was not significant, but as the table demonstrates, its interaction with grade was ($p < 0.05$). Unit was also significant ($p < 0.001$): Unit readiness tended to be rated higher in units that had recently deployed, lower in units that had been in the shipyard or had not recently deployed. Service and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Table 3.3

**Written Comments in Response to "Why Do You Think Your
Readiness and Your Unit's Readiness Is the Way It Is?"**

Categories	Written Responses	Number of Mentions
Training	Training	275
Workload	Operations Tempo	77
	Personnel Tempo	25
	Workload/Schedule	23
	Personnel Shortages	21
	How Hard People Work	12
Leadership	Leadership/Chain of Command	66
	Clarity of Unit Organization and Unit Mission	14
	Unit Management	10
	Discipline	6
	Level or Consistency of Unit Standards	5
Materiel	Materiel/Maintenance	65
	Shortage of Funds	11
Attitudes/Morale	Morale/Attitude	62
	Priorities Other Than Combat Mission	10
Quality of People and Unit	Quality of People	40
	Relevant/Combat Experience	16
	Successful Unit	15
	Unit Pride	14
	Mission of Unit	11
Cohesion	Time with Unit	6
	Teamwork/Cohesion	40
	Communication	4
	Gender	2

resents both such comments as, "We train constantly and automatically people know what to do for certain situations," and "Need more training, practicing. . . . Yes I am learning my MOS, but when it comes to combat training we haven't done anything besides what I did in Basic Training. I don't think that is enough training." People commented not only on the amount of training, but also on whether the type of training seemed relevant or necessary. Regardless of the

positive or negative nature of the comment, training was perceived as having the greatest effect upon their individual and unit readiness.

Likewise, the emphasis the chain of command placed on readiness or the quality and experience of the chain of command was also an important factor. Some participants mentioned the "[t]one set by current and prior CO and supported by entire chain of command," and some linked leadership to training: "[t]he amount of training offered is tremendous. The CO really pushes combat readiness." In contrast, negative reports included "the chain of command is afraid to let others (lower chain of command) take action and make decisions."

Given the stated focus of our research, it is surprising that out of 934 surveys, only 2 respondents indicated that gender issues had an effect upon readiness, indicating a general perception that gender integration plays a minor role in unit or individual readiness.

THE EFFECTS OF GENDER ON PERSONNEL READINESS ATTRIBUTES

Again, gender was perceived to be a minor factor in the readiness of a unit, but the following discusses the issues that gender integration does raise for specific readiness attributes: availability, qualification, experience, and stability.

Availability

There are two reasons personnel may not be available: (1) no individuals have been assigned to some positions, or (2) the individuals who have been assigned are not available for work or are on restricted duty. Duty restrictions can include nondeployability by itself or other restrictions on the tasks and locations at which an individual can perform.²

In discussions at service headquarters and units, we heard few gender-related problems in filling positions. In the Navy and Marine

²These availability effects also have implications for morale, which are discussed in Chapter Five.

Corps, gender could restrict assignment flexibility because the specific number of bunks available for women on ships prescribes the number of female billets.

For the Marines, this issue is especially problematic because they have integrated units that currently deploy on ships with no female accommodations. Thus, some Marine women are currently not allowed to deploy with their units. The problem will decrease as more combatant ships are modified. Units that deploy on ships are the only ones with official female quotas.

We heard more about gender-related causes of unplanned personnel losses, absences, and duty restrictions.³ Three causes were most often mentioned: pregnancy, single motherhood, and sickness or injury.

Pregnancy. The deployability of pregnant women is restricted by policy. Under some conditions, pregnant women can participate in field exercises, but they cannot deploy overseas or out to sea.⁴ Pregnant women are also excluded from military activities that are considered potentially dangerous to the baby, such as using chemicals or firing weapons.⁵

Many commanders we spoke with indicated that they had data showing a higher rate of nonavailability among women than among

³There is considerable debate in the research community regarding whether women miss more time from work than men do. The majority of the research concentrates upon the civilian workplace. The findings that do suggest women are absent more frequently cite life events, such as motherhood, as the primary factor explaining these differences (see, for example, Leigh, 1991; Vistnes, 1997; VandenHeuvel and Wooden, 1995). The studies that find women do not necessarily miss more time from work argue that other studies did not control for the different levels of seniority between men and women, the different types of jobs men and women tend to have, or other demographic or job differences (see, for example, Haccoun, 1988; Scott and McClellan, 1990). One recent study, however, did find that military women pilots were medically grounded more frequently than were their male colleagues (Voge, 1996).

⁴The Navy and Marine Corps policies state that pregnant women cannot be more than six hours from a hospital. The six-hour policy was established not to permit pregnant servicemembers to deploy to sea, but to allow some flexibility for short under way periods, such as transits to and from local shipyards or changing a ship's berth.

⁵Further research might compare these military policies regarding pregnancy to those from civilian organizations that employ women in environments that would be considered hazardous to pregnant women (e.g., factories with high noise levels or chemical exposure).

men. However, they differed in their assessments of the effect of pregnancy on their units' overall ability to deploy. For commanders of undermanned units, unplanned losses of any type are difficult to manage. In the Navy, where women are removed from the ship when they are 20 weeks into a pregnancy, the effect of this "unplanned loss" depends on how long it takes to get a replacement.⁶ In the other services, pregnant personnel are less likely to be detached from the unit, but they typically take convalescence leave following the birth. These losses must be compensated for because replacements are rarely available. Obviously, the management challenge of pregnancies also varies with the number of women who become pregnant at the same time or in close succession.

Pregnant women who remain in the unit may not be able to perform all their usual duties. This depends on the job, the woman's medical circumstances, and decisions made by the woman, her physician, and her commander or supervisor. Most unit personnel we spoke with drew contrasts between women who participated in unit physical-training runs to the very ends of their pregnancies and women who were on limited duty or sick leave during a considerable portion of their pregnancies. Performance during pregnancies is thought to vary across women. If the commanding officer and other unit personnel are familiar with and exhibit a knowledge of the regulations and restrictions accompanying pregnancy, managing a unit with one or more pregnant women is easier, and attitudes toward the pregnant woman appear to be more positive.

We heard many times that *who* was pregnant and *when* she was pregnant made a tremendous difference to unit readiness. There was a general perception that women officers and senior enlisted personnel try to time their pregnancies to have the least effect upon the unit—e.g., not before a scheduled deployment. This was due, in part, to their pride in and concern regarding their units and also

⁶We were told on our visits to ships that a replacement cannot be requested before the pregnant woman departs. This practice would ensure a considerable gap between departure and the arrival of a replacement and increases the resentment toward the pregnant woman. The actual Navy assignment policy, however, is that ships can begin the process to request a replacement as soon as they are aware of pregnancies. Assignment priority will depend upon multiple factors, though, such as the deployment schedules of the ships; thus, the ships may not receive replacements as soon as the pregnant women leave, even if they apply well in advance.

because, we were told, these women had invested a lot of time in their careers and would not want to damage them. These opinions stood in marked contrast to those concerning junior female personnel, especially single mothers. Single, pregnant, junior enlisted personnel were considered the most problematic because the pregnancies were less likely to be planned and more likely to create other problems, such as financial and child-care problems, that impacted the unit.

Single Mothers. Single parents of either gender were perceived to place a burden on the unit. We should note that, numerically, single fathers are more common in the military than single mothers, but the latter seem to be more visible to others, perhaps because a much higher percentage of women than men are single parents.⁷ We heard about many specific problems, particularly in the junior enlisted ranks. Young single parents often cannot afford adequate housing, child care, or transportation. They may amass considerable debt and then need assistance in managing financial crises. Further, young single parents frequently cannot attend early morning or late evening unit activities because of the restrictions of daycare, etc. Of the many issues that arise in these situations, few of the issues are unresolvable, but many consume the time of supervisory personnel, including the unit commander and/or executive officer, or senior noncommissioned and petty officers.

Sickness or Injury. Whether the number of women in a unit affects personnel availability also depends on whether the women are more or less likely than the men to be absent for all reasons, including sickness and injury in addition to pregnancy. The research team was

⁷Using data from DoD's 1992 Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel, we were able to estimate the fraction of all military personnel who are single parents. Two percent of men and 14 percent of women were single parents at that time. The biggest difference was for mid-grade enlisted personnel (E5-E6); in this group, 4 percent of men and 20 percent of women were single parents. Among single parents, just over half were men. The survey also provides some evidence to support the perception that women are less available than men. One question asked whether the individual "found it difficult to respond very quickly to a recall/alert or to a change in work schedule . . . in the past 12 months." Among those who had faced this situation, 38 percent of men and 51 percent of women found it difficult. Actually, there were few differences between men and women at the same grade; the overall difference mostly reflects that women are more likely to be in the junior enlisted grades, where servicemembers were more likely to report these difficulties.

told that women were more frequently on sick call, light duty, or profile (i.e., limited physical duties for health reasons) than the men. There are no automated records of the frequency of and reasons for absence, however, so we could not confirm these reports.

There were several explanations given for this perceived pattern. One explanation, as told to us by Marines, was that women are “broke more often,” or experience a disproportionate number of injuries. We were also told that men are more likely to be ordered to “suck it up” and perform despite pain or illness, whereas male commanders would usually not push women to that degree.

Additionally, many individuals thought that junior enlisted women used “female problems” to get out of unattractive work duties and that male supervisors would not challenge these complaints. In contrast, the perception was that senior women did not permit junior women to use menstruation as an excuse to get out of work and that they did not use this themselves.

In conclusion, most units we studied did not report that gender integration has had a significant negative effect upon the number of personnel available to the unit. When units were fully staffed and the proportion of women was representative, pregnancy seemed to be of little concern to commanders and coworkers. When the units visited were undermanned or had a disproportionate number of women, pregnancy or injuries among the women tended to be noted as a problem regardless of whether men were also becoming injured or regardless of whether the overall percentage of personnel on convalescence leave due to pregnancy was small.

In Chapter Two, we described policies that continue to restrict duty assignments that women can fill, particularly in some occupations. These policies disproportionately concentrate women in units with unrestricted positions and emphasize concerns about the effects of gender integration on personnel availability. These concerns, in turn, may also serve to justify the policy (i.e., if we have all those problems with women, it is a good thing women are not in the “important” units).

Qualification

Given that a unit has the necessary personnel available, the next personnel readiness criterion is "qualification," which reflects whether the people are trained and capable of performing their jobs within the unit. All the commanders with whom we spoke asserted that their units were 100 percent trained in their duty skills. Gender clearly had no effect on the degree to which the units were filled with individuals qualified and trained in the correct skills. However, we also took a broader look at whether it was generally perceived that women could perform their jobs as well as the men.

As Table 3.4 indicates, the majority of individuals in our survey of grade E5 and above believed that women performed similarly to men. Most supervisors asserted that they had women who performed throughout the performance spectrum; some women performed better than the men, some performed at the lower end of the scale. More junior enlisted respondents were inclined to respond that women did not perform as well as men. However, when discus-

Table 3.4

Answers to the Question: "How Would You Rank the (Other) Women in Your Unit?" (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=110)	E7-E9 (N=102)	E5-E6 (N=260)	E1-E4 (N=416)
They tend to perform better than the men.	6	6	7	2
They tend to perform in the same range as men do.	65	68	52	38
They tend to perform worse than the men.	21	12	23	32
I don't know. I don't really have much interaction with them.	9	15	18	27

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.001$. Unit was significant ($p < 0.01$), but there was no evident pattern among them. Thus, we attribute the differences to commander influence. Service, gender, and race were not significant.

Men were asked to rank the women in the unit; women were asked to rank the other women in the unit.

Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

sions turned to women who were not performing well in the units, junior women were those most frequently mentioned as examples. Frequently, these junior women were dissatisfied with the service or with their jobs; women who had reenlisted were committed to the military as a career and tended to be seen as performing as well as men.

When individuals were asked to rate their own performance and estimate how they would be evaluated by their peers, they tended to believe that they performed very well, but that their peers would not evaluate them as highly. This pattern is evident for both men and women, across all the services, although the gap between self-evaluation and peer evaluation was greater for women. Table 3.5 indicates the results for the men, and Table 3.6 displays the results for the women. For each grade, the tables indicate the results of the respondents' self-evaluations and then how their peers would rank them.

For many of the women in newly opened units, the jobs they are performing are the same as the ones women have been performing for years in other units, such as military police, and many of these assignments are traditional for women, such as administration. Thus, this question is only interesting when applied to newly opened MOSs, and then the question becomes problematic because of the small numbers of women assigned to these MOSs. Given such small numbers, it is not yet apparent whether women perform differently than men within these occupations. For example, one commander told us that two out of two women he has in a newly opened occupation have job-related injuries. From this evidence, it is impossible to infer whether women who perform that job will be more prone to injury.

Another issue was whether the ability to perform in their occupation was more important than general military skills. This issue came up more during our Marine Corps visits. For example, "I don't feel women should be in the Marines. A Marine is a basic rifleman, an MOS women cannot be assigned to. Therefore, women shouldn't be Marines. Other services, yes, but not Marines." Because women cannot be infantrymen, this kind of logic asserts that whether or not women can perform within their occupations is irrelevant. The

Table 3.5

Responses of Men to the Questions: "How Do You Rank Your Overall Work Performance Compared to the Others that You Work With?" (by grade and service) and "How Do You Think Your Peers Would Rank Your Overall Work Performance?" (by grade and service, in percent)

	Officers		E7-E9		E5-E6		E1-E4	
	Self	Peers	Self	Peers	Self	Peers	Self	Peers
Army men								
Top 15%	62	48	68	53	59	50	35	25
Above average	28	36	26	38	29	31	35	38
Average	10	15	6	8	10	16	29	33
Below average	—	1	1	1	2	2	1	3
Bottom 15%	—	—	—	—	0.4	1	1	1
Navy men								
Top 15%	61	49	70	50	64	53	38	29
Above average	26	33	26	39	23	28	35	35
Average	14	19	4	9	12	17	27	33
Below average	—	—	—	2	1	2	—	3
Bottom 15%	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Marine men								
Top 15%	68	61	75	74	74	74	46	29
Above average	18	21	20	21	21	15	32	49
Average	14	18	14	5	6	12	20	20
Below average	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Bottom 15%	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.001$. For service, $p < 0.01$. Unit and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Table 3.6
Responses of Women to the Questions: "How Do You Rank Your Overall Work Performance Compared to the Others That You Work With?" (by grade and service) and "How Do You Think Your Peers Would Rank Your Overall Work Performance?" (by grade and service, in percent)

	Officers		E7-E9		E5-E6		E1-E4	
	Self	Peers	Self	Peers	Self	Peers	Self	Peers
Army Women								
Top 15%	61	33	68	50	44	40	32	22
Above Average	33	56	18	41	41	38	32	36
Average	6	11	9	9	11	20	33	36
Below Average	—	—	5	—	2	—	—	4
Bottom 15%	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	2
Navy Women								
Top 15%	60	44	56	44	50	39	20	15
Above Average	36	44	39	50	41	41	40	39
Average	4	12	6	6	4	14	37	42
Below Average	—	—	—	—	5	4	2	5
Bottom 15%	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	—
Marine Women								
Top 15%	67	67	N/A	N/A	75	50	30	26
Above Average	—	—	N/A	N/A	13	38	39	35
Average	—	—	N/A	N/A	13	—	30	35
Below Average	—	33	N/A	N/A	—	—	—	4
Bottom 15%	—	—	N/A	N/A	—	13	—	—

NOTE: For rank, $p < 0.001$. For service, $p < 0.01$. Unit was not significant. Race was not significant for Army or Marine women. Race was significant ($p < .05$) for Navy women. Among Navy women, black E7-E9s tended to rate themselves higher than white women of the same ranks, and black E1-E6 tended to rate themselves lower than white women of the same ranks. Hispanic women and Others rated themselves lower than black or white women. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Marine Corps has a considerably lower percentage of technical skill requirements than the other services; instead, the service emphasis is on general military skills. In addition, the Marine Corps is considerably more junior in experience mix; over 60 percent of the Marine Corps has one to four years of service. Thus, the importance of technical skills is further minimized by the "apprentice" status of most of the service.⁸ In addition, because the Marine Corps is a more self-sustaining force in that it deploys with less internal service support, there is a minimized emphasis on the division of labor.

For many individuals, strength was the primary concern regarding whether women could perform their jobs. We were told that some jobs require considerable upper-body strength to move oil barrels, change large tires, or carry large sacks of flour. However, we also found supervisors who had resolved these problems. Supervisors who had resolved them asserted that the services have become more cautious about injuries in general, and that much heavy work now requires multiperson efforts. When women were part of a team working together to lift or haul equipment or supplies, supervisors found few problems. Other units were afraid that women could not handle the work, and thus did not even give women the opportunity to participate in the team-lifting or hauling. Savvy supervisors seemed to realize that some of their men could not lift heavy loads either and actively worked to manage the capabilities of the people they had, e.g., "If she's carrying less per load, I make sure she carries the last load." Once again, this emerges as an issue more where units were disproportionately female, and thus team efforts are disproportionately female.

Many participants expressed a desire for a physical test that could evaluate the ability of an individual to perform within a job. The current physical fitness standards do not test for the ability to perform in particular occupations. However, many troops believe that the physical fitness standards relate to the ability to perform in a combat environment; thus, the different physical standard for military women means to them that women will perform less well in a combat environment. As a result, the different physical fitness standards are less of a readiness issue than they are a morale issue, so this issue

⁸See Kirby and Thie (1996) for a profile of the different services.

is discussed in Chapter Five. However, individuals believed that, were physical tests devised to measure physical capabilities relevant to particular occupations, much of the controversy over individuals' abilities to perform in heavy-labor occupations would likely be resolved.⁹

Despite the concerns people held regarding physical strength requirements, the majority of men surveyed agreed that women should serve in their occupations. These results are shown in Tables 3.7 and 3.8. As shown in Table 3.9, women respondents generally believed their male coworkers were supportive of women serving in their occupations or career fields.

In addition to the skill aspect of an individual's job, many military personnel also have management or leadership responsibilities. We were repeatedly told of the high esteem in which senior male enlisted personnel hold their female peers. In addition, most junior people asserted that there was no difference between men and women supervisors. When a difference was noted between men and women supervisors, there was a general consensus that female leaders are stricter with junior enlisted females than are male leaders. The perceived unequal treatment is discussed in Chapter Four as an issue of morale.

Table 3.7

Men's Responses to the Question: "Do You Think Women Should Be Allowed to Serve in Your Occupation/Career Field?"
(by unit type, in percent)

	Army Combat Arms	Army Non-Combat Arms	Navy	Marines
Yes	66	80	89	73
No	34	20	11	27

NOTES: For unit type, $p < 0.001$. Service and grade were not significant.

⁹The design and implementation of occupation-specific physical requirements is a complex issue.

Table 3.8

Men's Responses to the Question: "Do You Think Women Should Be Allowed to Serve in Your Occupation/Career Field?" (by race, in percent)

	White (N=424)	Black (N=112)	Hispanic (N=68)	Other (N=51)
Yes	79	96	87	86
No	22	5	13	14

NOTES: For race, $p < 0.001$. Service and grade were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

In conclusion, both men and women in our sample believe that women perform similarly to men. Where women are assigned to newly integrated units, they are frequently performing a job that has been integrated successfully for years in other units. Where women are assigned to newly integrated occupations, the small numbers make an objective assessment of these individual performances very difficult. To the degree that leadership is an important aspect of an individual's qualifications, women leaders are well-regarded by their peers and subordinates and may be better at resolving some of the leadership gender inconsistencies observed by both men and women in our sample.

Table 3.9

Women's Responses to the Question: "Do Your Male Coworkers Seem to Think that Women Should Be Allowed to Serve in Your Occupation/Career Field?" (by grade, in percent)

	Officer	E7-E9	E5-E6	E1-E4
Most seem to think women should be allowed to serve in my occupation.	57	70	47	32
Some seem to think that women should be allowed, others do not.	25	20	26	32
Most seem to think women should not be allowed to serve in my occupation.	—	—	15	17
I can't really tell what they think.	18	10	12	18

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.05$. Service, unit, and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Experience

Given the high regard for female leaders within the military, the availability of female senior enlisted personnel and female officers is generally considered to enrich the units. The Navy placed a high value on female senior leadership on ships and established a policy of assigning junior enlisted women to newly gender-integrated ships only after female chief petty officers and female officers were aboard. The senior women were assumed to act as role models for the younger women and as resources to male colleagues unfamiliar with supervising women. This policy was regarded positively by the majority of Navy personnel with whom we discussed it, and personnel from other services also saw the benefits of such a policy. As we described earlier, however, the policy has constrained the pace of integration on ships because it takes time to grow senior female personnel.

Because many opportunities in the Army and Marines are still closed to women, the career path to senior positions may be extremely difficult to travel for all but a very few women who receive the limited number of assignments open to women. Besides limiting the number of women who can advance, restricted occupations also limit the credibility of the women who do advance. Even the Navy assignment policy mentioned above did have a slight negative aspect in that the senior women who were assigned to the newly integrated ships did not have the same amount of experience on that type of ship as did many of their new subordinates. In some cases, this negatively affected the credibility of these women. In general, however, this disadvantage was minor compared to the perceived advantage of assigning experienced women to newly integrated ships first and is a transitional issue.

Stability

Rapid personnel turnover can negatively affect the personnel readiness of a unit because individuals arriving at a new unit need time to learn the unit's duties and to work with their new colleagues. This learning curve is generally gender blind. The only relationship we found between stability and gender was through unplanned losses, and thus a higher rate of new personnel, due to pregnancy. Only the

Navy regularly replaces pregnant women with new personnel, so pregnancy is not as much of a stability issue for the other services.

A different kind of personnel stability, gender stability, is worthy of mention here. When services assign only very small numbers of women to a unit and when those assignments occur at the same time, the stability of gender integration becomes an issue. For example, female Navy aviators are often assigned to squadrons in pairs because they can then berth together while aboard ship. However, because they are typically assigned to the unit at the same time, they often leave at the same time, creating instability in unit integration. The result is that units become accustomed to having officers of both genders, then the women leave, and the environment becomes all male again. By the time the next pair of women is assigned, the unit must once again experience the transition to a mixed-gender population. The effects of these transitions and the possibility of increasing the gender stability of units merit further investigation, but stability is generally a gender-blind aspect of personnel readiness.

CONCLUSION

In summary, when queried about individual and unit readiness, military personnel offered comments that did not identify gender integration as having a major effect on readiness. Further, both men and women surveyed asserted that women performed within the same range as men. Women, and such issues as pregnancy, appear to affect the availability of personnel in units more frequently when units are disproportionately female or are undermanned.

Although supervisors have found ways to manage the strength differentials of their personnel, many personnel favor an occupation-specific qualification test to screen both women and men for the strength requirements for specific jobs and to relieve those individuals who did pass the test from the pressure to prove themselves. The current physical fitness test does not test for the ability to perform specific jobs and is thus not a test of qualification.

Finally, the value of female leadership is widely recognized, as is the scarcity of such female leaders, especially female E7s to E9s. These women are thought to contribute significantly to the quality and

readiness of individual units, especially those integrated with more junior female personnel.

EFFECTS OF GENDER INTEGRATION ON COHESION

This chapter examines the effects of gender integration on unit cohesion. First, a definition of and framework for cohesion developed by previous research is offered. Second, responses to questionnaire items on cohesion are presented. Third, survey and focus-group data regarding the effects of gender integration on cohesion are discussed. The people we surveyed differed in the level of cohesion they experienced within their units. These differences are acknowledged herein and serve as an organizing framework for reporting our data. Our findings are evaluated according to the standards set by decades of research on the topic of cohesion and work performance. Our results support the framework developed by previous scholars. In this chapter, *unit* refers to both the smaller work group and the larger unit level.

DEFINING COHESION

Before delving into the research findings to examine the differences in perception, especially according to grade, a discussion of cohesion in general is in order. A common misperception is that cohesion is equivalent to social bonding and that more is always desirable. Decades of social science research into social cohesion, work performance, and military effectiveness, however, demonstrate the importance of distinguishing between two types of cohesion:

Social cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group is socially cohesive to the extent that its members like each other, prefer to spend their social time together, enjoy

each other's company, and feel emotionally close to one another. (MacCoun, 1993, p. 291.)

Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve their goal. (MacCoun, 1993, p. 291.)

This body of work has also delineated the relationship among social cohesion, task cohesion, and group outcomes:

Task cohesion has a modest but reliable influence on performance; social cohesion does not have an independent effect after controlling for task cohesion. Under some conditions, high social cohesion is actually detrimental to unit performance; moderate social cohesion appears most beneficial. Research indicates that it is not necessary to like someone to work with them, so long as members share a commitment to the group's objective. (MacCoun, 1993, p. 330.)

Multiple research efforts have shown that high social cohesion, or bonding on a social level, can have deleterious effects on performance outcomes and task cohesion, because people start to prioritize friendship and social activities over performing their jobs and let their work suffer. Military regulations have long considered the potential negative effects of the wrong kind of bonding between leaders and subordinates and thus enforce institutional fraternization policies that forbid inappropriately close relationships (regardless of gender) between officers and enlisted personnel.

RESEARCH FINDINGS ON UNIT COHESION

Our overall research findings are that gender differences alone did not appear to erode cohesion. Cohesion was reported high in units where people believed the command emphasized unity and the importance and necessity of all members and divisions in accomplishing the mission. Within smaller units and departments with strong cohesion, people felt their coworkers were professional, quality people they could trust to help them out when necessary. A proven track record of long, arduous work schedules that met with success

strengthened their bond. These factors overrode social differences in the units, such as gender, grade, and race. In units rated as loosely cohesive, workers tended to note that people preferred to socialize either on their own or in subgroups but that this was not a problem because, when it came to getting their jobs done and done well, they were able to work together as professionals to do so. In units that were characterized as divided into conflicting groups, gender was one of an entire range of factors that pulled people apart. Members of these units tended to feel either that the divisiveness was caused by lack of attention to the issue by the command or that the command was the source of the problem. Not only was the leadership charged with creating and fostering divisions by work group, but rank was most often cited as a source of segregation or conflict. Other divisions among people were attributed to people forming cliques according to personal interests, values, race or ethnic group, or gender. Divisions within units along the lines of gender were created when male commanders warned the junior men to "stay away from the women" and were exacerbated on ships by segregated berthing, which separated women from the rest of their coworkers, who berthed together. Although gender was mentioned as a cohesion issue, it was rarely mentioned alone and usually as only a part of a larger problem.

Table 4.1 presents questionnaire responses to an item asking soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines about unit cohesion. Their assessments varied significantly by grade and unit, but not by gender, race, or service. Roughly half of the respondents described their units as loosely cohesive. Officers and noncommissioned officers

Table 4.1

Responses to the Question: "How Would You Describe the Cohesiveness of Your Unit?" (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=115)	E7-E9 (N=104)	E5-E6 (N=255)	E1-E4 (N=419)
We are a very cohesive group.	37	34	22	26
We are a loosely cohesive group.	56	53	48	48
We are divided into conflicting groups.	7	14	31	27

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.001$. Unit was also significant ($p < 0.001$); however, there was no apparent pattern by size, gender ratio, or type of unit. Service, gender, and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

(NCOs) in grades E7–E9 were more likely than the lower grades to think their units were very cohesive; the enlisted grades from E1–E6 were much more likely than more senior personnel to believe that their units were divided into conflicting groups. Men and women perceived cohesion similarly; their opinions did not vary significantly.

It is important to note that the units surveyed were operationally unemployed at the time of this study. This relative inactivity may have negatively affected the perceived cohesion within the units.

Open-Ended Cohesion Survey Results

The questionnaire also asked respondents what they thought contributed to the current state of cohesion in their units; their written comments were coded and are characterized in Table 4.2. Unlike the written comments offered in response to queries on readiness, which tended to focus overwhelmingly on a single factor, the comments for cohesion reflected a far broader range of issues, and no singular element could be identified as primary.

Specific Issues Related to Cohesion

In addition to the more-general questions, the questionnaire asked about specific elements related to cohesion. Table 4.3 presents the responses people gave as to whether they and their coworkers worked well together. As with the question that asked people to rate the level of cohesion in their units, grade was significant, and officers were most positive in their responses: Nearly 60 percent of officers agreed that all worked well together, while 45 to 55 percent of their fellow service members agreed.

Only 42.9 percent of military personnel surveyed agreed with the statement, “I believe that my coworkers and I would respond well to a crisis.” Service, unit, grade, race, and gender were not significant in this item.¹

¹This refers only to the cohesion of the work group and the ability of coworkers to work well together. The survey included separate questions about unit readiness, which are shown in Chapter Two.

Table 4.2
Written Comments in Response to "Why Do You Think Your Unit's Cohesion Is the Way It Is?"

Categories	Written Responses	Number of Mentions
Qualities of people	Different personal interests/values/ personalities	137
	Cliques	43
	Morale/attitude	27
	Quality of people	14
	Gender issues	10
	Racial issues	5
Organization of unit	Division by work department/ platoon	100
	Size of Unit	23
Leadership	Leadership	60
	Communication	19
	Management/mismanagement	5
	Discipline	4
	Recognition/rewards	1
Working/training together; accomplishing missions/goals	Teamwork	42
	Tradition/pride	18
	Operations tempo/long hours	12
	Work/Task cohesion	10
	Personnel tempo	8
	Training	5
	Work hard	4
Trust/friendship/respect	Stand up for/respect/depend on one another	39
	Relationship outside work hours	33

Table 4.3
Responses to the Statement: "I Believe My Coworkers and I Work Well Together" (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=119)	E7-E9 (N=108)	E5-E6 (N=266)	E1-E4 (N=441)
Did not agree	40	55	46	53
Agreed	60	45	55	47

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.05$. Service, unit, race, and gender were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Important to the cohesion of any group is whether its members are able to communicate well. While officers surveyed were more likely than other individuals to believe they communicated well with coworkers, the majority of respondents of all grades did not believe so. Table 4.4 indicates these results.

Finally, responses to the questionnaire item "I believe I can trust and depend on my coworkers," varied significantly by grade ($p < 0.001$), race ($p < 0.001$), sex ($p < 0.05$), and unit ($p < 0.05$). Service was not significant. In terms of grade, over half of the officers and enlisted personnel in grades E7–E9 believed that they could trust and depend on their coworkers (56.3 and 54.6 percent, respectively), compared to less than a third of enlisted personnel in grades E5–E6 and E1–E4 (27.1 and 30.2 percent). More men in our survey than women felt they could trust and count on their coworkers, at a rate of 38.7 percent compared to 26.3 percent. Whites were more likely than other races to report that they could trust and depend on coworkers (41.6 percent), followed by Hispanics (32.2 percent), and then Blacks (24.0 percent) and people of other races (22.4 percent). Unit was significant, although no pattern was apparent, and this may be due to command climate.

The perceptions of the military personnel we surveyed generally reiterate the findings of prior research. When people thought they performed well as a unit, they rated cohesion as high or medium. Medium raters did not necessarily see their situation as problematic. When social cohesion was low, but coupled with medium or high task cohesion, overall cohesion was rated medium. Only when both social and task cohesion were low did people rate overall cohesion as

Table 4.4

Responses to the Statement: "I Believe that My Coworkers and I Communicate Well" (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=119)	E7–E9 (N=108)	E5–E6 (N=266)	E1–E4 (N=441)
Did not agree	52	62	68	71
Agreed	48	38	32	29

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.01$. Service, unit, race, and gender were not significant.

low. The negative effects of too much social bonding were mentioned as well. In discussions over the loss of all-male bonding environments, even those who longed for the "good old days" of high social cohesion admitted that some now-abandoned types of social bonding between men were actually unprofessional and detracted from the work environment. Our questionnaire items did not distinguish between the types of cohesion, but the written comments spell out the differences indicated by many personnel.

RESPONDENTS' EXPLANATIONS BEHIND HIGH, MEDIUM, OR LOW UNIT COHESION

This section depicts unit work environments according to whether they were perceived as very cohesive, loosely cohesive, or divided into conflicting groups. As noted earlier, only the last category was considered a problem that might seriously jeopardize morale, readiness, or performance.

Very Cohesive Units

Where unit cohesion was reported high, people used their own words to communicate in academic terms that both task cohesion and social cohesion were high. Task cohesion was described by one person as, "[t]he professionalism and hard work of everyone on board: we work together to make things happen regardless of personal feelings." These people felt good about their accomplishments and supported one another in their efforts. They claimed "pride in our work and we're not afraid of putting in a little extra effort to help out a shipmate." Social cohesion was high when people felt "we are more of a family than a group of ordinary people." The leadership was seen as promoting cohesion by its management style: "Trust and communication—letting people do their jobs and have responsibility (not micro-manage)." This level of closeness, trust, and cooperation was linked to performance under stressful conditions: "People know each other and they tend to help out. We tend to stick together in a crisis." This type of environment was more easily achieved in smaller units or departments, as some people noted on their surveys. Not once did any respondent write that common gender, religion, race, ethnicity, or background was responsible for his or her unit's high level of cohesion. Although responses did vary signif-

icantly by unit, there was no indication that mostly white male units, for example, rated their units any higher in cohesion level than did units with a much more diverse population. The comments on the importance of the role in leadership in fostering cohesion suggest that unit variation might be due to leader attitudes and practices. Ultimately, time together in a positive, productive environment appears to override differences in social attributes: "We have worked closely together for 6 months out to sea. We have been through the good times and hard times and have had to depend upon each other."

Loosely Cohesive Units

People who thought of their units as loosely cohesive often actually preferred this level of cohesion: "There are individual interests but everyone works well together and is driving towards a common goal." That task cohesion was strong and took precedence over social cohesion was expressed in a number of different ways:

People have different agendas but in a crisis situation, I believe we would work well together.

We all have our own thing going but when we need to get together for a goal the ship works together well.

When an actual casualty occurs everyone joins for the common good.

When it's on the line we get the job done.

When it's time to pull together, all [work] to make the tasking complete.

Although we don't get along we are all ready to fight.

Although some people accepted loose social cohesion as the natural outcome of a work group comprising many different types of backgrounds and interests, others defined loose social cohesion as the result of people making transitions from the civilian social world into the military environment: "We are all raised in different environments and making change is hard for some people to do."

That people do not want to socialize together outside of work or in their free time does not necessarily mean that they do not get along, especially when people are forced to work long hours together: "When in homeport, everyone wants to spend time with family and friends on off hours, due to amount of time of deployment and 14-month turnaround."

Finally, even when there appeared to be a level of social conflict that divided people into groups or even scattered them individually, people made comments suggesting that the right situation or proper incentives could cause them to act as one:

Most members who are career minded have a look-out-for-themselves mindset. Everybody else just does their time. There's no good reason to function as a unit if there is no central purpose to function together, such as a crisis. It doesn't put more money in your pocket.

Thus the common sentiment among military personnel in loosely cohesive units paralleled the literature on cohesion in asserting that high social cohesion was not necessary to achieve task cohesion or reach group goals.

Units Divided into Conflicting Groups

Units divided into conflicting groups experienced the divisions either at an organizational level along the lines of platoons or work groups, or based on individual statuses, such as grade, race, or gender. People whose unit cohesion appeared to be low were most likely to mention gender as an issue, although gender was only one of several characteristics that separated people—and was often not the primary rift. Moreover, gender separations were often attributed to or thought to have been reinforced by structural components or leadership practices. Unlike the more contented members of loosely cohesive units, people in units where it was apparent that both social and task cohesion were low described lower morale and performance.

It is apparent from what service members wrote on their questionnaires that they want cohesion at the smaller work group level

(primary group), as well as a sense of esprit de corps at a larger unit level (secondary group).

We will first address the comments about lack of cohesion at the larger level that was due to unproductive competition with other groups and/or a lack of a sense of belonging to a greater entity with a larger purpose. In some places, cohesion at the larger level did not exist because of a lack of communication or coordination: "Sometimes it seems that different departments are on different teams, not the same mission." A few people noted that connecting is particularly challenging when the larger group is extremely large. On "a large vessel with many varying jobs and many missions," it may seem that, "[e]veryone has a piece of a pie but no one person has the entire pie." Other comments attributed the divisions to leadership, not unit size: "There's no teamwork or team building, just command generated reasons to hate other departments or divisions." Working with an organization founded on a division of labor, supervisors can either emphasize how all the roles fit together into one, or they treat departments as separate and competitive: "This command is very cliquish. People are always compared to others, i.e., engineer vs. topsider." While fostering competition may increase morale and cohesion for those units that are considered "the best," it may leave members of other units feeling underappreciated and unentitled to take pride in larger unit successes. The chain of command may also build walls between subsections of the larger unit when each commander has different standards and policies for his or her section: "I think there are inconsistencies in the standards set by the different departments and on this ship. That makes it difficult for the departments to fuse together at the deck plate level."

Some of the lack of cohesion among subsections was placed in the context of current shortages: "When resources are limited (manpower, time, materials) you tend to protect your resources, not help others." At least one unit actually bonded to protect itself from other units: "We stick together so we don't get overrun by others."

There were no comments suggesting that units were divided and competed along the lines of whether they were staffed mostly by women or by men. There was also no indication that male or female commanders dealt with this issue any differently from one another.

At the smaller work group level, less cohesion was reported when individuals fell into cliques or believed that they were on their own, "In my division, it's every person for themselves. Not a lot of team-work." These delineations may not always be visible, but may resurface whenever a disagreement takes place:

People tend to want to be around others who are like them: same color, sex, rank, whatever. This creates barriers and draws lines. Because a gap, however small, is already there it makes it easy for the rest to become huge when a conflict does occur. People take sides and the gaps deepen.

The issue of cliques is not limited to social cohesion and can be tied to work conditions and rewards: "Too much favoritism and politicking. If you're not in the clique you don't receive the adequate recognition for your job."

The biggest gap reported among subgroups was the one between the junior enlisted personnel and the officers and senior enlisted personnel who lead them. The military organizes housing according to grade, and experienced people receive more amenities than the juniors. These differences are not the ones respondents reported in explaining how rank divides people. Rather, there seemed to be grade differences in understanding the unit's goals and how to get there: "Officers refuse to listen to the experienced enlisted for solutions to problems." There was also a generation gap in perceptions of how the services should be run and how junior people should be treated: "personality conflicts [between] older workers used to old ways and new ones who are used to today's ways."

Leaders create resentment between men and women by holding them to different standards or giving them assignments or recognition based on gender. This issue will be discussed in detail in the following chapter on morale. In some of the units in which women were recently integrated for the first time, men and women had to overcome a hurdle set by preintegration indoctrination. Many men had been told not to talk to the women, sit next to them, or even go near them, or they would be asking for disciplinary action. These instructions, intended to keep men from sexually harassing women, made life very difficult in work groups that included both men and women who were expected to communicate and coordinate their

efforts. This environment also made it difficult for women to have male friends, because rumors about their relationship would often suggest that they were romantically involved, and the men might even be counseled to curtail their interactions. Women officers in particular found this restriction difficult: They couldn't socialize with male peers without causing speculation about their intentions, and they often did not have much of an opportunity to coordinate time to socialize with other women officers (assuming they would have common interests and would wish to do so). These issues also had an effect on morale and will be discussed further in the next chapter.

From the focus groups, we learned that segregated berthing lessened work group cohesion on recently integrated ships because department heads were generally accustomed to having their entire crew berthed together in the same area of the ship. Both official and unofficial information used to be communicated in berthing areas, either verbally or by posting notices, and often one worker would wake his replacement to take over the shift. Now men are still berthed according to unit, but the women are berthed together regardless of work group. Supervisors often did not think to go to women's berthing in addition to their men's berthing to pass along important information, and no male coworker dared go into female berthing to wake a female sailor if she were the one that happened to oversleep that day.

Although women's berthing was often seen as a location of conflict, this behavior was not due to women being disproportionately difficult, but was often due to women having different and conflicting work schedules since they were pieced together from different units. Also, it was often unclear who should be responsible for resolving female berthing-area conflicts and making sure these berthing areas were clean. Generally, the unit leaders took care of their unit's berthing area, but for women's berthing there is no standard Navy policy on who should be held accountable. Thus, women did not necessarily bond simply because they were all women and were housed together, and conflict among them could affirm the perception that "women just can't get along."

Discussions of gender integration of military units often raise the issue of whether the presence of women disrupts male bonding. Some

men did complain that they could no longer walk around half-naked on ship, swear and drink with the guys, go as a unit to a strip club with their leaders, or engage in hazing practices. Usually, other men in the focus group would point out (and then they might often agree) that these activities do not belong in today's professional military and that showing up drunk for work or beating each other up was not best for work performance or readiness. On ships, we heard stories of men who used to be quite malodorous due to infrequent bathing; now their male peers appreciate that such men seem to take better care of their hygiene when working in the presence of women. Overall, usually more men than not thought that raising the standards for discipline and behavior was a positive effect of gender integration.

People mentioned that dating between military personnel disrupted unit cohesion when they placed their relationship above all else and did not interact with their coworkers or focus on their job. In one location, a pair of junior peers had been counseled to end their relationship; when they did not, one of them was transferred elsewhere. Perhaps more of an issue is when relationships end on less-than-favorable terms, yet these people must continue to interact in their work environment and help each other out if the job calls for it. The problem of couples is usually found with junior enlisted, although complaints of fraternization between NCOs and junior people were also heard. The latter situation caused divisiveness when people perceived favoritism or inconsistent standards on the part of the chain of command. Such inappropriate relationships are against policy in all of the services, and virtually all of the stories about such relationships ended with one or both of the violators being disciplined or removed from the unit.²

Finally, we explored the issue of whether men might attempt to protect the women in their units rather than perform their duties during combat. Most people tended to think this would be more likely to occur in the case of couples, that men in general would not take special care to protect the women, but that a boyfriend might be concerned about his girlfriend and that she too might be upset at the

²Policies regarding fraternization and interpersonal relationships vary between services and continue to evolve.

thought of losing her mate. When we asked people to think about dangerous situations to which they have had to respond in real life (fires on ships, fires in the field training environment, or dangerous situations during peacekeeping operations or on the flight decks of aircraft carriers), virtually all of them stated that no one paid attention to gender when taking action. Men and women alike pitched in to deal with the situation, and men did not ask where the women were, tell them to get out of the way, or take over their role in managing the crisis in order to protect them.

PREFERENCES ABOUT THE MIX OF MEN AND WOMEN IN THE WORK GROUP

The majority of individuals, both men and women, did not have a preference about the gender of their colleagues. There were significant service differences ($p < 0.001$), so the responses are presented by service in Table 4.5. Of those who did state a preference, the majority (again both men and women) preferred to work with men. This finding for the women we surveyed is not surprising, as these women have self-selected to work in a male-dominated profession.

CONCLUSION

Overall, perceptions about cohesion among survey respondents tended to vary by rank more than anything else. Higher ranking men and women were more likely to report higher rates of cohesion than junior personnel. Junior personnel often gave leadership practices and guidance as an explanation for cohesion level. Workers who described their units as very cohesive or loosely cohesive appeared to be personally satisfied with their situations and to believe that their units were able to meet their goals in terms of work requirements. Any divisions that may be caused by gender were minimized or invisible in those units. Gender was an issue only in units characterized as divided into conflicting groups, and then it took second place to divisions along the lines of work groups or, within work groups, along the lines of rank. When gender did have a negative effect on cohesion, it was because (1) this is one of several ways people break into categories socially when conflict arises; (2) structures or organizational behavior pointed out gender differences; and (3) dating could interfere with work if it occurred within a unit. Where people men-

tioned a positive effect of gender integration on cohesion, it was to comment that women's presence had raised the professional standards of conduct in the military workplace.

Table 4.5

Answers to the Question: "Does the Proportion of Women to Men at Work Matter to You?" (by service and grade, in percent)

Service	Answer	Officers	E7-E9	E5-E6	E1-E4
Army	No, it doesn't matter.	72	68	59	68
	Yes, I prefer to work mostly with men.	28	23	33	19
	Yes, I prefer to work where the ratio of men to women is about the same.	—	9	7	12
	Yes, I prefer to work mostly with women.	—	—	2	2
Navy	No, it doesn't matter.	76	67	64	60
	Yes, I prefer to work mostly with men.	15	27	28	20
	Yes, I prefer to work where the ratio of men to women is about the same.	6	6	8	19
	Yes, I prefer to work mostly with women.	3	—	—	0.4
Marine Corps	No, it doesn't matter.	50	82	74	67
	Yes, I prefer to work mostly with men.	50	9	24	23
	Yes, I prefer to work where the ratio of men to women is about the same.	—	9	—	9
	Yes, I prefer to work mostly with women.	—	—	2	1

NOTES: Unit and grade were significant, $p < 0.05$, but there was no discernible pattern to the unit significance. Gender and race were not significant.

Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

EFFECTS OF GENDER INTEGRATION ON MORALE

OVERALL ISSUES THAT AFFECT MORALE

A 1991 assessment of various definitions and uses of the term *morale* in the military arrived at a useful working definition, and the assessment asserts that the term is really relevant only for individuals who are members of a goal-oriented group (Manning, 1991). That definition focuses on the degree to which group members are enthusiastic about and committed to carrying out the duties of that group. This assessment also noted that research indicates morale is a function of cohesion at both the primary (small) work group level and the secondary (larger) unit level.

The written survey findings suggest that gender is one of many issues that affect morale, but it is not one of the primary factors influencing morale. In the written questionnaire, we asked respondents to rate the morale of their units. These results are shown in Table 5.1. The majority of people ranked their units' morale as medium. Of the remainder, those of higher pay grades tended to evaluate their units' morale as high, whereas more junior personnel tended to perceive morale as low. The responses differed by unit, but there was no apparent pattern among the differences by either the gender ratio of the unit or the relative size of unit. Thus, we attribute the unit differences to unit history and leadership differences.

Besides asking respondents directly about unit morale, as shown above, we also asked a less direct question about how they felt about their units. These responses are shown in Table 5.2. If one interprets the five responses as five measures on a scale of morale, the respon-

Table 5.1

Responses to the Question "How Would You Rate the Morale of Your Unit?" (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=118)	E7-E9 (N=106)	E5-E6 (N=262)	E1-E4 (N=439)
High	33	27	12	15
Medium	60	61	54	52
Low	7	11	34	33

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.001$. Unit was also significant ($p < 0.001$), but there was no apparent pattern by size or gender ratio. Gender was significant ($p < 0.05$) in that women were slightly less likely to rate morale as high and slightly more likely to rate morale as low. Service and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

dents tended to have high or very high morale, as over half of the respondents within each grade group responded that they were very proud of their units or that they enjoyed being a part of their units. Officers and higher-ranking enlisted personnel were more likely to feel very positively about their units and less likely to feel very negatively about them.

Table 5.2

Attitude Toward Unit (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=116)	E7-E9 (N=105)	E5-E6 (N=259)	E1-E4 (N=436)
I am very proud of what my unit does, and I feel honored to be a part of it.	48	47	29	21
I enjoy what my unit does and I enjoy being a part of it.	41	39	34	37
I am indifferent to what my unit does; I can take it or leave it.	5	12	23	26
I don't like what my unit does and I would rather not be a part of it.	4	1	11	10
I intensely dislike what my unit does and I don't want any part of it.	1	1	3	7

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.001$. Unit was also significant, $p < 0.001$, but there was no apparent pattern by size or gender ratio. Service, gender, and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

After posing the questions shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the questionnaire asked the respondents why they thought their morale and their units' morales were the way they were. Table 5.3 exhibits the wide range of responses to this question coded into like categories. Clearly, leadership plays a large role in the morale of a unit. Of the 934 questionnaires completed, 261 individuals specifically cited leadership or the chain of command. These comments included positive comments such as "Department head is great; CO is interested in the crew," and "The new CO has made a big difference for the better," as well as negative comments: "Our superiors in the chain of command know very little about leadership and TQL." There were an additional 117 mentions of issues related to leadership. These related comments included references to the treatment of junior personnel, such as "People are spoken to in a very derogatory way and over a period of time it wears them down" and "In boot camp they tear you down and build you back up. Here on the ship, they tear you down and leave you for dead."

Issues relating to the work load in units were also perceived as having an important effect upon morale. These comments included negative comments about the long work hours and the operational tempo, such as one reference to the "strenuous under way schedules." The comments also recognized the effect of the unit's deployment schedule: Whether a ship was new to the shipyard or had been in the shipyard for a long period of time affected morale. "We've just finished 3 years of constant deployment with little to no turnaround time. We are now to have an 18 month turnaround—everyone is happy."

Only eight comments from over 900 completed questionnaires mentioned gender issues as having an effect upon morale, despite the introduction that prompted the respondents to consider gender issues while completing the survey.

GENDER ISSUES THAT AFFECT MORALE

The survey results indicate that gender issues are not perceived to be among the primary issues affecting morale. Nevertheless, the group discussions concentrated upon the ways gender *does* affect morale. The gender issues affecting unit morale that emerged are related to

sexual harassment, a perceived double standard for men and women, and romantic relationships within the unit.

Table 5.3

Written Comments in Response to "Why Do You Think Your Morale and Your Unit's Morale Is [Are] the Way It Is [Are]?"

Categories	Written Responses	Number of Mentions
Leadership	Leadership/chain of command	261
	Way junior personnel are treated	39
	Micromanagement style/ disorganization	33
	Discipline	16
	Degree of fairness perceived/consistent policies	15
	Politics	14
Work load	Operations tempo/deployment schedule	94
	Work hours	51
	Personnel shortage	27
	Personnel tempo	9
Cohesion	Unit cohesion/camaraderie/friendship	38
	Quality of people	14
	Teamwork	13
	Communication	12
	Gender conflicts/issues	8
	Racial conflicts/issues	1
Job satisfaction	Pride in unit	31
	Job satisfaction	18
	Unit mission/successful unit	12
	Difficulty advancing	3
Individual attitudes	Attitude toward work	27
	General attitudes	11
	Self-interest	5
Quality of life	QOL/family life	17
	Fun activities	6
	Living conditions	6
	Pay	6
Materiel/training	Equipment/materiel	7
	Training	6
	Shortage of funds	5

Sexual Harassment

Within the units we visited, all of which had recently been opened to women or included recently opened occupations, sexual harassment and the threat of sexual harassment charges continue to be morale issues. First of all, there appears to be considerable confusion about the definition of sexual harassment. One commander was horrified to discover that an abnormally large percentage of his women were claiming sexual harassment, but upon further investigation, most of their complaints were about the living and working environment and did not qualify as sexual harassment. For example, some women were unhappy that their male supervisor had access to their barracks. Others objected to swearing, tobacco chewing, or watching sports games or kung fu movies in the workplace or the barracks. These activities tended to be male activities that women either object to or do not enjoy but that do not qualify as sexual harassment. We encountered many individuals, especially junior personnel, who did not understand what does—and does not—constitute harassment.¹

Ironically, some sexual harassment prevention and awareness training programs instituted at units prior to their gender integration seemed to have a negative effect on the transition to an integrated unit in that the training scared the men from interacting on any level with the women. Some men reported that they were told “don’t talk to them, don’t sit near them in the mess, don’t breathe near them.” Not surprisingly, the women in those units reported that the men seemed “scared to death of us.”

Many men acknowledged that they treated women differently in some ways because of the constant perceived threat of a sexual harassment charge. Men were reluctant to push women, especially during physical activities, such as unit runs, because of the fear that the women would retaliate with an unfounded charge of sexual harassment. Most men were also reluctant to counsel women privately, as they would men, because of the innuendo that would accompany them if they were alone together and because of the lack of any wit-

¹The Defense Manpower Data Center 1995 Sexual Harassment Survey found that 90 percent of officers, 86 percent of senior enlisted, and 76 percent of junior enlisted personnel indicated that they knew, to a large extent, what constituted sexual harassment.

ness who could speak on their behalf if, for example, the woman were displeased with the counseling and threatened to accuse the man of having harassed her while he was alone with her.

Many men and women we spoke with felt that some women used sexual harassment charges, or the threat thereof, to avoid unpleasant work. We were told that this worked in two ways. First, some supervisors were hesitant to assign unpleasant tasks to a woman because she had a "club" she could threaten him with. Second, if a woman did not like her job, she could complain of harassment. Even if the charges were determined to be unsubstantiated, the woman was generally removed and placed in another work group.

Of all the personnel surveyed, the majority (both men and women) believed that sexual harassment was not happening in their unit, although men were slightly more likely than women to believe some women were being sexually harassed. These views are shown in Table 5.4. The responses of our study participants are significantly different from those reported in a DoD study, shown in Table 5.5, which asked women whether they had been sexually harassed, in any way, in the past year.² Given that many of the units we surveyed had recently integrated, one might have expected the reported harassment rates to differ.³

Of the women who responded in our survey that they had experienced harassment, the majority said that they did not report the event. This differed slightly by grade, as 78.5 percent of junior enlisted women said they did not report the event, but from 87.5 to 100 percent of women in more senior grades did not report the harassment. Many of the written comments that accompanied these answers stated that the women had confronted the harasser and handled the situation on their own.

²Compart (1996), p. 4. The questions differed slightly. We asked whether women had been harassed since arriving at the unit studied; the DoD study asked whether they had been harassed over the prior year. Additionally, the DoD study reflects 1988 and 1995 data, whereas our study was conducted in 1997.

³Our data are not presumed to be representative of the services overall but to be indicative of the environment at the units we visited.

Table 5.4

Are the Women in Your Unit (Are You) Being Sexually Harassed? (by gender, in percent)

	Men	Women
No	53	66
Yes, but rarely	29	17
Yes, sometimes	15	11
Yes, frequently	4	6

NOTES: For gender, $p < 0.001$. Service, unit, grade and race were not significant.

Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Table 5.5

DoD Study "Have You Been Sexually Harassed in Any Way Within the Past Year?" (percentage of women who responded positively)

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Coast Guard	Active Force
1988	68	66	75	57	62	64
1995	61	53	64	49	59	55

SOURCE: Compart (1996), p. 4.

Often these women described the events as minor and thus felt they could handle them without command intervention, or that the man involved would be dealt with "too harshly." Women told us, "After all, he has eighteen years of service," meaning both that they did not want to destroy his career and also that they did not want to be known as the woman who had destroyed someone's career. In other cases, women felt they could not report the harassment, for several reasons. First, women felt that such reports would be used to prove that women do not belong in the military. Second, women either felt that nothing would happen or that they would be subject to a backlash of gender harassment by others in the unit.⁴ One woman wrote that, if she reported harassment, the result would be that "gossip would increase—making fun of would increase." Others wrote:

⁴For a definition and example of forms of gender harassment distinct from sexual harassment, see Miller (1997b).

I know I would be believed, however I think I would be treated badly by everyone—alienated, sneered at, etc. Think about it; women have been here for [x] years and no one has had sexual harassment charges—do you honestly think that's because it doesn't exist? It's because there are so few women here we know we would all feel the repercussions

and that "[The harassment] would change from individual to group harassment."

In addition to these views, many women felt that women who falsely claimed sexual harassment ruined the situation for the rest of the women by crying "Wolf!" too frequently.

Interestingly, the men of these units perceived that women who felt they were being harassed were more likely to report sexual harassment than they actually did. Roughly a third of enlisted personnel in the grades of E1–E6 believed events were being reported, and more than 60 percent of officers believed that the events were being reported. This is consistent with our observation that most commanders felt they had the sexual harassment issue under control, that they did not tolerate unfounded charges, and that they dismissed unsubstantiated charges but kept a watchful eye over those involved. However, the fear of sexual harassment charges appeared to be a constant source of concern for many of the other men we spoke with. Senior enlisted men were the most concerned, as they felt they had invested considerable time in their careers and that a single harassment charge would render them "guilty until proven guilty." They explained that, even if they were exonerated, such a decision would be too late to repair their reputations and careers. They felt that these were not unfounded fears, as most seemed to know of such occurrences personally.

"Zero tolerance" is a frequently cited policy when the issue of sexual harassment arises. There appear to be two interpretations of the policy. In the first interpretation, zero tolerance means that the command will not tolerate violations of policy and will take swift and serious action when violations do occur. Most people who thought that zero tolerance was a good policy held this interpretation. They thought that publicly chastising violators deterred overt violations.

Others who held this interpretation but thought the policy was wrong complained that it was not right to give unfairly harsh treatment to first offenders to set an example for others. The first interpretation also supported women's concerns about reporting harassment because of the severe reprisals for even "minor" violations. Some felt that their command was not serious about the policy: Command was aware of violations but did not intervene. These people believed the command would only take action if someone were openly caught in flagrant violation.

A second interpretation of the policy is that zero tolerance means "this doesn't happen under this command at all." Everyone with this interpretation thought zero tolerance was a bad idea. Violations do occur, and people who held this interpretation felt that zero tolerance meant the command would not dare to recognize or punish violators because that would be a public admission that the command had failed to prevent violations and that, in so doing, they would risk scandalous media coverage and would hamper their high-level careers.

Is There a Double Standard?

Many study participants asserted that men generally treated women differently from their male peers for several reasons. First, the physical fitness standards demand different levels of performance from men and women. Second, men do not always know the regulations, such as uniform and personal appearance regulations, that apply to women. Third, men treat women differently either because they have been socialized to do so, or because they are afraid of sexual harassment charges if they displease a woman, even (or perhaps especially) a female subordinate.

Men (65.9 percent) and women (74.4 percent) generally agreed that the unit commanders were not treating women differently from men. However, there was disagreement regarding whether other unit personnel treated women differently from men. Table 5.6 indicates the percentages of women who thought they were treated differently from the men. In our sample, junior enlisted women were more likely to report that they were treated differently, whereas the majority of female officers and female senior enlisted personnel did not believe they were treated differently because of their gender.

Table 5.6

Percentage of Women Who Reported that Their Coworkers Treated Them Differently (by grade, in percent)

	Officers	E7-E9	E5-E6	E1-E4
Yes	46	40	60	61
No	54	60	40	39

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.05$. Gender was significant ($p < 0.01$). Service, unit, race were not significant.

The majority of men respondents (from 60 percent of officers to 71 percent of E5-E6) did believe that women were being treated differently by personnel other than the commander. However, men and women surveyed differed in the ways that they thought women were treated differently. Table 5.7 indicates that men surveyed, especially junior male personnel, were considerably more likely to believe that women are given less of the unattractive duties, or "dirty work," and to believe that less was generally expected of women than of men:

Women are held to lower standards in P.T., marksmanship, work, because they are women and leaders are afraid to do anything about it. Because it will hurt [the leaders'] careers.

Men were also more likely to believe that women were being singled out or receiving special attention.

On the other hand, women were more likely to believe that they were receiving more of the "dirty" work and that more was expected of them than of the men. These results are shown in Table 5.8.

In discussion sessions with women, most women claimed to be working hard to be as successful as the men, and most men acknowledged the existence of particularly hard-working or capable women. In the words of two survey respondents,

I feel there isn't much difference between men and women when it comes to work. I see hard working men and women and I also see lazy men and women. Men usually have more strength but other than that as far as work goes it's just how the individual studies and learns their job.

Table 5.7

How Are Women Treated Differently? (percentage agreeing with each statement, by grade and gender)

	Officers		E7-E9		E5-E6		E1-E4	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Women have been given less of the "dirty work." ^a	36	0	41	10	59	9	66	14
Others pay more attention to women/single them out. ^b	32	21	35	10	44	27	45	38
Less is expected of women than the men. ^c	34	3	43	15	64	8	64	17

^aGrade was significant ($p < 0.001$), and gender was significant ($p < 0.001$). Service, unit, race were not significant.

^bGrade was significant ($p < 0.01$), and gender was significant ($p < 0.01$). Service, unit, race were not significant.

^cGrade and gender were significant ($p < 0.001$).

It's the 10% that gives the rest of the female service people a bad rep. There are many females who are good at their jobs and [in the service], but the 10% seem to get away with anything and get their way.

Women who believed they were treated differently frequently claimed that they had to work twice as hard as the men to receive the same or less credit for their work. For example, one woman wrote "I have to prove myself more than the men do. I feel I'm under a mi-

Table 5.8

Are Women Treated Differently? (percentage agreeing with each statement, by gender)

	Male	Female
Women are (I am) given more of the "dirty work"	4	18
More is expected of women (me) than of the men	3	26

NOTES: Gender was significant ($p < 0.001$). Service, unit, race were not significant.

croscope. I feel literally hundreds of prying eyes on my body everywhere I go. . . .” They explained that this was partly because some women took advantage of the lower expectations for women. The hardworking and ambitious women were generally annoyed and frustrated with women who put forth less effort, as they felt that the high visibility of all women meant that the poor performance or negative attitudes of some women reflected upon all women in the unit.

This visibility of a potentially small minority of women may have contributed to a perception among the men that women were not contributing as much to the unit, but that they tended to receive better work, more chances to succeed, and inflated performance evaluations.

Men also tended to assert that women demanded equal rights and recognition within the company but that they were not equal in their performance or contribution to the unit. During these discussions, the topic of the physical fitness test frequently arose. Men claimed that the female standards were too easy and that women were not being forced to meet even the lower standards. Although men frequently acknowledged that women have different upper body strength and body compositions, they were generally unable to accept the degree of difference between the men’s and women’s physical fitness requirements. We were told repeatedly that, if relevant and realistic physical tests existed so that only qualified women (and men) were assigned to these positions, gender integration would not be an issue. The presence of women proven strong and capable would not be resisted:

By this survey it probably appears that I’m strongly against women in the military, I’m not. I AM against women being put in jobs they are not qualified to do. I AM against different standards for men and women (performance, physical, and otherwise). When women are held to the same standards as men you will have equality. . . . Some of the women [in the unit] work very hard and are definitely as asset to the [unit]. The other 2/3 of them shouldn’t be here.

To the extent that gender affected morale, the perception of different standards or policies for men and women was a frequently cited source of morale problems. Some of these differences were instituted because they were believed beneficial to the women. For ex-

ample, we were informed frequently of an unofficial Army policy that women should receive showers every 72 hours while deployed to the field. Although the likelihood of infection is generally cited as the reason for this policy, the practice is not supported by official medical guidance. The practice appeared to erode morale and build resentment among the men, who endure a heavier workload when the women, the vehicles, and the drivers return to base so that women can take showers. Many women who have deployed on exercises or missions assert that "Wet Wipes" or sponge baths suffice under field conditions and that they do not need more frequent showers than do men. Absent specific medical guidance supporting this practice, it appears unnecessary. Instead of benefiting the women, practices such as these build resentment and are used as arguments against integration, such as "I cannot take my women on field exercises, because I cannot provide showers every 72 hours."

Romantic Relationships Affect Morale

In this study, we had no way of determining how common dating or sexual relationships were in these units. When these relationships had occurred, they were perceived to affect morale. Relationships that qualified as fraternization were dealt with by the chain of command. However, personal relationships between male and female peers not in a chain of command relationship do not usually violate the regulations, unless they affect good order and discipline. Such relationships were identified as potential morale problems, however, especially within the combined living and working environment found aboard ship or when units are deployed overseas.

There are several problems with these relationships. First, we were told that the existence of such relationships "sexualizes" the environment and makes it difficult for colleagues to regard one another as just coworkers. Thus, the cohesion of the unit is negatively affected. For example, "The mess . . . at night [for] this unit looks more like a singles club or promenade deck than a mess hall [for a military unit]" and

I get tired of seeing a junior enlisted female and her boyfriend [at mess] Both are attached to [this unit]. This place is like high school all over again. Everyone is dating others. To me this is not the mili-

tary. We are here to do a job not meet our spouse. Guys seem more worried about getting a girl than doing their job.

These relationships can also breed resentment among colleagues based upon jealousy or sexual frustration. Second, when these relationships dissolve, the effectiveness of the individuals and the morale of others suffer. While this is a natural response to affairs of the heart, we were told that these emotions do not belong in a military environment. Finally, we were told that a dissolved relationship leaves the male vulnerable to charges of sexual harassment and even rape if the woman claims that she was not a consensual partner.

Friendships between men and women were not a problem. In fact, some men told us that they appreciated the opportunity to have friendships with women and that they were able to talk to women about many of their personal problems that they were not comfortable discussing with their male colleagues. Thus, the women relieved some of the stress of the extreme living and working conditions and reduced the inclination of some of the men to become drunk and disorderly in the process of "blowing off steam." In this way, the presence of women promoted a more pleasant work environment.

CONCLUSION

Because morale refers to the degree to which group members are enthusiastic about and committed to carrying out the duties of that group, the enthusiasm the study participants had for their jobs and for their units is notable. When asked whether serving in their current units has made them more or less interested in staying in the military, enlisted personnel in grades E1-E6 were more likely to say their current experience has made them less interested in remaining in the military. These responses are shown in Table 5.9. These views did not differ by gender. Although many of the units we visited were recently integrated units that might have been expected to be more difficult environments for women, women and men did not differ in their evaluation of the experience.

Instead, the differences in views are attributable to differences in grade. Throughout the study, officers and senior enlisted personnel tended to hold higher views of cohesion and morale. Junior people

were more likely to feel overworked and underappreciated; therefore, their experiences were more likely to give them a more negative view of a military career. In addition, many of the junior people were serving in their first unit. We do not have evidence to suggest that they would have answered any differently if they had been serving in other units.

In conclusion, gender issues were cited by fewer than 1 percent of the survey respondents when queried about issues that affect morale. Leadership was overwhelmingly cited as the primary factor of morale. The gender-specific factors of morale raised in focus groups were often issues of leadership. To the degree that leadership can address and resolve such issues as the perception of a double standard for men and women, morale will improve. In addition, service or unit policies that apply to men and women differently, thus emphasizing the differences between the genders, are especially detrimental to morale. Finally, when they occur, dating and sexual relationships, even when not proscribed by the regulations, are often problematic within military units.

Table 5.9
Responses to the Question: "Has Serving in This Unit
Made You More or Less Interested in Staying in the
Military?" (by grade, in percent)

	Officers (N=117)	E7-E9 (N=108)	E5-E6 (N=264)	E1-E4 (N=438)
It has made me more interested in staying in.	28	19	13	11
It has made little difference.	44	56	42	38
It has made me less interested in staying in.	28	25	46	51

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.001$. Service, gender, unit, race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES

Since many current public debates have focused on gender integration in the military, this study had the opportunity to explore those issues with people who have first-hand experience with the integration process. Recent public concerns have included

- Whether the presence of women changes military culture
- Whether basic training should be integrated
- Whether military women would be more likely to report sexual harassment if there was an all-female “chain of complaint”
- Whether additional units and occupations should be gender integrated.

This chapter offers some data on each of these issues from the perspective of service personnel.

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES SOMETIMES MISTAKEN FOR GENDER DIFFERENCES IN THE MILITARY

A very common theme in our discussions was the ongoing change in military culture. We might have concluded that gender was an important factor of influence had military personnel not pointed out the larger picture. Military youth often took exception to being treated as a “lesser person” by senior supervisors; to being told to do something their commander’s way “because he said so,” even when they pointed out that their way was “by the books” and was more efficient; or to being seen as unintelligent and irresponsible. Both

young men and young women espoused such views. The senior enlisted and officer side of the story, however, is that the resistance to leadership exhibited by this “generation that was never spanked” undermines discipline and the rank authority system. Because women are overrepresented in the younger generation, generational differences were occasionally reported as a gender problem. Additionally, we were told that, because some more senior male personnel were hesitant to reprimand or discipline women, some junior females were permitted to espouse these attitudes more freely than their male colleagues. Thus, gender is one of the ways in which subordinates are now reported to be challenging or even chastising their superiors. While this may appear to the casual observer to be primarily a gender conflict, the discussions suggested that it is more a “generation gap.”¹

INTEGRATION IN BASIC TRAINING

This section offers the views of the survey sample on possible future policy modifications pertaining to gender in the military. The first table, Table 6.1, reflects individuals’ views on whether basic training should be gender integrated or not. One quarter of military women and nearly 40 percent of military men supported segregation on both the officer and enlisted levels. However, 54 percent of the men and 67 percent of the women thought training should be integrated on both levels. While the majority support integration, there is a substantial minority in the population we sampled favoring segregation.

GENDER-BLIND ASSIGNMENT

There are several ways in which current assignment practices consider gender. Earlier, we described policies that continue to restrict the occupations and assignments in which women may serve. In addition, gender-integrated ships have a specific number of billets that must be filled by women because of berthing allocations. Also, assigning women to some positions—specifically, officers or senior enlisted on ships—permits opportunities for more junior women.

¹These patterns have also been observed in the training environment (see Maze, 1997) and in the military services overall (see Blazar and Fuentes, 1997).

Table 6.1

Responses to the Question: "Do You Think Men and Women Should Be Segregated During Basic Training, or Integrated?"
(by gender, in percent)

	Men (N=673)	Women (N=245)
Segregated for both enlisted and officers.	39	25
Segregated for enlisted, but integrated for officers.	6	5
Integrated for enlisted, but segregated for officers.	1	4
Integrated for both enlisted and officers.	54	67

NOTES: For gender, $p < 0.001$. Service, grade, unit, and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

There may be other considerations for and against considering gender in making assignments.

On balance, findings from the written survey indicate that a majority of women support either gender-blind assignment or believe women should be assigned evenly across all units rather than be disproportionately concentrated in particular units. More men than women surveyed asserted that the assignment process should be gender blind, but like women, the majority did not support the practice of clustering women at fewer locations. These findings are shown in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2

Answers to the Question: "When Women Are Integrated Into Previously All-Male Units, How Should They Be Assigned?"
(by gender, in percent)

	Male (N=633)	Female (N=236)
We should try to assign women evenly across all the units.	40	52
We should assign women only to some units so there will be more of them at each site.	14	18
We shouldn't pay attention to gender when assigning women to previously all-male units.	47	30

NOTES: For gender, $p < 0.001$. Service, unit, grade, and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

ESTABLISHING A FEMALE CHAIN OF COMPLAINT

One suggestion for increasing the likelihood that sexually harassed women will report the harassment has been to create a female chain of complaint. The argument is that both men and women might be more comfortable reporting incidents to women and that women might take complaints more seriously. Table 6.3 shows that, while 5 percent of men may prefer reporting to a woman, 15 to 20 percent would prefer to report to a man, and three quarters have no preference at all. Men in the Army had a stronger preference for reporting to a man than did men in the Navy or Marines. Among women, approximately 31 percent of Army, 22 percent of Navy, and 19 percent of Marine women would prefer to report harassment to a woman. Women in the Navy and Marines were more likely than Army women to prefer to report harassment to a man; however, like men, the majority of military women have no preference with regard to the gender of the person to whom they would report harassment. These data suggest that most people do not care whether they report harassment to a man or a woman. However, that a significant minority

Table 6.3

Responses to the Question: "If You Were Being Sexually Harassed, Who Would You Be More Comfortable Reporting It to?"
(by service and gender, in percent)

	Army	Navy	Marines
Men			
A woman in my chain of command	2	4	1
A man in my chain of command	13	11	13
A woman outside my chain of command	1	3	3
A man outside of my chain of command	8	5	4
It makes no difference	76	78	78
Women			
A woman in my chain of command	11	13	16
A man in my chain of command	4	7	9
A woman outside my chain of command	20	9	3
A man outside of my chain of command	—	3	—
It makes no difference	65	68	72

NOTES: For service, $p < 0.001$. For gender, $p < 0.001$. Grade, unit, and race were not significant. These results exclude the first two units visited because of a revision to the question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

does have a preference stresses the importance of ensuring that both men and women are available in the chain of command.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE COMBAT-EXCLUSION POLICY

Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate the attitudes expressed regarding the combat-exclusion policy. Army and Marine Corps men surveyed tend to support the current combat-exclusion policy, and male officers feel most strongly about the issue. Less than half of Navy male officers, and even fewer Navy enlisted men, favor the current exclusion. Most of those who disagree with the current policy believe women should be assigned to combat units just like the men. The aggregate results for military women, shown in Table 6.5, indicate that officers and senior enlisted women prefer a system that would assign women to combat roles just like men.² Navy women were less likely to be satisfied with the current exclusions, and more likely to support assigning women the same as men.

One set of survey questions asked whether specific units should remain closed to women, whether qualified women should be allowed to volunteer for these units, or whether qualified women should be assigned to these units the same way that men are assigned. Respondents were given an opportunity to select among these choices for each of the following types of units: infantry, armor, submarines, and special forces.

The attitudes of survey respondents regarding the career opportunities that remain closed to women are shown in Tables 6.6–6.8. Of the three services in this survey, Marine Corps men were most opposed to opening infantry, armor, submarines, and special forces to women, followed closely by Army men. Far fewer Navy men would keep the present policies excluding women from these specialties. Of the Army and Marine Corps men who did support changing the policy, slightly more preferred allowing women to volunteer for these positions over assigning them the same as men. In contrast, for infantry and armor positions, Navy men were slightly more likely to

²These results vary significantly by service ($p < 0.001$), but the small number of women, when divided by grade and service, presents significance and confidentiality issues.

Table 6.4
Men's Attitudes Regarding the Combat-Exclusion Policy
(by service and grade, in percent)

Army and Marine Corps	Officers	E7-E9	E5-E6	E1-E4
I am satisfied with the present military regulations that exclude women from certain combat roles.	79	64	60	57
I think that women who want to volunteer for the combat arms should be allowed to do so.	12	12	27	22
I think that women should be treated exactly like men and serve in the combat arms just like men.	10	24	13	21
Navy	Officers	E7-E9	E5-E6	E1-E4
I am satisfied with the present military regulations that exclude women from certain combat roles.	48	17	26	36
I think that women who want to volunteer for the combat arms should be allowed to do so.	17	28	30	29
I think that women should be treated exactly like men and serve in the combat arms just like men.	36	54	44	36

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.05$. Navy responses differed significantly from Army and Marine Corps, $p < 0.001$. There was not a significant difference between Army and Marine Corps responses. Unit and race were not significant. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

support assigning women the same as men over allowing them to volunteer, but were more evenly split over which way to assign women to submarines and special forces.

Of the Army and Marine Corps women surveyed, half would keep units in the infantry and armor closed to women and a third would keep submarines and special forces closed. Few Navy women supported the current exclusions in infantry, armor, and special forces, and only a quarter would keep submarines off-limits to women. In all three services, women who believed the remaining bans on women's opportunities should be lifted were more likely to support a voluntary assignment policy for women than a policy that

Table 6.5
Women's Attitudes Regarding the Combat-Exclusion Policy
(by grade, in percent)

	Officers	E7-E9	E5-E6	E1-E4
I am satisfied with the present military regulations that exclude women from certain combat roles.	17	10	21	19
I think that women who want to volunteer for the combat arms should be allowed to do so.	41	40	55	71
I think that women should be treated exactly like men and serve in the combat arms just like men.	41	50	24	10

NOTES: For grade, $p < 0.05$. For service, $p < 0.001$, but the small number of women, when divided by grade and service, presents significance and confidentiality issues.

Table 6.6
Army Attitudes Regarding Combat Arms Career Opportunities for Women
(by gender, in percent)

	These Units Should Remain Closed to Women		Qualified Women Should Be Allowed to Volunteer for These Units		Qualified Women Should Be Assigned to These Units the Same Way Men Are	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Infantry	62	48	20	31	18	21
Armor	42	26	37	54	21	20
Submarines	40	31	34	50	26	19
Special Forces	54	32	28	42	19	27

NOTES: Service was significant ($p < 0.001$). Gender was significant ($p < 0.001$) for the questions pertaining to infantry, submarines, and special forces. Gender was slightly less significant ($p < 0.01$) for the question pertaining to armor. Race was significant ($p < 0.01$) for the armor question. Rank was significant ($p < 0.05$) for the special forces question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Table 6.7

**Navy Attitudes Regarding Combat Arms Career Opportunities for Women
(by gender, in percent)**

	These Units Should Remain Closed to Women		Qualified Women Should Be Allowed to Volunteer for These Units		Qualified Women Should Be Assigned to These Units the Same Way Men Are	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Infantry	22	9	37	53	42	38
Armor	17	7	38	53	45	40
Submarines	34	27	32	46	35	28
Special Forces	32	11	34	57	34	32

NOTES: Service was significant ($p < 0.001$). Gender was significant ($p < 0.001$) for the questions pertaining to infantry, submarines, and special forces. Gender was slightly less significant ($p < 0.01$) for the question pertaining to armor. Race was significant ($p < 0.01$) for the armor question. Rank was significant ($p < 0.05$) for the special forces question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

Table 6.8

**Marine Corps Attitudes Regarding Combat Arms Career Opportunities for
Women (by gender, in percent)**

	These Units Should Remain Closed to Women		Qualified Women Should Be Allowed to Volunteer for These Units		Qualified Women Should Be Assigned to These Units the Same Way Men Are	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Infantry	71	53	16	29	13	18
Armor	46	24	31	46	23	30
Submarines	52	32	25	35	23	32
Special Forces	63	38	23	41	14	21

NOTES: Service was significant ($p < 0.001$). Gender was significant ($p < 0.001$) for the questions pertaining to infantry, submarines, and special forces. Gender was slightly less significant ($p < 0.01$) for the question pertaining to armor. Race was significant ($p < 0.01$) for the armor question. Rank was significant ($p < 0.05$) for the special forces question. Percentages may not sum to 100 because of rounding.

would assign them the same as men. During the interviews and focus groups, people sometimes referred to these questions and suggested that the small unit size of special forces may preclude gender integration. The primary concern with submarines was the long deployment times and the lack of privacy that accompanied the small enclosed space. When people resisted opening the infantry and armor units to women, they generally argued against women participating in direct ground combat.

RESISTANCE TO REPEATED STUDIES ON GENDER IN THE MILITARY

Across the services, we repeatedly heard complaints from senior enlisted women about the seemingly never-ending barrage of surveys about gender issues in the military: "I've been to 150 surveys about women in the Navy: it's overkill." Some Navy women were baffled by the concern over integration on combatant ships, "Congress wants to see how we're doing; don't they realize we've been going to sea for years?" The women were concerned that this study was initiated by legislators who doubted women's abilities to fulfill their roles and wanted to prove that the changes were a mistake. They were offended to think that after 15 to 20 years of trying to prove themselves, civilian leadership still did not believe in their worth as a military asset.

Officers and senior enlisted women also felt that the recent public spotlight causes problems where none may otherwise exist: "The more they do things like this, the more they set us apart, the more difficult they make it." These women saw integration as more of an organizational and structural issue, not a personnel issue: "If the government would leave us alone, quit pointing out the differences, people would quit acting like we're so different. Just put more toilets on the ships and we'll be fine." As noted in earlier sections, the higher visibility of women made their faults more apparent than those of men and led to greater generalizations about women than individual examples would merit.

Some women pointed out that constantly treating people as either men or women, rather than as a worker or servicemember, leads

people more easily to fall back on gender-based excuses for their behavior:

Too much emphasis has been placed upon gender issues in the military by non-military organizations (Congress members, activist groups). [Soldiers] are capable of dealing with each other based upon job performance and leadership—unfortunately the high visibility of gender issues/inconsistencies taken out of context (sometimes)—can easily create a scapegoat excuse for one's own shortfalls, when it comes to job proficiency. Men could say they feel women get special treatment, while women could just as easily complain they have been singled out from their male peers. This could only work against unit cohesion and readiness issues.

For a number of these women with long military careers, the work environment has become awkward and unpleasant: "I came in 20 years ago and never have I felt the spotlight and tension as much as in the past two years." The sense of camaraderie that many of these experienced women have enjoyed has been replaced by stiff formality with men who are afraid to make a mistake in their presence.³

One other concern was that public coverage of military women often centered on negative stories because "good things that we do do not sell stories." They wished that studies and reports would also cover the achievements of integrated units and spread examples of solutions to problems so that other units could benefit:

I know you're not reporters, but The media should report stories of women who are integrating and succeeding. We need encouragement. Sometimes I feel very alone in my "crusade" for equal opportunity in [my unit/occupation]. (I don't call it a "crusade," the men do). But things can work in these units, with lots of patience and hard work on the women's part, and a little extra professionalism on the men's part.

On a final note, a few male officers were also initially defensive because they thought that the motivation for conducting the survey might be to expose their failures or uncover a scandal, not to high-

³We did not talk with women who might have left the military earlier in their careers because they did not feel a sense of belonging.

light their successes or laud men for their efforts in the integration process:

I take issue with the premise behind these surveys. As a professional military officer, I am able to set aside my personal feelings and see to the fulfillment of the requirements laid out by my chain of command. As I told my [unit] when we were told we were to be among the first to be integrated, "Like it or not, this is the policy and it is my intention to carry it out—as it should be yours." Let's just quit the ongoing, endless surveys and social dissections, and let us get on with the business at hand.

Men across the grades also complained that the focus on the achievements or deaths of military women ignored the achievements and even more frequent deaths of military men. They felt that in celebrating women's contributions, their own and their male colleagues' were taken for granted or ignored.

Both men and women in our survey expressed a skepticism behind political and media concern for their well-being. They were taken aback by the constant scrutiny of military personnel and presumption of either incompetence or wrong-doing. What they want is equal treatment of all service personnel, confidence that they could manage whatever they were asked to carry out, recognition for their hard work under stressful conditions, and a more balanced portrait of military life that would include achievements as well as scandals.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

THE CRITICAL NATURE OF A MULTIMETHOD APPROACH

We must reiterate the importance of a multimethod research approach for a balanced assessment. We used focus groups to probe for gender issues and developed a rich understanding of gender issues that exist in newly integrated units and units with newly integrated occupations. However, the interviews and surveys were invaluable in placing those explanations of gender issues into the larger context of readiness, cohesion, and morale. Had we just depended upon focus groups, we would likely have drawn more negative conclusions about the impact of gender integration in these units. Likewise, had we depended solely upon the survey data, we would have concluded that gender was not an issue in these units at all. In concert, all data sources offered a greater context and indicated that gender issues are just one aspect, and indeed a relatively minor aspect, of readiness, cohesion, and morale.

We must also point out that, on a number of questionnaire items for which gender first appeared to be significant, the difference was in fact due to grade. Misperceptions about gender relations may occur, then, because women are often concentrated in the junior enlisted grades. This finding has implications for anyone making judgments about gender, based on casual observations of units. In many locations, there were very few, if any, women in the senior enlisted or officer grades. Therefore, unit members may perceive the opinions of junior enlisted women as representing the opinion of women in general, but actually they may more accurately reflect the perspective of the junior enlisted.

RESULTS

In response to the policy and legislative changes, the services have opened more occupations and organizations to women. Table 7.1 shows the change in the number of positions open to women. Relatively few new positions opened in the Army and Air Force. The increases in the Navy and Marine Corps are much larger, although the number of women who can be assigned to the new openings in the Navy is limited by the number of berths for women on combatant ships. The movement of women into these positions has varied, depending on such factors as the number of women in each service, their interest in these positions, training or retraining times, and whether facilities or systems must be reconfigured.

The legislative and policy changes also opened core combat roles to women in the Air Force and Navy. Women can now fly in combat aircraft in both services, and they can serve on combatant ships in the Navy. As a result, women will be able to acquire the experience in combat units that is a key to most senior leadership positions.

Limitations do still exist across the services, and some of them operate in complex ways. Certain units and skills are still closed to women, primarily those that engage in direct ground combat or collocate with units that do. In other cases, the skill is open to women but only at certain organizational levels, e.g., brigade or higher. Some positions that are officially open to women may actually be closed because the position is coded to be filled by a skill closed to

Table 7.1
Positions Opened to Women by Law and Policy Since April 1993
(percent)

Service	Positions Open	
	Before April 1993	After Law and Policy Changes
Army	61.0	67.2
Navy	61.0	91.2
Air Force	97.0	99.4
Marine Corps	33.0	62.0
DoD Total	67.4	80.2

women, e.g., infantry. Unfortunately, there is no method other than by individually checking each position that is formally open to women to determine its MOS coding. Finally, some limitations are informal, e.g., the commander who will not have a driver or an aide of the opposite sex because of concerns about rumors or potential charges of sexual harassment. In other cases, a commander may have a woman assigned to a nontraditional position but actually performing duty in another.

Effects on Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale

A major finding of this study is that gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale in the units we studied. This is not to say that it has no effect. However, other influences, such as leadership and training, are perceived as being far more influential.

Commanders and personnel in the units we studied indicated that gender integration has not had a major effect on their units' readiness. Both men and women asserted in the survey that women perform about as well as men, although there was widespread support for setting gender-neutral physical requirements for positions requiring strength. The most-often mentioned effect on readiness was the nonavailability of personnel due to pregnancy. When the unit has many women or is understaffed, the limitations imposed by pregnancy are both more visible and have a disproportionately greater effect.

Any divisions caused by gender were minimal or invisible in units with high cohesion. Gender appeared as an issue only in units with conflicting groups, and then it took a back seat to divisions along work group or grade lines. When it did negatively affect cohesion, it was generally because gender is one way that people break into categories when conflict surfaces or because dating occurred within a unit. Gender was also mentioned as having a positive effect, raising the level of professional standards.

In the survey, gender was almost never mentioned in issues cited as affecting morale. Leadership was regarded as the overwhelming influence. In the focus groups, we centered the discussion on gender issues, and two were most frequently brought out: sexual harass-

ment and double standards. The majority of both men and women reported that sexual harassment does not occur in their units. Of those women in the units studied who said they have been harassed (and there is considerable confusion about what constitutes sexual harassment), most did not report it. Most frequently, they regarded such incidents as minor and handled them on their own. Less frequently cited reasons include a fear of overreaction by the institution, resulting in draconian punishment; a belief that such reports will be used against the case for women in the military; and a belief that nothing will happen to the offender. The fear of unsubstantiated or false sexual harassment charges was prevalent among men in the focus groups. The perception of a double standard was held most widely by men and tended to revolve around such things as different physical standards and a perceived unwillingness of male supervisors to demand as much of women as they do of men. Finally, dating and sexual relationships, even those not forbidden by the regulations, can pose problems for morale within a unit.

Gender integration also has some positively perceived effects upon morale. Some men told us that the integration resulted in the units developing a more positive, professional work atmosphere. In addition, both women and men told us that men could discuss frustrations and other personal issues with female colleagues more than with men, and that this opportunity prevented them from seeking more destructive outlets, such as excessive drinking or fighting.

Other Findings Related to Gender

This study offered an opportunity to gather the opinions of personnel in newly integrated units on various issues in the public debate.

- The majority of men and women favored integration in basic training. However, 25 percent of women and 39 percent of men preferred segregated training.
- Few (14–18 percent) felt that women should be assigned in groups to newly opened units, but the remainder differed in whether women should be assigned evenly across all units or whether the assignment process should be gender blind.

- Most study participants do not care whether they report harassment to a man or a woman. Twenty-two to thirty-five percent do have a preference, most often for someone of the same sex.
- Over half of surveyed men in the enlisted ranks favor some relaxation of the ground combat exclusion policy; only one-third of male officers agree, and Army and Marine Corps men of all grades are more likely to prefer the current policy. A change in the policy is supported by over 80 percent of the women surveyed. Those who support change differ on allowing women to serve voluntarily in ground combat positions or requiring them to do so, as men are.

Many of the men and women we talked to were concerned that the public spotlight on gender integration in the military was making the adjustment more difficult and diverting attention from the progress that has occurred.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

During our visits to the 14 units we studied, we were given numerous suggestions for remedying issues that related to gender. Some suggestions were very specific, such as to improve supervision and the flow of information in female berthing areas on ships. Others were broader, such as to evaluate how much discretion commanders and supervisors should exercise in how they use the women assigned to their units. We have been careful to incorporate both types of suggestions in this report. In concluding, we summarize some of the more important and broader implications for policy arising from our results.

The personnel in these units do perceive some differences in the availability and physical abilities of the women the units, compared to men. However, it is not clear which of these differences are perceptions due to women's greater visibility and which would be borne out by systematic data. Better information would clear up any misperceptions and identify areas where policies might be developed to minimize differences that do occur. We heard repeatedly how double standards undermine women's credibility and generate hostility from junior enlisted men, who believe that they are afforded the fewest privileges of anyone. Although some double standards are set

by policy, many result from practice. New policies should avoid establishing double standards for men and women in the same positions and, where possible, eliminate double standards that exist now. Another consistent message we heard was the call for a screening process that would help the military to assign personnel to heavy-labor occupations and remove the need for a double standard. We do, however, acknowledge the difficulties inherent in establishing such a screening process.

Navy personnel were highly satisfied with the practice of assigning women leaders prior to or in concert with the junior women. Their presence helped with transitional issues, provided a positive role model for female behavior, and contributed overall to the discipline on the ship. In Army and Marine units that lacked female leadership, both junior and senior personnel found this situation undesirable, or less preferable, to a more balanced representation of women. A policy of ensuring senior female leadership in integrated units may not be feasible in all cases, but the experience of the units we studied suggests that it is desirable when it is feasible.

Especially during the transition period, new norms are required when men and women work together. The military's sexual harassment programs and policies on consensual relationships are currently being reevaluated. Our study adds to the evidence pointing to areas needing the most focus when women enter previously restricted occupations or units: clearer guidance on what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior, more emphasis on the "do's" than on the "don'ts" in instructing men and women about working together, and ensuring that sexual harassment complaints are—and are perceived to be—handled as fairly as possible.

Appendix A

METHODOLOGY

HOW UNITS WERE SELECTED FOR STUDY

The process of selecting units was constrained. We were limited to units that were not deployed, and the units we initially selected were given very little notice. In most cases, the units responded positively, and we were very pleased with the support the commanders gave to the study. A couple of times, the unit we had originally selected was not available, and our service contact in the service headquarters assisted us in selecting a replacement that was available. We were also limited in the number of different locations to which we could travel. In an ideal research situation, we would have maximized the number of geographical locations from which we selected units to minimize the effect of any single location. Additionally, an ideal research effort would also study units while they were deployed, to include Navy ships at sea. Nonetheless, we are confident that the research sample was sufficient to illuminate certain issues worthy of further research and to identify trends and patterns across the services, across personnel according to their experience and grades, and across different types of units.

The units selected generally represent two categories: units with newly opened occupations, and newly opened units. To determine which units had occupations newly opened to women and filled by women, we used DMDC data that listed the units with billets coded to the newly opened occupations and indicated which of those billets within the unit were filled by women.

We surveyed and conducted interviews and focus groups with individuals from five Army units. We also interviewed command per-

sonnel from other units. We included units in the study that had been traditionally open to women, units that had been open to women but included recently opened Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs), and units that had been previously closed to women. The units visited were located at two Army bases and included combat arms, combat support, and combat service support units.

We visited three Navy combatant ships and four Navy aviation squadrons; all of the ships and three of the squadrons were recently opened to women. In designing the Navy population to be sampled, we selected candidate mixed-gender combatant ships based upon their deployment schedules. Our sample included different sized ships, from destroyer to aircraft carrier; different kinds of aviation units; and units from both the east and west coasts. The ships we visited also differed in the amount of time since they had last been deployed.

The Air Force presents a much more complicated research dilemma than do the other services. Few occupations were closed to women prior to the legislative and policy changes. Thus the changes applied to only six officer occupations: fighter pilot and navigator, bomber pilot and navigator, and special operations pilot and navigator. The changes for enlisted women were considerably fewer and generally only opened positions as sensor operators aboard specific aircraft. The 26 female officers in these newly opened positions are assigned to 22 different units. Because the women are spread so thinly among units, any research effort will need to study most, if not all, of these units to distinguish issues of personality and individuals from issues of gender integration. In addition, because the emphasis of this effort was not just on evaluating the experiences of these women but on understanding the effects of gender integration upon the entire unit, this was an overwhelming task for a limited research effort. We considered telephone interviews with the personnel of these units, but this would still have been extremely time consuming. In addition, the quality of information that can be obtained from limited telephone interviews is questionable.

The most imposing constraint, and that which ultimately prevented unit visits with the Air Force, was the need for anonymity and confidentiality. Because there was most often only one female officer in

the units in which we were interested, any study of the unit would focus upon the effect of an individual upon the unit, and any comments about gender integration would refer to that single individual. We were unable, within the scope of this project, to travel to enough units that we could guarantee the anonymity of the female officers involved. An aggregate analysis of Air Force units both with and without female pilots and navigators would provide a more informative assessment of the integration.

We selected two Marine Corps units to visit. One of the units had been open to women prior to the legislative and policy changes, but had women assigned to newly opened occupations. The other unit had previously been closed to women.

HOW INDIVIDUALS WERE SELECTED TO PARTICIPATE

When we contacted units to arrange our visit we requested specific numbers of individuals by grade and gender, as shown in Table A.1. The units selected the specific individuals who would participate in the study. Depending upon the size of the unit, we were often short in various categories (e.g., female E7–E9s) because of a lack of personnel in that grade and gender. Upon the several occasions that we combined field site visits and included personnel from more than one unit in the focus groups, we usually still limited the focus group size to approximately ten individuals. However, we still requested the same number of survey participants from each of the units.

At each site, we gained a general understanding of how the individuals were selected. Sometimes the decision was deferred downward

Table A.1
Requested Sample Population

	Focus Group and Survey		Survey Only		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	
Officers	10	10	15	15	50
E7, E8, E9	10	10	15	15	50
E5, E6	10	10	15	15	50
E1, E2, E3, E4	10	10	30	30	80

as each department was told to send a certain number of individuals; sometimes the commanding officer's staff selected names; and sometimes we had access to almost everybody present (e.g., not on leave or temporary duty). Although we acknowledge the possibility that units might have prevented us access to individuals with objectionable views, we have no reason to believe that was the case. The range of opinions represented in the interviews and focus groups was broad, and the numbers of individuals produced for the survey would have made such selection difficult.

INTERVIEWS, FOCUS GROUPS, AND SURVEYS

Interviews

Our field research was based upon three main components: interviews, focus groups, and a written survey. Interviews were conducted with the commanding officers, executive officers, and ranking enlisted persons (e.g., command sergeant major) for the units we visited. From one to three RAND researchers were present for each of the interviews, which concentrated on the following issues:

- Unit mission
- Whether gender integration affects the deployability and readiness of the unit
- Effects of gender integration upon cohesion and morale
- Discipline and indiscipline issues in the unit
- Harassment issues
- Capability and performance of women in the unit
- Career paths for women in the unit.

At the close of the interviews, we provided interviewees the opportunity to examine the survey vehicle and ensured that they understood we would not provide substantive feedback to them.

Focus Groups

The focus groups were conducted with one or two researchers and a group of approximately ten individuals. The focus groups were

divided by grade and gender into eight groups, as shown in Table A.2. Grades E1–E4 were included in the same group; E5s and E6s were combined with one another; and E7–E9 (excluding the ranking enlisted individual, if he or she was included in the CO's interview) met in a single focus group. Officers (excluding the CO and XO) constituted the final group. Male and female groups met simultaneously but separately. For units with few women, the focus group was necessarily smaller.

We began the focus groups by introducing ourselves and describing the purpose and reason for the study. We stressed that the study was nonattributable and addressed all the services; that we traveled to a sufficient number of locations that no one would be able to determine the source of any comments or input; and that their comments would not be reported to their chain of command. We also described ourselves as unaffiliated with any political party and not predisposed toward any particular study outcome. We differentiated ourselves from the media and said that we were not seeking sensationalized stories; any well-founded research conclusion was an acceptable conclusion. The participants were told that their participation was voluntary and that, if they felt uncomfortable with any survey question or any issue discussed, they were welcome to skip that question

Table A.2
Typical Research Schedule

Time	Participants	Research Vehicle	Researcher
0700–0750	CO, XO, CSM	Interview	Both
0800–0950	Female E1–E4	Focus group	A
0800–0950	Male E1–E4	Focus group	B
1000–1150	Female E7, E8, E9	Focus group	A
1000–1150	Male E7, E8, E9	Focus group	B
1150–1230	Lunch		
1230–1420	Female E5, E6	Focus group	A
1230–1420	Male E5, E6	Focus group	B
1430–1520	Assorted	Survey	Both
1530–1720	Female officers	Focus group	A
1530–1720	Male officers	Focus group	B
1730–1800	CO and XO	Interview and outbrief	Both

or not participate in that part of the discussion.¹ We also identified whether the opening of particular occupations or the entire unit had prompted us to survey their unit. We stressed that the decision to select their unit from other similar units (e.g., another ship from the same class) had been a scheduling and availability issue and that we were not there to investigate any particular problems.

Once we had completed our introduction and explanation, the focus-group discussions centered around the following questions and issues:

- Whether (and how) they were selected or they volunteered for their jobs
- Whether women felt any pressures to perform better than the men or to prove women's abilities
- Whether women are treated differently by commanders, colleagues, or subordinates
- Their assessment of the readiness, morale, and cohesion of the unit
- Whether they are happy in the unit and in their jobs
- How they balance work and family or social life
- Whether other problems in the unit are related to the presence of women
- Whether women are as qualified as men
- Whether women treat subordinates differently
- Whether and how the gender integration has changed the unit
- Whether the unit or commander conducted special preparations for the arrival of women personnel in the unit
- Whether the men are concerned about how they conduct themselves around female colleagues, subordinates, and superiors
- Whether their spouses express concern about the gender integration.

¹In general, we had very few people who did not contribute to the focus-group discussions, and only a very few surveys were returned blank during the entire study.

Questionnaires

The written questionnaire was completed by all the personnel who participated in the focus groups prior to the focus-group discussion. We also requested permission to distribute the questionnaire to additional personnel, who were generally gathered together in one central location to take the survey. Our introduction to those who participated in the survey was very similar to the introduction we used with the focus groups. We ensured that participants knew their participation was voluntary and that they could skip any questions with which they were uncomfortable. We also told them that we read each survey ourselves, that we welcomed additional written comments, and that they could change any of the provided answers to customize their responses.

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Our study relies primarily on self-reported perceptions of cohesion, morale, and readiness by the unit commanders and unit personnel. Additional research could complement our findings by gathering evaluations of unit performance made by people outside the units. Evaluations of the units already recorded during training exercises (such as those at the National Training Center and the Joint Readiness Training Center) have been made without gender integration as a stated focus of those evaluations. We did not have the opportunity to collect such evaluations and compare units before and after integration, or to compare currently integrated units with units that are still all male. Such comparisons could provide data regarding the effect of integration upon objectively measured unit performance. It is important to note that the units surveyed were operationally unemployed at the time of this study. This relative inactivity may have negatively affected the perceived cohesion within the units.

**ADDITIONAL DATA REGARDING THE STATUS OF
WOMEN'S OPPORTUNITIES IN THE SERVICES**

AIR FORCE

Table B.1 presents a list of currently closed or restricted officer and enlisted skills, the justification for that status, and the number of positions in each skill as of March 1997. The justifications fall into the following five categories, which are consistent with the DoD guidelines allowing restrictions from direct ground combat or collocation with direct ground combat units:

- 1 = Special Operations Rotary Wing Aircraft
- 2 = Only those assigned to units below brigade level whose primary mission is direct ground combat (as defined by OSD)
- 3 = All these positions are assigned to units whose primary mission is direct ground combat (as defined by OSD)
- 4 = Direct Ground Combat

ARMY

Table B.2 captures the number of recently opened units currently available to Army women.

Table B.3 indicates the MOSs and career fields newly opened to women and the current numbers of men and women assigned to these occupations.

Table B.4 indicates the officer career fields that remain closed to women. Table B.5 lists the enlisted occupations that remain closed to women. Both tables refer to the following key for justification:

1 = Direct Ground Combat

2 = Collocation

3 = Special Operations

Where occupations refer to a weapon system that is being or has already been phased out, that fact is footnoted.

Table B.1

Air Force Positions That Remain Closed or Restricted to Women

Occupation	Status	Justification	No. of Positions
Officer			
Combat Control (13DX)	Closed	4	58
Helicopter Pilot for MH-53, MH-60 (115XV)	Restricted	1	172
Weather (15WX)	Restricted	2	8
Air Liaison Officer (ALO)	Restricted	2	115
Enlisted			
Combat Control (1C2X1)	Closed	4	433
Tactical Air Command & Control (1C4X1)	Closed	3	835
Pararescue (1T2X1)	Closed	4	339
Flight Engineer/Gunner for MH-53, MH-60 (1A1X1)	Restricted	1	144
Weather (1W0X1)	Restricted	2	82
Ground Radio Communications (2E1X3)	Restricted	2	31
Radio Communications Systems (3C1X1)	Restricted	2	27
Total			2,244

Table B.2
Previously Closed Army Units Formally Open to
Women (Active Army as of October 1996)

Units	Total Positions	Positions Open (No.)	Open (%)
Division Military Police Companies	1,317	1,317	100
Combined Chemical Reconnaissance & Smoke Platoons	235	235	100
Smoke Platoons (Mechanized Smoke Companies)	209	209	100
Engineer Bridge Companies	1,042	1,042	100
Military Intelligence Collection and Jamming Companies	637	637	100
Forward Support Teams of Forward Support Battalions	2,198	2,198	100
3rd Infantry (Old Guard) Military Police Platoon	45	45	100
Regimental Aviation Squadron of ACR & Air Cav Troops	374	374	100
Division Air Cavalry Troops	621	621	100
HQS, Maneuver and Separate Brigades	2,128	1,665	78
HQS, 3rd Infantry (Old Guard) Regiment	213	33	15
HQS, Armored Cavalry Regiment	273	193	71
HHC, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment	170	159	94
HQS, Special Forces Group	445	335	75
HQB, Divisional Air Defense Artillery Chaparral Air Defense Artillery ^a Air Defense Battalion			
Corps Avenger Air Defense Artillery Battalion	1,603	824	51
HHC, Combat Engineer Battalion	3,155	2,686	85
Total	14,665	12,573	86

^aChaparral is being phased out.

Table B.3
Career Fields and Occupations That Recently Opened to Women

Career Fields and Occupations		Current Assignments		
		Male	Female	Total
Officers	None			
Warrant Officers	152B OH-58A/C Scout Pilot	187	5	192
	152D OH-58D Pilot	632	17	649
	152F AH-64 Attack Pilot	915	6	921
	152G AH-1 Attack Pilot	120	1	121
Enlisted	12C Engineer Bridge Crewmember	810	37	847
	12Z Combat Engineer Senior Sergeant ^a	345	0	345
	82C Field Artillery Surveyor	871	58	929
Total		3,880	124	4,004

^aThis occupation has not been open to women long enough for any women to have advanced to the rank of senior sergeant.

Table B.4
Army Officer Career Fields That Remain Closed

Career Fields		Justification
Officers (7 of 221)	11A Infantry	1
	12A Armor, General	1
	12B Armor	1
	12C Cavalry	1
	13E Cannon Field Artillery	2
	14B Short Range Air Defense Artillery	2
	18A Special Forces	1
Warrant Officers (3 of 67)	140B SHORAD Systems Technician	2
	152C OH-6 Scout Pilot	3
	180A Special Forces Technician	1

Table B.5
Army Enlisted Occupations That Remain Closed to Women

Category	Code	Occupation	Justification
Infantry	11B	Infantryman	1
	11C	Indirect Fire Infantryman	
	11H	Heavy Antiarmor Weapons Infantryman	
	11M	Fighting Vehicle Infantryman	
	11Z	Infantry Senior Sergeant	
Combat Engineering	12B	Combat Engineer	2
	12F	Engineer Tracked-Vehicle Crewman	
Field Artillery	13B	Cannon Crewmember	2
	13C	Automated Fire Support Systems Specialist	
	13E	Cannon Fire Direction Specialist	
	13F	Fire Support Specialist	
	13M	Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Crewmember	
	13P	MLRS Operations/Fire Direction Specialist	
	13R	Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator	
Air Defense Artillery	14J	Air Defense Command, Control, Computers, Communication and Intelligence Tactical Operations Center Enhanced Operator/Maintainer	2
	14R	Bradley Linebacker Crewmember	
	14S	Avenger Crewmember	
	16P	Chaparral Crewmember ^a	
	16R	Vulcan Crewmember ^a	
	16S	Manpads Crewmember ^a	
	24M	Vulcan System Mechanic ^a	
	24N	Chaparral System Mechanic ^a	
Special Forces	18B	Special Forces Weapons Sergeant	1
	18C	Special Forces Engineer Sergeant	
	18D	Special Forces Medical Sergeant	
	18E	Special Forces Communications Sergeant	
	18F	Special Forces Assistant Operations and Intelligence Sergeant	
	18Z	Special Forces Senior Sergeant	
Armor	19D	Cavalry Scout	1

Table B.5 (continued)

Category	Code	Occupation	Justification
Mechanical Maintenance	19E	Armor Senior Sergeant	1,2
	19K	M48-M60 Armor Crewman	
	19Z	M1 Armor Crewman	
	45D	Self-Propelled Field Artillery Mechanic	
	45E	M1 Abrams Tank Turret Mechanic	
	45N	M60A1/A3 Tank Turret Mechanic	
	45T	Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Turret Mechanic	
	63D	Self-Propelled Field Artillery System Mechanic	
	63E	M1 Abrams Tank System Mechanic	
	63N	M60A1/A3 Tank System Mechanic	
	63T	Bradley Fighting Vehicle System Mechanic	
Military Intelligence	96R	Ground Surveillance Systems Operator	2

^aPhased out.

NAVY

Table B.6 lists the newly opened ratings for Navy enlisted women.

The matrices of closed occupations and units are reproduced in Tables B.7 through B.9. Table B.7 displays the Navy occupations that remained closed to women, the justification for remaining closed, and the number of billets. Table B.8 indicates the Navy units or billets on particular ships that remain closed. Table B.9 indicates the Navy positions in support of the Marine Corps that remain closed to women. The justifications given are consistent with the Secretary of Defense's guidelines for acceptable restrictions on the assignment of women, and can be interpreted with the following justification code, which the Navy submitted with the matrices:

1 = Clearly direct ground combat

2 = Units and positions are doctrinally required to collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women

3 = Units are engaged in long-range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Force missions

4 = The costs of appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive.

Tables B.10 and B.11 summarize the effects that the Secretary of Defense's guidance of April 28, 1993 and the repeal of the combat exclusion have upon opportunities for women in the U.S. Navy. While the last column indicates that four kinds of ships are still closed to women, the submarines represent the overwhelming majority of closed billets, as was shown in Table B.8.

Table B.12 provides the current numbers of women assigned to mixed-gender combatant ships.

The types and numbers of ships that are still scheduled for modifications by the end of FY 98, and the resulting approximate number of billets that will come available for female officers, chief petty officers, and enlisted personnel, are shown in Table B.13.

The numbers and percentages of enlisted Navy women in traditional and nontraditional occupations is shown in Table B.14. The first column of numbers indicates the percentage of women in that rating category. The second column indicates the number of women in that rating, and the final column shows how the total population of women is distributed across the different ratings.

Table B.6
Newly Opened Ratings for Navy Enlisted Women

Category	Code	Position
Aviation	AW	Aviation Warfare System Operator
	ABE	Recovery
Deck	STG	Sonar Technician—Surface
	EW	Electronic Warfare Technician
Electronics/ Ordnance	FC	Fire Controlman
	GMM	Gunner's Mate—Missiles
	GMG	Gunner's Mate—Guns
	GM	Gunner's Mate
Engineering	GS	Gas Turbine System Technician
	GSE	Gas Turbine System Technician—Electrical
	GSM	Gas Turbine System Technician—Mechanical

Table B.7
Navy Positions Closed to Women

Remain Closed to Women	Justification	No. of Billets
Special Warfare Officer, 113X	1	488
Chief Warrant Officer, 715X	1	69
Submarine Warfare Officer, 112X	4	3,643
Ratings FT, MT, STS	4	6,632
Surface Warfare Officer, 111X Special Boat Units (OIC Combat Billet)	1	60
Special Warfare Combatant Swimmers, 532X	1	1,561
UDT/SEAL Candidate, 5301	1	300
Special Warfare Combatant Craft Crewmember, 9533	1	900
Special Operations Independent Duty Corpsman	1	117
Special Operations Technician	1	126
Submarine Force Independent Duty Corpsman	4	322
Support Personnel Assigned to Naval Special Warfare Dev. Group; 6 RMs, 6 ETs, and 12 CMs	2	24
Support Personnel Assigned to Joint Communications Unit; 18 RMs and 6 ETs	2	24
Total Billets		14,149

Table B.8
Navy Units and Positions Closed to Women

Remain Closed to Women	Justification	No. of Billets
Surface Warfare Officer, 111X	MCM, MHC—4	For 111x, 114X:
Special Operations Officer, 114X	PC—2,4	MCM—84 billets on 14 ships
Surface Engineering Technician, 713X		MHC—15 billets on 3 ships
Officer Billets on MCM/MHC/PC Class Ships		PC—30 billets on 10 ships
		For 713X:
		PC—10 billets on 10 ships
SSN/SSBN Direct Support, Cryptologic Officer, 161X	4	20
SSN Direct Support Billets, Supply Officer, 310X	4	140
MCM/MHC/PC Ships		
QM, YM, HM, OS, SM, STG, ET, RM, BM, MS, GM, SK, EM, IC, EN, HT, DC Ratings	4	MCM—1,050 MHC—138 PC—240
SSBN/SSN	4	15,042
EM, ET, IC, MM, MS, MT, QM, RM, SK, TM, YN, SN Ratings		
Total Billets		16,769

Table B.9
Navy-USMC Support Positions Closed to Women

Remain Closed to Women	Justification	No. of Billets
Surface Warfare Officer, 111X ANGLICO	1	38
Chaplain Corps, 410X Marine Units Below Regiment Level	1	47
Medical Corps, 2100 Infantry Regiment and Below	1	35
Medical Corps, 2100 Tank Bn and Below	1	4
Medical Corps, 2100 Assault Amphibian Bn and Below	1	8
Medical Corps, 2100 Light Armored Recon Bn and Below	1	6
Medical Corps, 2100 Combat Support Co, 3rd MAR DIV	1	1
Medical Corps, 2100 DET, H&S Co, 3rd MAR	1	3
Medical Corps, 2100 Artillery Bn and Below	2	15
Medical Corps, 2100 Combat Engr Bn and Below	2	4
Marine Basic Combat Skills Specialist, RP NEC 2401	1	118
Special Amphibious Reconnaissance Independent Duty Corpsman, HM NEC 8403	1	24
Marine Force Reconnaissance Corpsman, HM NEC 8427	1	65
Medical Field Service Technician	1	4,785
Total Billets		5,153

Table B.10
Summary of Ship Assignments Available to Women

Ship Types 1978–1993	Ship Types Added April 1993	Ship Types Added When Combat Exclusion Was Repealed	Ship Types Still Closed
Tenders (AD, AS, AR)	Fast Combat Support Ships (AOE)	Cruiser (CG)	Submarines (SSBN/SSN)
Salvage Ships (ARS)	Replenishment Oilers (AOR)	Destroyers ^a (DD/DDG)	Mine Counter- measure Ships (MCM)
Frigates (Training) (FFT)	Amphibious Command Ships (LCC)	Frigates ^a (FF/FFG)	Mine Hunter Craft (MHC)
Hospital Ships (AH)	Auxiliary Command Ships (AGF)	Amphibious Warfare Ships ^a (LHA/LHD/LPD/LS D/LST)	Patrol Craft (PC)
Fleet Oilers (AO)	Fleet Staffs (2,3,7)	Mine Countermeasure Command and Control Ship (MCS)	
Combat Stores Ships (AFS)		Aircraft Carriers (CV/CVN)	
Military Sealift Command Ships (USNS)			

^aSome ships were not included in the embarkation plan because of the cost of the modification, low number of accommodations resulting for women and/or planned decommissioning. No FF/FFG were planned for gender integration.

Table B.11
Summary of Aviation Assignments Available to Women

Prior to April 1993	April 1993	Combat Exclusion Repealed
Officers	Officers	Officers
FY 92 Defense Authorization allowed women aviation officers as part of air element	No restrictions on women aviators Gender neutral accession and pipeline selection	No restrictions, may assign to any type squadron, embarked in any type ship
DOD policy continued to restrict women from combat roles	Aviation ground officers still restricted from embarking in combatants	
Enlisted	Enlisted	Enlisted
Aviation enlisted may forward deploy to shore station but excluded by law from embarking in combatants	Enlisted aircrew in Maritime Patrol (VP) Still restricted from embarking in combatants	All positions available
No combat aircrew		

NOTE: Excerpted from Navy briefing "U.S. Navy Policy on the Assignment of Women," October 1996.

Table B.12
Gender-Integrated Navy Combatant Ships

Ship Identification			Female			Male			Percentage Female		
Class	ID	Name	Enl	Off	Total	Enl	Off	Total	Enl	Off	Total
CG	72	VELLA GULF	36	9	45	308	23	331	10	28	12
CG	73	PORT ROYAL	31	5	36	304	23	327	9	18	10
CV	63	KITTY HAWK	48	11	59	2,556	135	2,691	2	8	2
CV	64	CONSTELLATION	0	11	11	2,617	141	2,758	0	7	0
CV	65	JF KENNEDY	312	15	327	2,221	134	2,355	12	10	12
CVN	65	ENTERPRISE	0	5	5	2,981	161	3,142	0	3	0
CVN	68	NIMITZ	233	19	252	2,395	132	2,527	9	13	9
CVN	69	EISENHOWER	335	18	353	2,373	139	2,512	12	11	12
CVN	70	VINSON	0	3	3	2,703	153	2,856	0	2	0
CVN	71	T ROOSEVELT	251	6	257	2,547	157	2,704	9	4	9
CVN	72	LINCOLN	278	16	294	2,259	145	2,404	11	10	11
CVN	73	G WASHINGTON	0	5	5	2,857	161	3,018	0	3	0
CVN	74	J STENNIS	277	18	295	2,563	149	2,712	10	11	10
CVN	75	H TRUMAN	111	2	113	442	61	503	20	3	18
DD	964	P FOSTER	28	6	34	273	16	289	9	27	11
DD	965	KINKAID	44	6	50	240	19	259	15	24	16
DD	971	D R RAY	32	6	38	254	19	273	11	24	12
DD	972	OLDENDORF	44	5	49	287	16	303	13	24	14
DD	973	J YOUNG	19	4	23	287	22	309	6	15	7
DD	977	BRISCOE	34	6	40	259	16	275	12	27	13
DD	978	STUMP	54	7	61	235	15	250	19	32	20
DD	980	MOOSEBRUGGER	16	8	24	274	15	289	6	35	8
DD	981	J HANCOCK	30	1	31	250	25	275	11	4	10
DD	987	OBANNON	45	9	54	243	17	260	16	35	17

Table B.12 (continued)

Ship Identification			Female			Male			Percentage Female		
Class	ID	Name	Enl	Off	Total	Enl	Off	Total	Enl	Off	Total
DD	992	FLETCHER	36	7	43	274	17	291	12	29	13
DD	997	HAYLER	35	7	42	260	18	278	12	28	13
DDG	52	BARRY	19	6	25	261	17	278	7	26	8
DDG	54	CWILBUR	20	2	22	234	19	253	8	10	8
DDG	58	LABOON	21	6	27	264	21	285	7	22	9
DDG	65	BENFOLD	32	6	38	253	21	274	11	22	12
DDG	68	SULLIVANS	36	5	41	249	20	269	13	20	13
DDG	69	MILIUS	36	3	39	251	19	270	13	14	13
DDG	70	HOPPER	16	4	20	138	16	154	10	20	11
DDG	71	ROSS	20	3	23	119	14	133	14	18	15
DDG	72	MAHAN	8	3	11	29	6	35	22	33	24
DDG	73	DECATUR	1	0	1	7	0	7	13	0	13
DDG	74	MCFAUL	2	0	2	19	2	21	10	0	9
LHA	1	TARAWA	0	11	11	951	48	999	0	19	1
LHA	2	SAIPAN	0	8	8	967	55	1,022	0	13	1
LHA	3	BELLEAU WOODS	0	8	8	985	50	1,035	0	14	1
LHA	4	NASSAU	0	7	7	947	53	1,000	0	12	1
LHA	5	PELELIU	0	9	9	970	54	1,024	0	14	1
LHD	1	WASP	156	11	167	868	54	922	15	17	15
LHD	2	ESSEX	0	16	16	1,044	59	1,103	0	21	1
LHD	3	KEARSARGE	0	8	8	1,040	58	1,098	0	12	1
LHD	4	BOXER	48	9	57	969	59	1,028	5	13	5
LHD	5	BATAAN	65	5	70	176	27	203	27	16	26
LHD	6	BONHOMME RICHARD	2	3	5	1	1	2	67	0	50

Table B.12 (continued)

Ship Identification			Female			Male			Percentage Female		
Class	ID	Name	Enl	Off	Total	Enl	Off	Total	Enl	Off	Total
LPH	9	GUAM	0	1	1	648	54	702	0	2	0
LSD	39	MT VERNON	0	2	2	289	20	309	0	9	1
LSD	41	WIDBEY ISLAND	28	3	31	270	22	292	9	12	10
LSD	42	GERMANTOWN	26	5	31	254	15	269	9	25	10
LSD	43	FT MCHENRY	29	6	35	186	18	204	13	25	15
LSD	44	GUNSTON HALL	50	6	56	239	18	257	17	25	18
LSD	45	COMSTOCK	63	6	69	245	17	262	20	26	21
LSD	46	TORTUGA	28	5	33	242	17	259	10	23	11
LSD	47	RUSMORE	0	6	6	283	18	301	0	25	2
LSD	48	ASHLAND	26	7	33	248	16	264	9	30	11
LSD	50	CARTER HALL	0	2	2	331	19	350	0	10	1
LST	1184	FREDERICK	2	2	4	86	15	101	2	13	4
MCS	12	INCHON	94	1	95	546	45	591	15	2	14
TOTALS			3,157	400	3,557	46,871	2,893	49,767	6	12	7

NOTE: Data provided by service. Updated 30 April 1997.

Table B.13
Ships Scheduled for Gender Integration, FY98-FY03

Type Ship	No. Still Scheduled for Integration	Female Bunks/Billets		
		Off	CPO	Enl
Carrier (CVN)	2	— ^a	60	500
Cruiser (CG)	8	— ^a	48	264
Destroyer (DD/DDG)	15	— ^a	38	578
Amphibious Warfare Ships (LHA/LHD/ LPD/LSD/LST)	10	— ^a	53	1,116
Total	35	— ^a	199	2,458

NOTE: Data provided by service.

^aNo restrictions.

Table B.14
**Enlisted Navy Women in Traditional and
 Nontraditional Occupations**

Rating Category	% Women in Category	Number of Women	Distrib of Women (%)
Unrated	17.5	9,788	21.0
Traditional			
Administrative	20.9	15,023	32.3
Medical/Dental	25.5	7,497	16.1
Total Traditional		22,520	
Nontraditional			
Aviation	9.2	6,594	14.2
Construction	6.2	562	1.2
Deck	6.5	2,259	4.9
Electronics	5.3	985	2.1
Engineering	5.1	3,103	6.7
Misc (DM,LL,MU)	17.0	216	0.5
Ordnance	2.8	478	1.0
Total Nontraditional		14,197	

NOTE: Excerpted from Navy briefing "U.S. Navy Policy on the Assignment of Women," October 1996.

MARINE CORPS

Table B.15 provides the justification for opening 33 previously closed occupations and nine previously closed units, including the command, aviation combat, and combat service support elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit deployed aboard amphibious ships. The justification codes used in the tables are

- 1 = Clearly direct ground combat
- 2 = Units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collocate and remain with direct ground combat units that are closed to women
- 3 = Units are engaged in long range reconnaissance operations and Special Operations Force missions
- 4 = Repeal of Title 10, Section 6015 (Duty on Combat Vessels/Aircraft Now Open to Women)
- 5 = Does not meet the definition of direct ground combat.

The occupations newly opened to female Marines and the number of women in these occupations from FY 93 to FY 96 are shown below in Table B.17.

Table B.15

Newly Opened Marine Corps Units and Positions

Unit or Position	Justification
MEU Command Element	4,5
HQ&SVC, Combat Support Group, 3D MARDIV	5
Marine Helo Light Attack (HML/A) Squadron	4,5
Marine Helo Med (HMM) Squadron	4,5
Marine Helo Experimental (HMX) Squadron	4,5
Marine Helo Hvy (HMH) Squadron	4,5
Marine Fixed Wing Attack (VMA) Squadron	4,5
Marine Air Support Squadron (MASS)	4,5
MEU Service Support Group	4
8153 Marine Corps Security Force Cadre Trainer	5

Table B.16

Marine Corps Units and Positions That Remain Closed

Unit or Position	Justification
Force Recon Company	1,3
ANGLICO	1
SCAMP	2
Counter Intel Team	2,3
Interrogation Platoon	2,3
Infantry Regt and Below	1
Artillery Bn and Below	1,2
Combat Engr Bn and Below	2
Tank Bn and Below	1
Assault Amphibian Bn and Below	1
Light Armored Recon Bn and Below	1
Combat Support Co, 3D MAR	1
DET, H&S Co, 3D MAR	1
Riverine Assault Craft Unit	1
Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD) Bn	2
8152 Marine Corps Security Force Guard	1
8154 Marine Corps Security Force Close Quarter Battle TM Member	1
Two Infantry Line Cos, Marine Barracks 8th and I	1 ^a
Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security TM Co	1
Marine Security Guard Posts in Beijing, China; St. Petersburg, Russia; Paris, France; Rome, Italy; Asunción, Paraguay; Sanaay, Yemen; Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dhahran, Saudi Arabia	See below ^b

^aInfantry companies on ceremonial duty, all infantry MOS

^b121 posts are currently open. Beijing, St. Petersburg, Paris, Rome, and Asunción remain closed by the Department of State based on available facilities. The remaining four posts are closed due to cultural acceptance by the host nation.

Table B.17
Newly Opened Marine Corps Occupations

Occupation			Fiscal Year			
Field	Code	Description	93	94	95	96
Logistics	0430	Embarkation Officer	0	0	0	1
	0451	Air Delivery Specialist	0	0	2	2
	0481	Landing Support Specialist	0	0	7	18
Engineer, Construction, Facilities, and Equipment	1302	Engineer Officer	0	0	1	5
	1371	Combat Engineer	0	0	9	28
Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance Disposal	2305	Explosive Ordnance Disposal	0	0	0	0
	2336	Explosive Ordnance Tech	0	0	0	0
Aircraft Maintenance	6015	Aircraft Mechanic, AV-8	0	1		7
	6038	Maint Specialist, AV-8	0	0	0	0
	6055	Aircraft Hydraulic Pneumatic Mech, AV-8	4	1	1	0
	6111	Helo Mech Trainee	0	3	11	9
	6112	Helo Mech, CH-46	0	0	9	13
	6113	Helo Mech, CH-53	0	0	3	7
	6114	Helo Mech, U/AH-1	0	0	1	4
	6115	Helo Mech, MV-22	0	0	0	0
	6119	Helo Maint Chief	0	0	0	0
	6125	Helo Power Plants Mech, MV-22	0	0	0	0
	6135	Aircraft Power Plants Test Cell Operation, Rotary Wing	0	0	0	0
	6151	Helo Airframe Mech Trainee	0	0	0	1
	6154	Helo Airframe Mech, U/AH-1	2	0	0	0
	6155	Helo Airframe Mech, MV-22	0	0	0	0
	6162	Presidential Spt Specialist	0	0	0	0
	6172	Helo Crew Chief, CH-46	0	0	0	2
	6173	Helo Crew Chief, CH-53	0	0	1	0
	6174	Helo Crew Chief, UH-1N	0	0	0	2
	6175	Helo Crew Chief, MV-22	0	0	0	0

Table B.17 (continued)

Occupation		Description	Fiscal Year			
Field	Code		93	94	95	96
Avionics	6315	Aircraft Comm, Nav Sys Tech, AV-8	0	0	0	1
	6322	Aircraft Comm, Nav Elec Sys Tech, CH-46	1	1	1	5
	6323	Aircraft Comm, Nav Elec Sys Tech, CH-53	3	3	5	7
	6324	Aircraft Comm, Nav Elec, Wpns Sys Tech, U/AH-1	2	2	2	11
	6335	Aircraft Elec Sys Tech, AV-8	0	1	3	3
Air Control/Air Support/AntiAir Warfare/Air Traffic Control	7208	Air Spt Control Officer	0	0	0	2
	7242	Air Spt Ops Operator	0	0	5	21
Pilots/Naval Flight Officers	7500	Pilots/Naval Flight Officers	0	10	11	29
Total			12	22	74	178

Appendix C

DEMOGRAPHICS OF POPULATION STUDIED

All the participants were active-duty personnel; 73.1 percent (or 683) of the study participants were male, and 26.9 percent (or 251) of the participants were female. Table C.1 indicates the total number of individuals that participated in the study and the representation by each service. The average percentages of unit personnel who participated in the study are shown in Table C.2. Table C.3 indicates the racial demographics of study participants, the majority of whom are white.

Table C.1
Number of Individuals That Participated in
Focus Groups and/or Written Survey

	Percentage of Study Population	Total
Army	20.8	195
Marine Corps	21.6	202
Navy Aviation	12.9	121
Navy Ships	44.7	418
Total	100.0	934

Table C.2
Percentage of Unit That Participated in Focus
Groups and/or Written Survey

	E1-E4		E5-E6		E7-E9		Officers	
	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)	Male (%)	Female (%)
Army Units	23	43	20	44	25	67	21	0 ^a
Marine Corps Units	32	54	44	83	62	0 ^a	58	80
Large Ship(s) ^b	3	29	4	39	7	56	8	46
Small Ship(s)	36	78	42	64	29	100	27	100
Naval Aviation Units	7	38	8	58	30	50	12	60

^aThere were very few Marine women in these pay grades, and they were not available.

^bUnit for ships is taken to be the entire ship, so the measurement of sample size appears very different.

Table C.3
Racial Demographics
of Study Participants

Race	Percentage of Participants
White	62.0
Black	18.8
Hispanic	9.8
Other	9.3
Total	100.0

Appendix D

MEN'S QUESTIONNAIRE

This appendix contains the men's questionnaire. The original was printed in an 8-1/2- by 11-inch format. Although greatly reduced, this representation otherwise proportionally preserves the amount of white space and the font in the original questionnaire.

MEN'S VERSION

**SURVEY TO SUPPORT THE STUDY OF
"INTEGRATING WOMEN INTO PREVIOUSLY CLOSED
MILITARY OCCUPATIONS"**

Providing information on this survey is voluntary. There is no penalty if you choose not to respond. However, maximum participation is encouraged so that the data will be complete and representative. Your survey instrument will be treated as confidential. Identifying information will be used only by persons engaged in, and for the purposes of, the survey. Only group statistics will be reported.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

1. How did you end up in this occupation/career field?

1. I was recruited for it.
2. I volunteered for it, and it was my first choice.
3. I volunteered for it, but it wasn't my first choice
4. I was assigned to it/it was the only job open to me.

2. Were you interested in serving in this occupation/career field?

1. Yes
2. No
3. I didn't care

3. If yes, why? (Circle only the most important one please)

1. Pay/enlistment bonus
2. Learn these job skills
3. Thought it would be a promising career track
4. Wanted to continue a family tradition in this field
5. Thought this job would be more challenging than others.
6. Other _____

4. What are your future plans?

1. I would like to stay in the service in this occupation/career field.
2. I would like to stay in the service but transfer into a different occupation/career field.
3. I would like to leave the service.

5. Has serving in this unit made you more or less interested in staying in the military?

1. It has made me more interested in staying in.
2. It has made little difference.
3. It has made me less interested in staying in.

6. How do you rank your overall work performance compared to the others that you work with?

1. Top 15%
2. Above average
3. Average
4. Below average
5. Bottom 15%

7. How do you think your peers would rank your overall work performance?

1. Top 15%
2. Above average
3. Average
4. Below average
5. Bottom 15%

8. Which of the following best describes your attitude toward your unit and its mission?

1. I am very proud of what my unit does and I feel honored to be a part of it.
2. I like what my unit does and I enjoy being a part of it.
3. I am indifferent to what my unit does; I can take it or leave it.
4. I don't like what my unit does and I would rather not be part of it.
5. I intensely dislike what my unit does and I don't want any part of it.

9. How would you rate the morale of your unit?

1. High
2. Medium
3. Low

10. Why do you think your morale and your unit's morale is the way it is?

11. How would you rate your readiness for a combat mission?

1. High
2. Medium
3. Low

12. How would you rate your unit's readiness for a combat mission?

1. High
2. Medium
3. Low

13. Why do you think your readiness and your unit's readiness is the way it is?

14. Which of the following describes how you feel about your coworkers?
(Circle all that apply.)

- a. I believe that I can trust and depend on my coworkers.
- b. I believe that my coworkers and I communicate well.
- c. I believe that my coworkers and I work well together.
- d. I believe that my coworkers and I would respond well to a crisis.

15. How would you describe the cohesiveness of your unit?

- 1. We are a very cohesive group
- 2. We are a loosely cohesive group
- 3. We are divided into conflicting groups

16. Why do you think your unit's cohesiveness is the way it is?

How do you feel about the possibility of women serving in the following units?

	These units should remain closed to women.	Qualified women should be allowed to volunteer for these units.	Qualified women should be assigned to these units the same way men are.
17. Infantry	1	2	3
18. Armor	1	2	3
19. Submarines	1	2	3
20. Special Forces	1	2	3

21. Which one of these three options comes closest to your own opinion?

- 1. I am satisfied with the present military regulations that exclude women from certain direct combat roles
- 2. I think that women who want to volunteer for the combat arms should be allowed to do so
- 3. I think that women should be treated exactly like men and serve in the combat arms just like men

138 New Opportunities for Women

22. Do you think men and women should be segregated during basic training, or integrated?

1. Segregated for both enlisted and officers
2. Segregated for enlisted, but integrated for officers
3. Integrated for enlisted, but segregated for officers
4. Integrated for both enlisted and officers

23. When women are integrated into previously all-male units, how should they be assigned?

1. We should try to assign women evenly across all the units.
2. We should try to assign women only to some units so there will be more of them at each site.
3. We shouldn't pay attention to gender when assigning women to previously all-male units.

24. Do you believe you or your male coworkers treat the women in your unit any differently because they are women?

1. Yes
2. No

25. Do you believe the commander of this unit treats the women any differently because they are women?

1. Yes
2. No

26. If you believe women have been treated differently, how have they been treated differently? (Circle all that apply)

- a. Women have received more mentoring/instruction/support than the men.
- b. Women have received less mentoring/instruction/support than the men.
- c. Women have been given more of the "dirty work."
- d. Women have been given less of the "dirty work."
- e. Others pay more attention to women/single them out.
- f. Others pay less attention to women/ignore them.
- g. Women have been teased or harassed because they are women.
- h. More is expected of women than the men.
- i. Less is expected of women than the men.
- j. Women tend to get better assignments than the men.
- k. Women tend to get worse assignments than the men.
- l. Women tend to receive overly positive work evaluations
- m. Women tend to receive overly negative work evaluations
- n. Women have a better chance of being selected for promotion than the men.
- o. Women have a worse chance of being selected for promotion than the men.

27. Do you think the women have been sexually harassed since they arrived at this unit? By sexual harassment, we mean unwanted sexually-oriented comments, advances, or touching.

1. No
2. Yes, but rarely
3. Yes, sometimes
4. Yes, frequently

28. If so, do you think they report it?

1. Yes
2. No

If a woman in your unit were being sexually harassed and she reported it, what do you think would happen...

29. ...with her complaint?

1. No action would be taken.
2. It would take a long time to handle the complaint.
3. The complaint would be dealt with quickly.

30. ...with the harassment?

1. The harassment would stop.
2. The harassment would decrease.
3. The harassment would not change.
4. The harassment would increase.

31. ...to the harasser?

1. The harasser would be properly disciplined.
2. The harasser would receive more punishment than is fair.
3. The harasser would receive too little punishment.
4. The harasser would receive no punishment at all.

32. ...in a case where it was one person's word against another?

1. The woman would probably be believed over the man.
2. The man would probably be believed over the woman.
3. The higher-ranking person would probably be believed.
4. The lower-ranking person would probably be believed.
5. No one is more likely to be believed

140 New Opportunities for Women

33. If you yourself were being sexually harassed, who would you be more comfortable reporting it to?

1. A woman in my chain of command
2. A man in my chain of command
3. A woman outside of my chain of command
4. A man outside of my chain of command
5. It makes no difference

34. Does the proportion of women to men at work matter to you?

1. No, it doesn't matter
2. Yes, I prefer to work mostly with men.
3. Yes, I prefer to work where the ratio of men to women is about the same.
4. Yes, I prefer to work mostly with women.

35. Prior to this assignment, which of the following have you worked with?
(Circle all that apply.)

- a. a woman superior
- b. women coworkers
- c. women subordinates

36. Do you think women should be allowed to serve in your occupation/career field?

1. Yes
2. No

37. Are you worried about how to conduct yourself around the women in your unit?

1. No
2. Yes, a little worried
3. Yes, somewhat worried
4. Yes, very worried

38. How would you rank the women in your unit?

1. They tend to perform better than the men
2. They tend to perform in the same range as men do
3. They tend to perform worse than the men
4. I don't know: I don't really have much interaction with them

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

39. Which of the armed services are you a member?

1. Army
2. Navy
3. Air Force
4. Marines

40. What is your grade?

- | | |
|---------------|--------------------|
| 1. E-1 to E-3 | 6. Warrant officer |
| 2. E-4 | 7. O-1 to O-2 |
| 3. E-5 | 8. O-3 |
| 4. E-6 | 9. O-4 |
| 5. E-7 to E-9 | 10. O-5 and above |

41. What category does your occupation or career field fall into?

0. **Infantry, Gun Crews and Allied Specialists**, including armor and amphibious, combat engineering, combat air crew and military police
1. **Electronic Equipment Repair**
2. **Communications and Intelligence Specialists**
3. **Medical and Dental Specialists**
4. **Other Technical and Allied Specialists**, including photography, drafting, surveying, mapping, weather, ordinance disposal and diving, scientific and engineering aides, musicians
5. **Administrative Specialists and Clerks**
6. **Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repair**
7. **Craftsworker** including metalworking, construction, utilities, lithography, gas and fuel production, fabric, leather and rubber repair, marine operating crafts, fire fighting and damage control
8. **Service and Supply Handlers**, including food service, motor transport, material receipt, forward area equipment support

42. What is your job title?

(please write out a title, such as F-15 pilot, truck mechanic, or cook, rather than giving a skill code such as "11B")

43. How long have you been in your current occupation/career field?

_____ year(s) and _____ month(s)

44. How long have you been in your current unit?

_____ year(s) and _____ month(s)

45. Are you (mark only one)

1. Hispanic
2. Black
3. White
4. Other

46. What is the highest grade of regular school that you have completed?

1. High school, but not a graduate
2. High school diploma or GED
3. Associate's or other two year degree
4. Bachelor's degree
5. Graduate study or graduate degree

47. What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

48. What is your family status?

1. Never married, no children
2. Married but no children
3. Never married, with children
4. Married, with children
5. Divorced or separated, no children
6. Divorced or separated, with children

Men's Questionnaire 143

49. If you are currently married, is your spouse

1. On active military duty?
2. A civilian, but formerly in the military?
3. A civilian, never in the military?
4. N/A I am single

50. If you are currently married does your spouse...

1. Work full-time?
2. Work part-time?
3. Stay home full-time?
4. N/A I am single

51. Which of your family members are or were in the military? (Circle all that apply)

- a. Father
- b. Mother
- c. Brother(s)
- d. Sister(s)
- e. Son(s)
- f. Daughter(s)
- g. Other
- h. None of my family are in the military

52. If one or both of your parents were in the military, which of the following are true? (circle all that apply)

- a. Father career enlisted
- b. Father short term enlisted
- c. Father career officer
- d. Father short term officer
- e. Mother career enlisted
- f. Mother short term enlisted
- g. Mother career officer
- h. Mother short term officer
- i. Neither of my parents served in the military

53. Have you served in any recent U.S. operations? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ Operation Just Cause in Panama
- ☐ Operations Desert Storm/Shield
- ☐ Operation Joint Task Force Hurricane Andrew in Florida
- ☐ Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
- ☐ Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia
- ☐ Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti
- ☐ Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia
- ☐ Other _____

144 New Opportunities for Women

54. Would you like to stay in the military until retirement?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Not sure

55. Is there anything on the topic of women serving in your unit that you would feel uncomfortable saying in front of other service members or to the research interviewers?

1. Yes
2. No

If yes, which issues or opinions would you feel uncomfortable discussing?

Thank you for completing this survey. If there are any other comments you would like to make or any other issues you would like to bring up, please feel free to write about them below.

Appendix E

WOMEN'S QUESTIONNAIRE

This appendix contains the women's questionnaire. The original was printed in an 8-1/2- by 11-inch format. Although greatly reduced, this representation otherwise proportionally preserves the amount of white space and the font in the original questionnaire.

WOMEN'S VERSION

**SURVEY TO SUPPORT THE STUDY OF
"INTEGRATING WOMEN INTO PREVIOUSLY CLOSED
MILITARY OCCUPATIONS"**

Providing information on this survey is voluntary. There is no penalty if you choose not to respond. However, maximum participation is encouraged so that the data will be complete and representative. Your survey instrument will be treated as confidential. Identifying information will be used only by persons engaged in, and for the purposes of, the survey. Only group statistics will be reported.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION

Women's Questionnaire 147

1. How did you end up in this occupation/career field?

1. I was recruited for it.
2. I volunteered for it, and it was my first choice.
3. I volunteered for it, but it wasn't my first choice
4. I was assigned to it/it was the only job open to me.

2. Were you interested in serving in this occupation/career field?

1. Yes
2. No
3. I didn't care

3. If yes, why? (Circle only the most important one please)

1. Pay/enlistment bonus
2. Learn these job skills
3. Thought it would be a promising career track
4. Wanted to continue a family tradition in this field
5. Thought this job would be more challenging than others.
6. Other _____

4. What are your future plans?

1. I would like to stay in the service in this occupation/career field.
2. I would like to stay in the service but transfer into a different occupation/career field.
3. I would like to leave the service.

5. Has serving in this unit made you more or less interested in staying in the military?

1. It has made me more interested in staying in.
2. It has made little difference.
3. It has made me less interested in staying in.

6. How do you rank your overall work performance compared to the others that you work with?

1. Top 15%
2. Above average
3. Average
4. Below average
5. Bottom 15%

7. How do you think your peers would rank your overall work performance?

1. Top 15%
2. Above average
3. Average
4. Below average
5. Bottom 15%

8. Which of the following best describes your attitude toward your unit and its mission?

1. I am very proud of what my unit does and I feel honored to be a part of it.
2. I like what my unit does and I enjoy being a part of it.
3. I am indifferent to what my unit does; I can take it or leave it.
4. I don't like what my unit does and I would rather not be part of it.
5. I intensely dislike what my unit does and I don't want any part of it.

9. How would you rate the morale of your unit?

1. High
2. Medium
3. Low

10. Why do you think your morale and your unit's morale is the way it is?

11. How would you rate your readiness for a combat mission?

1. High
2. Medium
3. Low

12. How would you rate your unit's readiness for a combat mission?

1. High
2. Medium
3. Low

13. Why do you think your readiness and your unit's readiness is the way it is?

14. Which of the following describes how you feel about your coworkers?
(Circle all that apply.)

- a. I believe that I can trust and depend on my coworkers.
- b. I believe that my coworkers and I communicate well.
- c. I believe that my coworkers and I work well together.
- d. I believe that my coworkers and I would respond well to a crisis.

15. How would you describe the cohesiveness of your unit?

- 1. We are a very cohesive group
- 2. We are a loosely cohesive group
- 3. We are divided into conflicting groups

16. Why do you think your unit's cohesiveness is the way it is?

How do you feel about the possibility of women serving in the following units?

	These units should remain closed to women.	Qualified women should be allowed to volunteer for these units.	Qualified women should be assigned to these units the same way men are.
17. Infantry	1	2	3
18. Armor	1	2	3
19. Submarines	1	2	3
20. Special Forces	1	2	3

21. Which one of these three options comes closest to your own opinion?

- 1. I am satisfied with the present military regulations that exclude women from certain direct combat roles
- 2. I think that women who want to volunteer for the combat arms should be allowed to do so
- 3. I think that women should be treated exactly like men and serve in the combat arms just like men

150 New Opportunities for Women

22. Do you think men and women should be segregated during basic training, or integrated?

1. Segregated for both enlisted and officers
2. Segregated for enlisted, but integrated for officers
3. Integrated for enlisted, but segregated for officers
4. Integrated for both enlisted and officers

23. When women are integrated into previously all-male units, how should they be assigned?

1. We should try to assign women evenly across all the units.
2. We should try to assign women only to some units so there will be more of them at each site.
3. We shouldn't pay attention to gender when assigning women to previously all-male units.

24. Do you believe you have been treated differently by your coworkers in this unit because you are a woman?

1. Yes
2. No

25. Do you believe you have been treated differently by the commander of your unit because you are a woman?

1. Yes
2. No

26. If you believe you have been treated differently, how have you been treated differently? (Circle all that apply)

- a. I have received more mentoring/instruction/support than the men.
- b. I have received less mentoring/instruction/support than the men.
- c. I have been given more of the "dirty work."
- d. I have been given less of the "dirty work."
- e. Others pay more attention to me/single me out.
- f. Others pay less attention to me/ignore me.
- g. I have been teased or harassed because I am a woman.
- h. More is expected of me than the men.
- i. Less is expected of me than the men.
- j. I tend to get better assignments than the men.
- k. I tend to get worse assignments than the men.
- l. I tend to receive overly positive work evaluations
- m. I tend to receive overly negative work evaluations
- n. I have a better chance of being selected for promotion than the men.
- o. I have a worse chance of being selected for promotion than the men.

27. Have you been sexually harassed since you arrived at this unit?
By sexual harassment, we mean unwanted sexually-oriented comments, advances, or touching.

1. No
2. Yes, but rarely
3. Yes, sometimes
4. Yes, frequently

28. If so, did you report it?

1. Yes
2. No

If you were being sexually harassed and you reported it, what do you think would happen...

29. ...with your complaint?

1. No action would be taken.
2. It would take a long time to handle the complaint.
3. The complaint would be dealt with quickly.

30. ...with the harassment?

1. The harassment would stop.
2. The harassment would decrease.
3. The harassment would not change.
4. The harassment would increase.

31. ...to the harasser?

1. The harasser would be properly disciplined.
2. The harasser would receive more punishment than is fair.
3. The harasser would receive too little punishment.
4. The harasser would receive no punishment at all.

32. ...in a case where it was one person's word against another?

1. The woman would probably be believed over the man.
2. The man would probably be believed over the woman.
3. The higher-ranking person would probably be believed.
4. The lower-ranking person would probably be believed.
5. No one is more likely to be believed

33. If you were being sexually harassed, who would you be more comfortable reporting it to?

1. A woman in my chain of command
2. A man in my chain of command
3. A woman outside of my chain of command
4. A man outside of my chain of command
5. It makes no difference

34. Does the proportion of women to men at work matter to you?

1. No, it doesn't matter
2. Yes, I prefer to work mostly with men.
3. Yes, I prefer to work where the ratio of men to women is about the same.
4. Yes, I prefer to work mostly with women.

35. Prior to this assignment, which of the following have you worked with?
(Circle all that apply.)

- a. a woman superior
- b. women coworkers
- c. women subordinates

36. Do your male coworkers seem to think that women should be allowed to serve in your occupation/career field?

1. Most seem to think women should be allowed to serve in my occupation.
2. Some think that women should be allowed, others do not.
3. Most seem to think women should not be allowed to serve in my occupation.
4. I can't really tell what they think.

37. Do the men in your unit seem worried about how to conduct themselves around the women?

1. No
2. Yes, a little worried
3. Yes, somewhat worried
4. Yes, very worried

38. How would you rank the other women in your unit?

1. They tend to perform better than the men
2. They tend to perform in the same range as men do
3. They tend to perform worse than the men
4. I don't know: I don't really have much interaction with them

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

39. Which of the armed services are you a member?

1. Army
2. Navy
3. Air Force
4. Marines

40. What is your grade?

- | | |
|---------------|--------------------|
| 1. E-1 to E-3 | 6. Warrant officer |
| 2. E-4 | 7. O-1 to O-2 |
| 3. E-5 | 8. O-3 |
| 4. E-6 | 9. O-4 |
| 5. E-7 to E-9 | 10. O-5 and above |

41. What category does your occupation or career field fall into?

0. **Infantry, Gun Crews and Allied Specialists**, including armor and amphibious, combat engineering, combat air crew and military police
1. **Electronic Equipment Repair**
2. **Communications and Intelligence Specialists**
3. **Medical and Dental Specialists**
4. **Other Technical and Allied Specialists**, including photography, drafting, surveying, mapping, weather, ordinance disposal and diving, scientific and engineering aides, musicians
5. **Administrative Specialists and Clerks**
6. **Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repair**
7. **Craftsworker** including metalworking, construction, utilities, lithography, gas and fuel production, fabric, leather and rubber repair, marine operating crafts, fire fighting and damage control
8. **Service and Supply Handlers**, including food service, motor transport, material receipt, forward area equipment support

42. What is your job title?
(please write out a title, such as F-15 pilot, truck mechanic, or cook,
rather than giving a skill code such as "11B")

43. How long have you been in your current occupation/career field?

_____ year(s) and _____ month(s)

44. How long have you been in your current unit?

_____ year(s) and _____ month(s)

45. Are you (mark only one)

1. Hispanic
2. Black
3. White
4. Other

46. What is the highest grade of regular school that you have completed?

1. High school, but not a graduate
2. High school diploma or GED
3. Associate's or other two year degree
4. Bachelor's degree
5. Graduate study or graduate degree

47. What is your gender?

1. Male
2. Female

48. What is your family status?

1. Never married, no children
2. Married but no children
3. Never married, with children
4. Married, with children
5. Divorced or separated, no children
6. Divorced or separated, with children

49. If you are currently married, is your spouse

1. On active military duty?
2. A civilian, but formerly in the military?
3. A civilian, never in the military?
4. N/A I am single

50. If you are currently married does your spouse...

1. Work full-time?
2. Work part-time?
3. Stay home full-time?
4. N/A I am single

51. Which of your family members are or were in the military? (Circle all that apply)

- a. Father
- b. Mother
- c. Brother(s)
- d. Sister(s)
- e. Son(s)
- f. Daughter(s)
- g. Other
- h. None of my family are in the military

52. If one or both of your parents were in the military, which of the following are true? (circle all that apply)

- a. Father career enlisted
- b. Father short term enlisted
- c. Father career officer
- d. Father short term officer
- e. Mother career enlisted
- f. Mother short term enlisted
- g. Mother career officer
- h. Mother short term officer
- i. Neither of my parents served in the military

53. Have you served in any recent U.S. operations? (Check all that apply.)

- ☐ Operation Just Cause in Panama
- ☐ Operations Desert Storm/Shield
- ☐ Operation Joint Task Force Hurricane Andrew in Florida
- ☐ Operation Restore Hope in Somalia
- ☐ Operation Able Sentry in Macedonia
- ☐ Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti
- ☐ Operation Joint Endeavor in Bosnia
- ☐ Other _____

54. Would you like to stay in the military until retirement?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Not sure

55. Is there anything on the topic of women serving in your unit that you would feel uncomfortable saying in front of other service members or to the research interviewers?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

If yes, which issues or opinions would you feel uncomfortable discussing?

Thank you for completing this survey. If there are any other comments you would like to make or any other issues you would like to bring up, please feel free to write about them below.

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